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Abstract
Background: While economic insecurity adversely affects the well-being of sex workers, few studies
examine economic interventions in this community. Extant interventions employ microfinance
approaches and are limited in scope, scale, and sustainability. Critiques of microfinance initiatives
highlight their inability to achieve economic and gender empowerment. Moreover, microfinance
interventions among sex workers often fail to address structural causes of economic disempowerment,
and do not increase economic agency. This dissertation examines an alternative economic intervention:
the Usha Multi-purpose Cooperative Society (Usha), a bank operated by a sex workerâ??s union in
Kolkata, India. Examining the organizational structure, culture, and operations of the bank I explore the
manner in which Usha addresses the critiques aimed at microfinance initiatives, and the manner in which
it cultivates economic and political agency in the sex work community.
Methods: Utilizing a mixed-methods case study design, I conducted 80 semi-structured interviews with
Usha members (n=60) and staff (n=20), participant observation and document analysis. Additionally, I
conducted quantitative analyses of the bankâ??s administrative database (N=14,382). Modified grounded
theory and regression models were utilized to analyze the qualitative and quantitative data, respectively.
Results: Usha facilitates empowerment through two intersecting operational approaches: its interventions
operate at the individual and community levels, while targeting logistical as well as political outcomes.
Specifically, Usha offers individual logistical financial support to sex workers through savings and loans
programs which reverse predatory practices used by other microfinance initiatives. Community-level
logistical financial support is provided by investing in businesses and social programs which benefit the
sex worker community. Usha fosters individual sex worker political agency by supporting professional
identity, independent decision-making, and sex worker leadership. Community-level political agency is
developed by undermining the influence of financially coercive community power-brokers such as
madams and pimps, providing labor protections, and facilitating access to civil society institutions.
Conclusion: Usha challenges neoliberal approaches that attribute poverty to individual shortcomings, and
resists the neocolonial framing of sex workers as victims. These results advance our understanding of
how microfinance interventions can support social movements and effect structural change.
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ABSTRACT
SHORT-CIRCUITING NEOLIBERAL DEVELOPMENT: THE CASE OF THE USHA
MULTI-PURPOSE COOPERATIVE
Megan Stanton
Toorjo Ghose, Ph.D.
Background: While economic insecurity adversely affects the well-being of sex workers,
few studies examine economic interventions in this community. Extant interventions
employ microfinance approaches and are limited in scope, scale, and sustainability.
Critiques of microfinance initiatives highlight their inability to achieve economic and
gender empowerment. Moreover, microfinance interventions among sex workers often
fail to address structural causes of economic disempowerment, and do not increase
economic agency. This dissertation examines an alternative economic intervention: the
Usha Multi-purpose Cooperative Society (Usha), a bank operated by a sex worker’s
union in Kolkata, India. Examining the organizational structure, culture, and operations
of the bank I explore the manner in which Usha addresses the critiques aimed at
microfinance initiatives, and the manner in which it cultivates economic and political
agency in the sex work community.
Methods: Utilizing a mixed-methods case study design, I conducted 80 semistructured interviews with Usha members (n=60) and staff (n=20), participant
observation and document analysis. Additionally, I conducted quantitative analyses of the
bank’s administrative database (N=14,382). Modified grounded theory and regression
models were utilized to analyze the qualitative and quantitative data, respectively.
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Results: Usha facilitates empowerment through two intersecting operational
approaches: its interventions operate at the individual and community levels, while
targeting logistical as well as political outcomes. Specifically, Usha offers individual
logistical financial support to sex workers through savings and loans programs which
reverse predatory practices used by other microfinance initiatives. Community-level
logistical financial support is provided by investing in businesses and social programs
which benefit the sex worker community. Usha fosters individual sex worker political
agency by supporting professional identity, independent decision-making, and sex worker
leadership. Community-level political agency is developed by undermining the influence
of financially coercive community power-brokers such as madams and pimps, providing
labor protections, and facilitating access to civil society institutions.
Conclusion: Usha challenges neoliberal approaches that attribute poverty to
individual shortcomings, and resists the neocolonial framing of sex workers as victims.
These results advance our understanding of how microfinance interventions can support
social movements and effect structural change.
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CHAPTER ONE
Introduction

There are thousands of organizations and institutions world-wide whose mission is to
fight global poverty. These organizations are united in the way they conceptualize
poverty and its solutions. For most organizations, the solution to poverty lies in achieving
the correct balance of macro and micro economic growth, a goal attained by
implementing various development programs. According to this mainstream view of
development, such programs are best created in the ‘developed’ world, which possesses
an advanced understanding of economics, and implemented in the ‘Third World’ which,
for various reasons, has lagged in generating economic prosperity. Development
programs are overseen by a cadre of experts who skillfully deploy the tools of capital,
science, and technology to combat global poverty. Recipients of poverty interventions,
though often asked to participate in local program implementation, generally must trust
the guidance of development experts.
Arturo Escobar (1995) suggests that this vision of economic development has
reached a hegemonic status such that the need for ‘development’ is self-evident. He
argues, however, that the modern definition of development is not self-evident. It is a
discourse and as such is constructed and reconstructed by the production and
dissemination of knowledge and the implementation of action. Escobar’s formulation
indicates that a discourse which is constructed, can also be deconstructed, interrogated,
and alternatives uncovered. Scholars have pointed to the need to deconstruct this
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hegemonic discourse (Hickey& Mohan, 1995; Mohanty, 1988; Pogge, 2010) and there is
strong evidence to suggest that alternatives to mainstream development must be sought.
Despite the massive amount of resources dedicated to mainstream development in
its post-World War Two inception, the situation of the world’s poor remains deeply
troubling. About a third of all human deaths annually are attributable to poverty-related
causes, and about half of those poverty deaths are children (Pogge, 2010). Global
inequality is widening, with the ratio of income between the top and bottom decile at
273:1 (Pogge, 2010). Whatever economic growth might be occurring is clearly not
proportionally benefiting the resource poor people of the world. Many have deemed
mainstream economic development a monumental failure with fatal outcomes (Pogge,
2010).
There are myriad potential questions to investigate regarding the development
discourse and its impact on communities and individuals. As a scholar of social welfare I
am interested in praxis; how the theoretical is applied to the lived experience. I am
interested in alternative development discourses, but, importantly, also alternative
actions. However, Escobar suggests that there is limited utility in seeking generalizable
models to solve the development puzzle. He writes, “instead of searching for grand
alternative models or strategies, what is needed is the investigation of alternative
representations and practices in concrete local settings, particularly as they exist in
context of hybridization, collective action, and political mobilization (1995, p. 19).”
This dissertation is one such investigation. I will explore these issues through the
systematic analysis of a single case- the Usha Multipurpose Cooperative Society (Usha),
a cooperative bank created by and for sex workers in Kolkata, India. Usha is a
2

community-led economic intervention that provides banking services to the sex work
communities of Kolkata (ushacoop.org, 2014). Usha is also the financial arm of the
Durbar Mahila Samanwaya Committee (DMSC), a worker’s rights collective organized
by sex workers in Kolkata and surrounding areas (Durbar.org, n.d.). As I will argue, the
Usha cooperative stands in contrast to interventions supported by the mainstream
development discourse. Specifically, the Usha organization is run collectively by the
members of the community it serves, not by outside ‘experts.’ Additionally, Usha is a
part of a worker’s collective and as such is in tune with the social and political
circumstances of its members, not just their immediate needs. The study will examine
how this unique organization fits into and resists the development status quo.
In Chapter Two I examine how the theory and practice of neoliberalism has
dictated the terms of contemporary economic development. Reviewing the literature in
the field, I argue that the ethos of neoliberalism has permeated the social imaginary to
bring all aspects of society into the fold of individual market rationality. Microfinance, a
major tool of economic development of the last twenty years, is an illustrative example of
neoliberal development. There has been a growing body of literature critiquing
microfinance which exposes the ways microfinance does not meet the economic needs of
poor people and in many cases has detrimental effects. I examine how these critiques
draw on the neoliberal logic of mainstream microfinance. In this chapter, I situate
microfinance as a form of what Foucault (2003) defines as governmentality, a form of
management and surveillance that originates in bureaucratic machinery, and has a
stunting effect on political mobilization, socially transformative action, and structural
change.
3

Chapter Three extends this analysis to mainstream economic interventions
available for sex worker groups. I argue that under the prevailing terms of these
interventions, sex worker economic agency is only conceptualized as part of a neoliberal
market enterprise that “rescues” sex workers and channels them into the formal market
system. I conclude Chapter Two by introducing the Usha cooperative. Given its location
as a collective and part of a self-identified union, and the fact that it inhabits the
intersection of the competing discourses I have described above, I argue that a study of
the cooperative will shed light on the manner in which its economic development
initiatives counters, or is subsumed by, the neoliberal market agendas that are prevalent
in the field of microfinance.
In Chapter Four I present the research questions and hypotheses that will drive my
data collection and analysis. These hypotheses were derived from the literature and my
preliminary work in the field. The hypotheses describe the manner in which Usha
influences development outcomes at individual and community levels, through logistical
and political pathways.
Chapter Five outlines the specific methods I will use to empirically investigate
these hypotheses. Using case study method (Yin, 2008) I will draw from quantitative and
qualitative primary and secondary data to analyze the Usha organization in relationship
with my research questions. Scholars and activists have contributed thoughtful critiques
of both microfinance and abolitionist sex work interventions; however, there is almost no
research on community-based microfinance alternatives or on economic interventions
that support the economic agency of sex workers. This research will begin to address this

4

gap, thereby contributing to a growing body of critical development literature that
challenges hegemonic modes of development.
Chapters Six through Nine detail the results of the mixed-method case analysis.
These results chapters analyze the organizational structure and culture of Usha with
respect to the overarching research questions. The final chapters bring these findings
back into conversation with prevailing modes of neoliberal development and discourses
of empowerment, examining the extent to which Usha short-circuits mainstream
development approaches.

5

CHAPTER TWO
Microfinance: Concepts and Critiques

Neoliberalism and social welfare.
Neoliberal economic theory champions the extraction of the state from the functions of
the market (Harvey, 2005). Economic growth and stability, it is claimed, is achieved by
freeing restraints on trade and creating a healthy ‘business climate’ by reducing
regulation and tax on businesses. According to this paradigm, the state is the only
institution possessing the legitimate use of violence and the power to define law and
should use both of these powers to support and protect individual, market-based freedoms
(Harvey, 2005). With these individual freedoms protected, the individual is, in theory, in
a position to maximize their own welfare in the market system. Success or failure in
personal welfare, therefore, results from “entrepreneurial virtues or personal failings
(such as not investing in one’s own human capital enough through education) rather than
being attributed to any systemic property (such as class exclusions attributed to
capitalism) (Harvey, 2005, p.65-66).”
Neoliberalism in practice. Key tactics of neoliberalism include the privatization
of once communally or state owned resources, rolling back the welfare state,
undermining union or other collective power, opening trade to encourage foreign
investment, promotion of proprietary law (such as intellectual property rights),
implementation of regressive tax codes, maximization of competition and flexible
specialization of labor (Harvey, 2005). These tactics are promoted in the name of freeing
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capital, encouraging entrepreneurial innovation, and, supposedly, wide-spread economic
growth and wealth generation (Brown, 2003; Harvey, 2005).
Neoliberalism, however, is a construct rather than ontological fact; neither the
market, nor competition, nor rational economic behavior is the natural state of human
existence (Brown, 2003). Neoliberalism, therefore, must be actively facilitated. In fact,
Brown argues, neoliberalism has become such a core part of our current understanding of
the structure of society that it is not simply that the state supports the market, but the
market legitimizes, and in many ways controls, the state (2003). Additionally, the state
itself must operate according to the entrepreneurial ethos of market rationality; all state
actions must survive the market calculus of strict cost/benefit analysis, maximum
efficiency, and profitability (Brown, 2003). Neoliberal ideology does not just concern
itself with the market, but applying market rationality to all aspects of social life (Brown,
2003). Through the promulgation of market ethics and the power of governmentality
citizens are manufactured as neoliberal subjects, bound within the limits of constructed
social potentialities.
Though neoliberal mandates have shaped many aspects of international
development, I will specifically consider microfinance. I argue that microfinance is an
instantiation of neo-liberal development. However, as we will see, microfinance, with its
roots in community centered work, is a potential point of access for alternative paradigms
of community-centered economic intervention that can rupture the narrative of rugged
individualism and reconnect microeconomics with the politics of structural inequality.
The Microcredit Revolution
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Microfinance institutions (MFIs) take many different forms, but the common goal
of all MFIs is to provide financial services, of various kinds, to people who otherwise
would not have access to a formal banking system, particularly women (Armendariz &
Morduch, 2010). Muhammad Yunus of the Grameen Bank, considered by many to be the
father of microcredit, envisioned a banking system that would end poverty and create a
more just society (Rutherford, 2009). Several characteristics are specific to the Grameen
lending approach. Loans are targeted at the poorest sectors of the population, given
without collateral, rely on lending groups to exert social pressure to enhance loan
repayment, are repaid in regular installments, are based on group trust and accountability,
and have bank branches that are located within the community (Armendariz and
Morduch, 2010; Grameen Bank, 2011). Additionally, the original Grameen approach
encourages members to take advantage of the lending group community structure to
pursue social development goals including literacy, health education, and environmental
stewardship programs (Grameen Bank, 2011).
Research throughout the 1990’s provided evidence of the successes of
microcredit as a tool of poverty alleviation and women’s empowerment (Amin, Becker,
& Bayes, 1998; Cheston & Kuhn 2002; Hashemi, Schuler, & Riley, 1996; Pitt, Khandker,
& Cartwright, 2003). By the turn of the millennium the development world had embraced
microcredit as a near panacea of economic and social development (Ghosh, 2013). The
United Nations declared 2005 the “Year of Microcredit” and in 2006 the Nobel Peace
Prize was award to Muhammad Yunus and the Grameen Bank (Sengupta, 2013).
The rise of commercialism. Interestingly, just as Yunus was receiving these
accolades, the foundation of social development upon which the Bangladesh-style
8

microcredit was built was being fundamentally undermined by a ‘new wave’ of
microcredit programs emphasizing ‘full cost recovery’ over social development (Ghosh,
2013). After the successes of microfinance became apparent, major institutions such as
the World Bank became interested in the potential of microfinance, but criticized the use
of donor subsidies and promoted the liberalization, commercialization and privatization
of microcredit (Cull, Demirgüç-kunt, & Morduch, 2008). BRI in Indonesia and BancoSol
in Bolivia were some of the first microcredit institutions to undergo neoliberal reform,
rejecting supportive subsidies, adopting market interest rates, setting broad outreach and
expansion goals, generating profit, and highly compensating managerial staff, including
the option of shareholding (Bateman, 2010). The emergence of a commercial market for
microfinance revealed the potential of for-profit companies to make money while
providing a social good; an appealing proposition for the business world (Cull,
Demirgüç-kunt, & Morduch, 2008). The focus of microfinance shifted from social
development to the provision of bare financial services, the minimization of risk, and the
maximization of scale, efficiency and reward (Rankin, 2002). Proponents of
commercialization claim that the ‘financialization’ model encourages accountability not
found in donor based social programs (Cull, Demirgüç-kunt, & Morduch, 2008). This
new form of microfinance saw a flood of support from private investors and commercial
banks. An executive from ING was quoted as calling microfinance the ‘new financial
frontier,’ stating that banking to the extremely poor would create a ‘niche market with
competitive profits in ten years (ING 2008, p 35 quoted in Roy, 2010, p. 30).”
As the commercialization model began to take off, Bangladesh-style social
development NGOs began to feel the pressure to adopt neoliberal reforms (Ghosh, 2013).
9

Though still critical of fully commercial banks (Hudon & Sandberg, 2013) NGOs began
to take on the traits of private banks such as increased flexibility, higher interest rates,
and increased pressure to take or ‘top off’ loans (Augsburg & Fouillet, 2010; Rutherford,
2009).
Creating a discourse. The acceptance and promotion of microfinance as an effective
development tool has been supported by major knowledge producing organizations such
as the Consultative Group to Assist the Poor (CGAP), a World Bank group whose
mission includes the development of ‘responsible’ markets and to “increase access to the
financial services the poor need to improve their lives (CGAP, 2014).” The World Bank,
CGAP, and other institutions have invested considerable resources in the research and
development of ‘best practices’ in line with the commercial model (Karim, 2011).
Microfinance as an Instantiation of Neoliberal Development
Microfinance relies on the assumed latent entrepreneurial talent of the poor which can
be unlocked with the appropriate set of conditions and supports. The goal of most
microfinance projects is to provide sufficient start-up capital for poor people to invest in
individual income generating projects. Microfinance institutions assert that they provide
capital that is free from the regulations of corrupt governments and the restrictions of
donor subsidized NGOs, who condescend to their clients by demanding paternalistic
rituals, meetings, and rules (Roy, 2010).
Some have argued, however, that microfinance has been promoted to ameliorate and
distract from the consequences of the aggressive financial liberalization policies exacted
on post-colonial countries at the end of the 20th century (Rankin, 2002; Sengupta, 2013;
Weber, 2001). Roy explains, “the hand maiden of, rather than alternative to, neoliberal
10

globalization and free-market ideologies, microfinance serves as the safety net for the
devastating programs of structural adjustment (p. 29, 2010).” This safety-net is imbedded
in individualistic free-market principles of self-help and entrepreneurialism (Weber,
2001). The flip side of the promise of individual success is the individuation of failure
and responsibility (Sengupta, 2013).
Outcomes of microfinance participation. Individuals are expected use the tools
provided by microfinance to accrue sufficient human, social, and financial capital to
thrive in society. However, as studies evaluating the economic effectiveness of
microcredit interventions become more rigorous, evidence of economic transformation is
scant. Most studies find, at best, modest financial gain in treatment groups (Angelucci,
Karlan & Zinman, 2013; Banerjee & Duflo, 2011).
So why isn’t microfinance the magic bullet so many had hoped it would be? Firstly,
the project relies on the assumption that poor people want to start a business. In their
extensive research on the financial decision making processes of poor people, Banerjee
and Duflo found that many poor people are not interested or able to start a business
(2011). Many people would rather have a steady job with a steady wage and predictable
hours than become an entrepreneur.
Bateman (2010) discusses the trap of informal sector employment in general. He
argues that the informal market has been used since the Industrial Revolution to keep
poor people actively engaged in petty survival-based trades and out of transformational
activities that would “upset the social order (p. 32).” Microenterprises taken on today
with the help of microfinance are largely unregulated and un-protected businesses that do
not have organizational support (such as a union) or management toward which one can
11

direct demands. Participation in an uncertain and unregulated informal sector is positively
reframed as ‘flexibility’ of labor and ‘entrepreneurialism’ in the neoliberal discourse
(Harvey, 2005).
Many people choose not to participate in microfinance even when they have access to
it. People cite the rigid lending and repayment rules (Augsburg & Fouillet, 2010;
Banerjee & Duflo, 2011), program structures that are unresponsive to client need
(Mahajan, 2007), and limited services into which clients with various needs are forced
(World Bank, 2009) for this lack of interest. Furthermore, rhetoric suggesting that
microfinance improves the lives of the poorest members of society has proven to be
largely fallacious. There is evidence that many commercial microfinance organizations
find it challenging to lend to poorer segments of the population (Cull, Demirgüç-kunt, &
Morduch, 2008) and those who successfully benefit from microloans tend to be women
who already enjoyed higher levels of education, business experience and autonomy
outside the home (Angelucci, Karlan, & Zinman, 2013; Karim, 2011).
Empowerment outcomes. The effectiveness of microfinance for the empowerment of
women is a widely believed narrative (Weber, 2001). However, research questioning the
empowerment thesis began to emerge fairly early in the microfinance literature. For
example, there is evidence of an increase in intimate partner violence experienced by
women obtaining MFI services (Rocca, Rathod, Falle, Pande, & Krishnan, 2006; Schuler,
Hashemi, Riley, Akhter, 1996) and the extortion and misuse by male family members of
loans disbursed to women (Fernando, 1997; Garikipaki, 2008; Goetz & Sen Gupta, 1996;
Rahman, 1999). Others have found that microfinance participation may exacerbate, rather
than narrow, the structural inequalities faced by women and other groups (Rankin, 2002).
12

Karim (2011) found that microfinance organizations rely on an “economy of shame”
in which loan repayment is enforced through leveraging the negative social consequences
of shaming one’s family and community through loan default. Fear of such consequences
led to intense intra-community policing (Augsburg & Fouillet, 2010; Rahman, 1998).
Microfinance has been generally criticized for having weak systems in place to monitor
accountability of loan officers and bank mangers (Dixon, Ritchie & Siwale, 2006).
Notwithstanding the price borrowers pay in terms of social pressure and shame,
microloans themselves are expensive. D'Espallier, Hudon, and Szafarz (2013) found that
to compensate for lack of subsidies, commercial microfinance organizations raised
interest rates and, overall, lack of subsidies worsened social performance. Though many
dispute that high interest rates and commercialization necessarily lead to negative social
outcomes (Karlan & Zinman, 2010; Mersland & Strøm, 2010; Rosenberg, Gonzalez &
Narain, 2009) the debate around interest rates and microfinance revenue has grown more
heated in the last five years. High interest rates are justified by microfinance groups
because profits supposedly increase the money available for lending (Rosenberg, 2007).
Put another way, poor people are not only responsible for overcoming their own povertythey are paying high interest rates to support the welfare of other poor people, without
community-level protections (Bateman, 2010). Making loan payments has proven
difficult for microfinance participants and microfinance has been shown to promote overindebtedness in clients (Ghate, 2007).
In light of the critiques and limitations of microfinance, how has it maintained its
position as a quintessential tool of poverty alleviation in the modern era? I argue that
through the power of governmentality, microfinance has been constructed as one of very
13

few options for individuals to assist themselves in securing their own welfare. In the
following section I provide a brief overview of the power of governmentality, consider
how governmentality moves through microfinance, and explore the de-politicizing effect
of microfinance on the potential collective action of microfinance recipient populations.
Governmentality: An Overview
Foucault identifies governmentality as a modern mechanism of state power and situates it
in relation to two other mechanisms of state power, sovereignty and discipline, which he
had analyzed in previous works. The apparatus of the power of government, articulated
by Foucault as security, is directed not at individual bodies, but at the multiplicity of
people as a generalization; the population (Foucault, 2003). Birth rate, death rate, health
and longevity reflect trends in a population and are the objects of knowledge and targets
for the biopolitics of security (Foucault, 2003). Foucault argues that government is
involved in arranging the “complex of men and things (2007, p. 97).” These
relationships shape the processes by which the government exercises the technology of
security. The goal of security is not to “modify a given individual insofar as he is an
individual, but, essentially, to intervene at the level at which these general phenomena are
determined, to intervene at the level of their generality (2003, p.246).” Foucault goes on
to say, “We now have the emergence, with this technology of biopower, of this
technology of power over ‘the’ populations as such, over men insofar as they are living
beings. It is continuous, scientific, and it is the power to make live (p.247).”
Governmentality is therefore the power to set conditions such that some life, or aspects of
life, is supported and made to thrive, while others are neglected and left to die.
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The governor must rule through “the delimitation of phenomena within acceptable
limits (Foucault, 2007, p. 66).” Foucault outlines three key characteristics of a proper
governor; patience, wisdom, and diligence. Patience is the ability to deploy mechanisms
of power without force and willingness to tolerate the slow pace of governmental power.
Wisdom indicates knowledge about the myriad ‘things’ with which men are involved,
and ways that different situations and dispositions can be constructed to obtain the
objective of government through the arrangement of men and things. Finally, the quality
of diligence implies that the governor should act in the best interest of the population.
The population should therefore feel as though the mechanisms of security are working in
their interest; a situation that lends an essence of voluntariness to the process of being
subjected to governmentality. Governmentality is not just concerned with governing, but
guiding the ways one governs oneself (Lemke, 2001).
Governmentality as a tool of neoliberal power. Under neoliberalism individuals
‘choose’ the ways in which they will provide for their own welfare. It is through this
freedom of ‘choice’ that the power of neoliberal governmentality operates. Neoliberal
governance constructs the world of rational choice options for individuals in the market,
actively shaping the relationships between ‘men and things.’ Brown writes,
“neoliberalism does not simply assume that all aspects of social, cultural, and political
life can be reduced to such a calculus (of rational choice analysis), rather it develops
practices and rewards for enacting this vision. That is, through discourse and policy
liberalism produces rational actors and imposes market rationale for decision-making
in all spheres (2003, np, parenthetical added).”
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Thus, by delimiting choices available to populations, neoliberal governing institutions
can control individuals while avoiding responsibility for them (Lemke, 2001). In this way
“neo-liberalism encourages individuals to give their lives a specific entrepreneurial form
(Lemke, 2001, p.202).” In short, the state and other powerful institutions, through
neoliberal governmentality, lead individuals to live according to entrepreneurial values of
self-help while simultaneously obscuring their role in the process and absolving
themselves of responsibility for failure.
Microfinance and governmentality. Microfinance is an effective conduit of the
power of neoliberal governmentality and has therefore been protected and promoted. The
overarching governance goal of microfinance is to shape the choices of poor people by
encouraging the characteristics of entrepreneurialism, thrift, and investment to thrive in
the population. The cultivation of these characteristics is achieved through shaping the
options available to poor people. By constructing microfinance as one of limited options,
the population is driven to act in a way that supports the project. In this way,
governmentality shapes the wants and needs of the population. The intervention is
therefore justified by the ‘needs’ of the population (Bateman, 2010) and the population is
shaped by the intervention.
Processes of governmentality also dislocate the management of the population
from the lived experience of the population by necessitating a specific and technical
knowledge. The supremacy of the neoliberal microfinance intervention is protected by
institutions designed to produce and disseminate certain forms of ‘truth’ regarding
‘effective’ poverty alleviation programs (Karim, 2011). Organizations like CGAP are
committed to creating a ‘facilitating environment’ for their brand of development
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(Weber, 2001). A Senior C-Gap official was quoted as saying, “What is measured, is
what is managed. We script. We manage. We control (p. 46, Roy, 2010).”
There are several ways the production and control of technical knowledge
regarding microfinance aides the process of neoliberal governance. Firstly, the
knowledge that is created, mostly positivist in nature, captures rates and commercial
outcomes but cannot capture social processes, dynamics of power, and political
consequences of microfinance programs (Meyer, 2007). Because these forms of
knowledge are denied relevance, microfinance is encouraging characteristics of
entrepreneurialism in the informal sector, while allowing collective forms of social
welfare activities, such as labor organization or communal forms of resource
management and production, to die. Secondly, the technical knowledge used to manage
the population rests exclusively with the expert class. Microfinance participants do not
understand the statistical analysis of the population as a whole and therefore, even in
groups, can’t be trusted to manage themselves appropriately. Non-experts are not
equipped and therefore are excluded from the decision-making processes. This is made
clear in major microfinance training conferences that are conducted in English even when
taking place in the global South (Karim, 2011) and ethnographic work demonstrating that
‘local’ opinions, even the perspectives of local ‘experts’, are often dismissed in favor of
the thoughts and opinions of the leaders of major Western governing bodies such as
CGAP (Karim, 2011; Roy, 2010). The population, therefore, must rely on the good
intentions of the governor because it is denied its own voice. The governor promotes the
acquiescence of the population by 1) promising to work in its best interest and 2)
suffocating alternatives.
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Some have argued that through neoliberal governance, microfinance and other
development interventions have led to the ‘depoliticization’ of development (Bateman,
2010; Murray, 2007). There is no mention in the mainstream microfinance discourse of
structural inequalities that systematically reproduce poverty or macro-economic policies
that could address this intractable problem (Pogge, 2012; Rankin, 2002; Sengupta, 2013).
Abuse of power in the formal sector, lack of protection in the informal sector,
vulnerability in migrant labor, government regulation of trans-national business, the
impact of trade agreements on the bottom of the supply chain, and many other issues that
affect the livelihoods of the world’s poorest are whitewashed by the eternal optimism of
individual entrepreneurialism. The acceptable discourse of poverty and development has
been removed from the context of the political economy and into the realm of technical
intervention. Microcredit, then, becomes a ‘political safety net’ to mitigate resistance to
the implementation of neoliberal policy and the consequences thereof (Weber, 2001).
Brown describes this process,
“The rationally calculating individual bears full responsibility for the
consequences of his or her action no matter how severe the constraints on this
action, e.g., lack of skills, education, and childcare in a period of high
unemployment and limited welfare benefits. Correspondingly, a "mismanaged
life" becomes a new mode of depoliticizing social and economic powers and at
the same time reduces political citizenship to an unprecedented degree of
passivity and political complacency…A fully realized neo-liberal citizenry would
be the opposite of public-minded, indeed it would barely exist as a public. The
body politic ceases to be a body but is, rather, a group of individual entrepreneurs
and consumers (2003, np).”
Economically marginalized groups, therefore, become occupied with self-managing their
own welfare, using tools such as microfinance, and are less able to collectivize as a
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public to change structures of social inequality through collective action and/or civic
participation (Chatterjee, 2004; Weber, 2001).
Potential alternatives to neoliberal microfinance.
The dominant neoliberal discourse obscures the great heterogeneity of economic
interventions developed in communities to protect against financial uncertainty such as
rotating savings and credit associations (Anderson & Baland 2002; Donoso, Altunbas,
Kara, 2011; Gugerty, 2007; Handa & Kirton 1999) and cooperative banks (Ghosh, 2013)
that have all but disappeared from the discussion of economic interventions for the poor.
Credit cooperatives are member-owned, not-for-profit banks. These banks mobilize
member savings to generate funds that are invested back in the community in the form of
loans and sometimes other income generating projects (Bateman, 2010; Ferguson &
McKillop, 2000).
Sengupta (2013) envisions a model in which economic interventions are but one
of many tools used by larger member-run organizations aimed at addressing structural
inequalities at the root of poverty. Reclaiming the social-transformative definition of
solidarity, an economic intervention could be a springboard to political conscientization
(Rakin, 2002). Several studies suggest that such an organizational model could be a
powerful point of resistance to the dominant paradigm of microfinance and open up new
ways of conceptualizing empowerment in a neoliberal development environment
(Achwan, 2012; Sengupta, 2013). Could such model short-circuit the neoliberal
governance of microfinance and reclaim the social development potential of the
microcredit revolution?
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The Usha cooperative bank incorporates many of these alternative ways of
conceptualizing economic interventions and the investigation of Usha will pose this very
question. Before turning to the specific research questions that guide the current study,
however, I will transition from theory to praxis and examine how neoliberal
governmentality becomes operationalized through interventions that have been
implemented on sex work populations.
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CHAPTER THREE
Sex Worker Economic Interventions: Current State and Alternative Models
The previous chapter examined logistical and political critiques of microfinance,
positing the intervention as a tool of neoliberal governmentality. The microfinance
discourse suggests that participants, particularly women, are liberated from poverty and
reclaim their agency through free market participation. This specific form of economic
agency becomes the working definition of ‘empowerment’ in neoliberal development. In
this chapter I will specifically examine microfinance as it has been implemented on sex
work populations as a part of the popular ‘raid, rescue, and rehabilitate’ intervention
model. This analysis illuminates the limitations of ‘agency’ and ‘empowerment’ under
neoliberal development.
Microfinance with Sex Workers: Rehabilitative Alternative Employment Schemes.
Microfinance is most often introduced to sex workers as a vehicle for alternative
employment. Such interventions could be categorized as part of the raid, rescue and
rehabilitate (RR&R) approach to intervening with sex works. RR&R interventions are
organized by the state or an NGO, often enlisting the help of local law enforcement for
the ‘raid’ portion of the program (Ahmed & Seshu, 2010; Magar, 2012). Sex workers are
ostensibly ‘rescued’ because it is assumed that the women do not want to be sex workers.
Detained workers are sent to either a non-profit run rehabilitation center or a state run
safe-house (Ahmed & Seshu, 2010; Magar, 2012; Soderlund, 2005). Women then engage
in rehabilitative activities, such as learning to make canvas bags or other small trades, as
a pathway to alternative employment (Ahmed & Seshu, 2010). Several such alternative
employment schemes are described in the literature (Odek, Busza, Morris, Cleland,
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Ngugu, Ferguson, 2009; Sherman, German, Cheng, Marks, and Bailey-Kloche, 2006;
Sherman, Srikrishnan, Rivett, Liu, Solomon, and Celentano, 2010; Tsai, Witte, Aira,
Altantsetseg, and Riedel, 2011) and constitute the bulk of the economic intervention
research for sex workers.
RR&R and neoliberalism. RR&R interventions are promoted by a network of
organizations supporting the abolition of sex work as a part of the modern-day antislavery movement (Bernstein, 2007). The abolitionist perspective asserts that all
exchange of sexuality for money or material good is an inherent act of violence against
women and forecloses the potential for consenting sex work (Farley, 2006; Jeffries,
2009). Thus, according to abolitionist theory, the RR&R model extracts women from an
environment of inherent exploitation to one of legitimate entrepreneurial activity. The
imagery employed by abolitionists contrasts the oppressed third world sex slave with the
liberated artisan working to produce goods for mainstream consumption (Bernstein,
2010).
Bernstein (2010) highlights how the options available for public participation in
the anti-slavery movement promote a very specific vision of carceral and neoliberal
solutions to the problem of prostitution. Individuals can give money to an organization
that runs raids, allowing the donor to live vicariously through the rescue of a sex worker
and the incarceration of her enslaver. An individual can also purchase items made by
former sex workers participating in aforementioned alternative employment schemes,
thereby playing a personal role in the sex worker’s economic salvation through the
liberating power of the free market. Bernstein argues that the abolitionist coalition
perceives these two tools, the carceral and the consumer, as the main routes to achieve
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global social justice. The use of free market ideology and the power of individual
consumer-activism assert the superiority of Western, market-based approaches and
justifies its imperialism. The RR&R model has been heavily publicized and dominates
public common knowledge about sex work (see, for example, the ‘Half the Sky’
Movement, halfthesky.org). However, research investigating the experiences of sex
workers themselves highlights important limitations and critiques of this model.
Logistical Critiques of the Raid Rescue and Rehabilitate Model
Evidence suggests that raids are often conducted based on faulty information, at times
incorrectly citing underage workers on the premise (Ahmed & Seshu, 2010; Kinney,
2006). Raid violence has been reported including the assault of sex workers by raiding
police (Ahmed & Seshu, 2010; Busza, 2004; Magar, 2012). Rehabilitation centers to
which sex workers are sent vary greatly, with reports of some safe homes described as
“jail like” by sex workers (Ahmed & Seshu, 2010; Jayasree, 2004; Misra, Mahal, Shah,
2000). Forced rescue impedes workers’ ability to make money and workers are not
compensated for lost time due to raid and relocation (Ahmed & Seshu, 2010). This may
lead to increased risk taking in sex work later to make up for lost money (Busza, 2006).
Alternative employment’ opportunities are constructed for the sole purpose of
exiting from sex work. This is not a problem in and of itself. Many sex workers might
prefer to leave sex work if lucrative employment options were available. However, this
approach has several limitations and consequences. Alternative employment programs
often have limited and unstable funding (Chapkis, 2003; Vuylsteke & Jana, 2001).
Employment programs, therefore, have questionable sustainability and rarely offer
income equivalent to sex work. For example, one program (Sherman et al; 2010) is
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dependent on capacity of the NGO to support manufacturing production, in that instance
offering a maximum of 20 hours a week to former sex workers. Additionally, many of
these programs are highly restrictive about what women can and cannot do with their
money, which can be interpreted as paternalistic and further stigmatizing of sex workers
(Canadian HIV/AIDS Legal Network, 2007; Jayasree, 2004)
Perhaps the most telling critique of the RR&R model is the rate at which rescued
workers return to sex work (Busza, 2006). A Human Rights Commission Report from
the government of India reported that over 25% of those who were ‘rescued’ in a RR&R
program had been rescued at least once before (Magar, 2012). As noted above, many
women cannot provide for their families based on what they make in supported
employment programs. Other women prefer sex work to other options open to them
(Augustin, 2007). Domestic workers, for example, also face potential labor and sexual
exploitation but have less freedom over work-life, mobility, and significantly lower
earning capacity than sex workers. This last point is particularly important as many
women are keenly aware of the reliance of family members on remittances from their
earnings (Kinney, 2006). There is a mounting body of evidence therefore that, for many
sex workers, their participation in sex work is not forced or coerced, it is a decision made
within a constrained set of choices (Agustin, 2007; Doezema, 2002; Ghose, Swendeman,
George, Chowdhury, 2008; Jayasree, 2004; Sanders, 2008; Saunders 2005).
Economic needs of active sex workers. Research has shown that almost all sex
workers enter the profession to make money, citing reasons such as economic need and
higher wages of sex work compared to other professions (Basu, Jana, Rotheram-Borus,
Swendeman, Lee, Newman, Weiss, 2004; Bilardi, Miller, Hocking, Keogh, Cummings,
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Chen, Bradshaw, Fairley, 2011; Booranapim & Mainwaring, 2002; Chipamaunga,
Muula, Mataya, 2012; Devine, Bowen, Dzuvichu, Rungsung, Kermode 2010; Reed,
Gupta, Biradavolu, Devireddy, Blankenship, 2010). When asked, sex workers cite
economic independence and access to banking as some of their most pressing goals
(Ghose et al., 2008; Mahal, Seshu, Mane & Lal 2012). The few extant studies examining
active sex workers’ economic experiences found that while most sex workers have
savings goals (Booranapim and Mainwaring, 2002; Tsai et al., 2013), few had access to
secure mechanisms to save (Mahal et al., 2012; Tsai et al., 2013). Sex workers also
lacked access to affordable credit (Mahal et al., 2012; Tsai et al., 2013), had little
protection from microeconomic shocks such as missed work (Booranapim and
Mainwaring, 2002; Mahal et al., 2012), and were particularly economically unstable as
they aged (Mahal et al., 2012). This evidence suggests a need for economic interventions
supporting sex workers while they engage in sex work, especially in light of the effect of
economic instability of sex worker health and well-being.
Economics and the well-being of sex workers. Research has linked HIV risk with
unsupported indebtedness (Reed, Gupta, Biradavolu, Devireddy, & Blankenship, 2010;
Tsai et al, 2013) and economic dependence (Blankenship, West, Kershaw, Biradavolu,
2008; Tsai et al, 2013). It has been documented that clients are willing to pay more for
unprotected and risky sex (Deering et al., 2013; Gertler, Shah, Bertozzi, 2005; Karim,
Karim, Soldan, Zondi, 1995; Kerrigan, Moreno, Rosario, Gomez, Jerez, Barrington,
Weiss, Sweat, 2006; Rao, Gupta, Lokshin, Jana, 2002) and that economic need drives sex
workers to take more money for riskier sex (Chipamaunga, Muula, Mataya, 2012; Karim,
Karim, Soldan, Zondi, 1995; Varga, 1997). This leads some researchers to conclude that
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interventions, such as savings programs, that help sex workers build assets and regulate
money available for consumption needs could help reduce HIV risk (Rao Gupta,
Parkhurst, Ogden, Aggleton, Mahal 2008; Blankenship, West, Kershaw, Biradavolu,
2008). Despite the relationship between economic security and health there is no
research, to my knowledge, examining the potential for an economic intervention
supporting active sex workers.
The previous section outlined the practical limitations of the RR&R model as well
as the need for an intervention that financially supports active sex workers. As we saw in
the broader discussion of microfinance, there are also political critiques of the RR&R
model with sex worker groups.
Political Critiques of the RR&R Model
The RR&R model and sex worker agency. The RR&R model does not leave
space for sex workers’ agency in the decisions made about their futures. Sex workers are
seen as victims in need of rescue and redirection, not rational actors navigating a
complicated and challenging labor market to maximize the welfare of themselves and
their families. The sex worker’s economic agency is only legitimate when it is exercised
to take advantage of restrictive rehabilitative alternative economic programs designed for
exit out of sex work. Then, it is lauded as the very definition of ‘freedom’ (Bernstein,
2010).
RR&R and de-politicization. The abolitionist anti-slavery movement has defined
‘sex slavery’ as an individual and technical problem, not a structural economic one.
Given the macro effects of global economic policies on developing economies, the
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preservation of this binary plays an important political role in the larger neoliberal
project. Bernstein writes,
“the dichotomy between slavery and freedom poses a way of addressing the
ravages of neoliberalism that effectively locates all social harm outside of the
institutions of corporate capitalism and the state apparatus. In this way, the
masculinist institutions of big business, the state, and the police are reconfigured
as allies and saviors, rather than enemies, of unskilled migrant workers, and the
responsibility for slavery is shifted from structural factors and dominant
institutions onto individual, deviant men (2007, p.144).”
By framing sex work as a moral problem caused by individuals, rather than a complex
and global issue of income, labor, and livelihood, the abolitionist movement has
privileged a simplistic conversation of individual protection (Bernstein, 2010). The
abolitionist discourse does not entertain the potential for an alternative path to sex worker
empowerment through collective rights-seeking, political action, or other forms of
structural change. The RR&R model therefore, like microfinance interventions more
broadly, can be seen as a tool of governmentality. The intervention guides sex workers to
engage in entrepreneurialism as governing institutions (NGOs and the state) see fit by
forcibly limiting the option available to them. This is done in the sex worker’s best
interest, securing her ‘freedom’ for her and capping the terms of her agency. A hallmark
of depoliticizing forms of development, the RR&R model puts leadership in the hands of
outside ‘experts’ who are trained to manage sex worker populations.
Not all sex work interventions in the literature fit the RR&R model, however.
Community-led structural interventions (CLSI) have become the gold standard in public
health approaches to HIV prevention with sex worker groups. The CLSI model illustrates
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how community approaches have resisted mainstream narratives of sex worker
victimhood.
Community-Led Structural Interventions with Sex Workers
Broadly defined, structural interventions in the field of public health are
interventions that alter the contextual and environmental factors that influence health and
health behavior (Blankenship, Friedman, Dworkin, Mantell, 2006; Rao et al., 2008). To
be effective, relevant, and sustainable, interventions designed to alter structure must work
within a complex understanding of context (Rao et al., 2008). For this reason,
community-led structural interventions (CLSI) have gained traction in the last several
decades as a critical piece of the HIV prevention puzzle (Blankenship et al., 2006). A key
component of the CLSI is community mobilization, which aims to “alter the power
relations between marginalized and dominant groups (Blankenship et al., p. 63, 2006).”
This is accomplished through activities that assist groups in identifying and demanding
their rights and addressing socio-political barriers to positive health behaviors
(Blankenship et al., 2006).
Community-led structural interventions with sex workers. Over the last
decade there has been increasing documentation of the use of CLSI to address HIV risk
and prevention with commercial sex workers (Blankenship, West, Kershaw, Biradavolu,
2008; Ghose, Swendeman, George, Chowdhury, 2008; Kerrigan, Moreno, Rosario,
Gomez, Jerez, Barrington, Weiss, Sweat, 2006; Shahmanesh et al., 2008). Positive HIV
health outcomes of such interventions have been well documented (Blankenship et al.,
2008; Halli, Ramesh, O'Neil, Moses, Blanchard, 2006; Kerrigan, et al., 2006;
Swendeman, Basu, Das, Jana, Rotheram-Borus, 2009).
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Research suggests several explanations for these positive outcomes. Firstly, CLSI
can lead to a sense of professional identity in workers (Ghose et al., 2008). In stark
contrast to the stigma and social marginalization most sex workers regularly face from
both health intervention organizations and the society at large, pride in work fostered by
CLSI can inculcate condom use as professional conduct (Basu & Dutta, 2008; Ghose et
al., 2008). Interventions led by sex workers also develop trust within the community
more readily than outside organizations (Basu & Dutta, 2008; Blankenship, Biradavolu,
Jena, George, 2010). CLSI address issues according to community priority. Contextspecific barriers are therefore foregrounded and underlying structures central to HIV risk,
such as power imbalances within the community or tenuous police relations, are
recognized and addressed (Blankenship et al., 2010). Finally, a discursive reframing of
agency happens in sex worker-led structural interventions. Community members are
encouraged to reject outside judgments of sex workers as vectors of disease and instead
are galvanized to act as key agents of change in the fight against HIV (Blankenship et al.,
2010). Raid, rescue and rehabilitate interventions are not only the antithesis of the CLSI
model, but they directly undermine the work of CLSI with sex workers through diverting
resources (Busza, 2006; Kinney, 2006), destroying hard won and precarious stakeholder
relationships (Busza, 2006), and creating mistrust in the community (Magar, 2012).
Sex worker groups have struggled to invert deficit narratives in economics as they
have in public health. Despite a call for research examining the potential of community
led economic structural interventions (Blankenship et al., 2008; Rao et al, 2008;
Vuylsteke & Jana, 2001) there is no literature, to my knowledge, which addresses
community-led economic interventions with sex workers. Weldon (2010) suggests that
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when money is addressed in relation to sex work the discussion generally re-inscribes the
victim archetype by painting a picture of sheer economic desperation. She goes on to say,
“the financial experience the women are having is often assumed to be completely
irrelevant compared to the sexual experience the men are having; the experience of the
men is taken to define the exchange” The majority of researchers focus on the “sex” and
ignore the “work” (Weldon, 2010). Koken, (2010) refers to this discursive limit as what
remains “unknowable” when one subscribes to an abolitionist paradigm in which
consensual sex work does not exists. Agustin (2010) notes that the majority of research
is forced to fit into three conceptual molds: “AIDS prevention”, “violence against
women” and “trafficking.” Work that tries to go beyond these boundaries struggles to
access material and symbolic support.
Potential alternatives to the dominant discourse. Research examining the lived
economic realities of sex workers could create room for multiple truths that dismantle the
imagined victim of the abolitionist paradigm. This is an act of resistance against the
“post-colonial erasure” perpetrated by media and academic research that ignores
economic agency in their portrayals of sex workers (Shah, 2013; Sircar & Dutta, 2011).
Research on sex workers’ economic experiences would join a small but growing field of
literature that does not deny workers their agency, hide the benefits they receive from sex
work, or maintain centuries-old “acceptable” theoretical frameworks for discussion of sex
work; disease, violence, and salvation.
Pushing past individual experience, research can follow the trail blazed by sex
worker-led groups that have subverted the mainstream public health agenda to mobilize
around the social determinates of health. Might sex workers act collectively to address
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the economic challenges they face as individuals, communities, and members of a
stratified society? In doing so, could they create programs that offer an alternative to
neoliberal and neocolonial rehabilitative schemes that aim to govern their actions? Such
interventions could relocate the power to define the experiences of sex workers away
from outside ‘experts’ and back in the community.
To do this would necessitate the development of an economic intervention other
than traditional microfinance, for the reasons articulated in Chapter Two. Put simply, the
collective social, political, and economic good will not be achieved through neoliberal
technical development interventions. Brown theorizes how an alternative vision of ‘the
good’ might look.
“In its barest form, this would be a vision in which justice would not center upon
maximizing individual wealth or rights but on developing and enhancing the
capacity of citizens to share power and hence, collaboratively govern
themselves… However differently others might place the accent marks, none of
these values can be derived from neo-liberal rationality nor meet neo-liberal
criteria for the good (2003, np).”
Brown submits a tall order in this vision of the public good. However, there are
organizations that are making inroads to a different form of collective social welfare. The
final section of this chapter will describe one such group, the Durbar Mahila Samanwaya
Committee, a sex worker’s collective in Kolkata, India working to creatively fulfill the
needs and goals of the sex worker community through the activities of a communitybased organization. This organization is also the setting of my dissertation research.
The Durbar Mahila Samanwaya Committee.
The work of the DMSC and its precursor, the STD/HIV Intervention Project (SHIP), has
been well documented in public health literature (Jana et al., 2004). Moving away from
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the traditional focus on the individual, SHIP took a multi-level approach to HIV
prevention and intervention by considering the ways that HIV risk played out at the
individual, social network, community, and structural/environmental levels (Jana et al.,
2004; Swendeman et al., 2009). Positive HIV health outcomes of SHIP have been well
documented in the public health literature (Basu, Jana, Rotheram-Borus, Swendeman,
Lee, Newman, Weiss, 2004; Swendeman et al., 2009; Ghose et al., 2008) and the
program has been used as a model to replicate elsewhere in India (Swendeman et al,
2009).
Once under community leadership, the original HIV focus expanded to include
other issues that affected working conditions such as stigma, community violence, and
community political disenfranchisement. The resulting organization is the Durbar Mahila
Samanwaya Committee (DMSC), a sex worker-led trade union (Ghose et al., 2011). The
DMSC currently continues its political lobbying work, including sex worker’s rights
advocacy and the development of creative community approaches to local challenges
(Evans & Lambert, 2008). The organization has also developed branches to address other
relevant aspects of sex worker’s experiences. The Usha Multipurpose Cooperative
Society (Usha) is a cooperative bank that was developed as the financial arm of the
Durbar sex workers collective.
The Usha Multipurpose Cooperative Society. Usha is a community-led
economic intervention run by and for sex workers and is borne out of this rights based
movement. As such, it may provide insight into potential alternatives to the neoliberal
governance of microfinance and ‘rehabilitative’ alternative employment interventions
currently available to sex workers. My dissertation research will be an in-depth case
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study of the Usha Cooperative of Society and will be guided by the following central
research question; does Usha, a sex worker-led cooperative bank situated within a
worker’s rights collective, short circuit the neoliberal economic development agenda?
Specifically: Does the Usha bank address critiques aimed at microfinance initiatives?
Does the Usha organization engender individual and collective economic agency in the
sex work community?
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CHAPTER FOUR
Research Questions and Hypotheses
Before turning to the specific hypotheses that will guide my data collection and analysis,
it is worth distilling the preceding chapters to the core logic of their arguments.
Microfinance
In Chapter One, I argued that, as an economic development intervention, mainstream
microfinance is a vehicle of neoliberal governance. The mechanisms of neoliberal
development, such as profit-motive, privatization, and financialization, have impacted the
priorities and processes of microfinance interventions. Research has shown that these
modern, mainstream microfinance organizations do not adequately or appropriately
address the economic needs of their clients and client communities. Additionally,
microfinance individuates poverty and treats poverty as a technical problem. The
abundance of microfinance programs and the lack of banking and employment
alternatives have trapped poor people in an informal sector. This trap undermines
collective social and political mobilization for structural change. Some have argued that
collectively-run cooperative banks could provide an alternative to the microfinance
paradigm. Usha is one such bank and my study will ask: Does the Usha bank address
critiques aimed at microfinance initiatives?
To answer this question I will look at how Usha programs answers both the
logistical and political critiques of microfinance. Logistically, I will examine the specific
ways in which Usha programs serve members and support their financial goals and needs.
Politically, I will examine the extent to which Usha programs address structural poverty,
promote collective mobilization, and create in-roads into institutions of civil society.
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Sex Work and Economics
In Chapter Two I argued that the economic interventions that have derived from the
dominant abolitionist sex work discourse are ineffective and harmful for sex workers. I
also highlighted the importance of reclaiming sex worker individual and collective
agency for successful intervention programming with sex workers. This has been
documented in the dramatic success of sex worker community-led structural interventions
in public health. Some have argued that sex worker-led economic interventions could see
similar successes. This leads me to a second research question: Does the Usha
organization engender individual and collective economic agency in the sex work
community?
To address this question I will consider the extent to which Usha works with sex workers
as individuals capable of making personal financial decisions and as a community able to
collectively care for their own economic well-being without paternal outside intervention.
Conceptual Model
Taken together, what emerges from these arguments is a multi-level (individual and
community), multi-dimensional (logistical and political) critique of contemporary
microfinance organizations and economic interventions available to sex workers. This
critique is summarized in Table 4.1. Table 4.2 summarizes the hypothesized ways in
which the Usha Multipurpose Cooperative Society, as a sex worker community-led
economic intervention, counters these critiques.
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Table 4.1: Critiques of Existing Microfinance Organizations and Economic Interventions
for Sex Workers
Logistical

Individual
Expensive loans

Community
Profits made off of community
members, benefit shareholders

Over-indebtedness
-loans do not match
capacity to repay
-loans do not match
proposed use

Investment directed at market
saturation, not community
development

Systematic exclusions in access
and successful repayment
Political

Management of money not
determined by community

Sex workers treated as victims to
be saved from sex work

Does not address structural
dimensions of poverty

Narrow and prescriptive
alternative employment/ financial
programs

Expands informal sector with no
organized labor protection

No sex worker input on program
design or implementation

Undermines processes of political
citizenship

Table 4.2: Multi-Level Multi-dimensional Framework for Community-Led Economic
Intervention
Individual
Community
Reinvests income in community
Logistical Maintains loan affordability

Political

Disburses loans responsibly to
avoid over-indebtedness

Benefits community through investment
projects

Equitable access to and
successful repayment of loans

Manages organizational funds
autonomous of outside institutions

Marks member professionalism

Undermines community economic
exploitation

Maintains member agency in
program use and personal
financial decision making

Provides labor protection in an
unregulated informal labor sector.

Encourages member
Serves as vehicle for access to
participation in decision making institutions of civil society
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Hypotheses
Over-arching Hypothesis
I hypothesize that the Usha organization short-circuits the neoliberal development
agenda, promoting structural change and sex worker agency by addressing logistical and
political hurdles of economic empowerment, both at the individual and community
levels.
Logistical Hypotheses
I hypothesize that Usha programs economically empower sex workers individually and
collectively by addressing the logistical barriers confronting the sex worker community.
On the individual level, I propose that Usha programs offer affordable loans,
discourage over-indebtedness, and promote equitable access to and successful
repayment of loans. I hypothesize therefore, that:
Hypothesis 1: Usha maintains loan affordability. Specifically,
Hypothesis 1a: the average amount paid in interest on Usha loan per month will
be less than 30% of the individual’s monthly income.
Hypothesis 1b: loans will be less expensive than credit alternatives in the
community;
Hypothesis 2: Usha programs are designed to protect against over-indebtedness.
Specifically,
Hypothesis 2a: loan officers will use a complex calculus to determine loans, that
will account for various characteristics of the loan applicant and the proposed loan
use (matching financial capacity);
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Hypothesis 2b: lower monthly income will be associated with smaller loans
(matching financial capacity);
Hypothesis 2c: loan size will be associated with financial costs of proposed
projects (commensurateness with loan purpose);
Hypothesis 2d: Usha will offer various kinds of savings programs that
accommodate a range of savings needs (matching financial capacity).
Hypothesis 3: Usha will promote equitable services by offering all community members
access to Usha services and equally supporting all members in loan repayment.
Hypothesis 3a: loan applicant characteristics will not be associated with the
likelihood of loan provision or successful repayment.
Hypothesis 3b: sex workers will not perceive systematic exclusionary processes
by Usha staff and leadership.
On the community level I propose that the Usha organization will re-invest
surplus income back into the community, invest in community-based projects and
businesses, and autonomously manage all Usha and Durbar funds. I hypothesize
therefore that:
Hypothesis 4: Usha will invest in project and businesses that directly benefit the sex
worker community. Specifically:
Hypothesis 4a: Usha will invest in businesses that provide products integral to the
sex work profession.
Hypothesis 4b: Usha will invest in businesses that employ part-time or retired sex
workers.
Hypothesis 5: surplus income generated by Usha will be reinvested in the community.
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Hypothesis 6: Usha will achieve community control of funds by autonomously managing
all Usha and Durbar financial accounts.
Political Hypotheses
I hypothesize that Usha programs empower sex workers individually and collectively by
addressing sociopolitical barriers contributing to economic marginalization.
On the individual level I propose that Usha programs foster sex worker
professional identity, promote independent financial decision making, and support
member participation in organizational leadership and decision making. I
hypothesize, therefore, that:
Hypothesis 7: sex worker professional identity will be enhanced through participation in
Usha as professional organization.
Hypothesis 8: Usha will promote sex workers’ independent individual financial decision
making.
Hypothesis 9: Usha will encourage member participation in organizational leadership
and decision making.
On the community level I propose that Usha programs reduce economic
exploitation, provide informal sector labor protection, and promote civil society
incorporation. I hypothesize, therefore, that:
Hypothesis 10: Usha will undermine economic exploitation by power-brokers in the
community.
Hypothesis 11 Usha will provide a system of informal labor sector protection.
H11a: participation in Usha will allow members to build an individual financial
safety net and increase systematic financial management.
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H11b: participation in Usha will serve as a gateway to participation in the Durbar
worker’s collective.
Hypothesis 12: civil society incorporation will be enhanced by the legitimization of the
sex work profession through official cooperative bank recognition and participation in
Usha as a means to achieve legitimate property and business ownership.

40

CHAPTER FIVE
Methods
Community-Based Participatory Research
This research will be guided by the tenants of Community Based Participatory research
(CBPR). CBPR is a process in which researchers, organizational representatives, and
community members collaborate on research within a horizontal power structure (Israel,
Schulz, Parker, Becker, 2001). CBPR was developed as a way to structure ethical,
collaborative research engagement with marginalized communities that contributes to
self-identified goals of the communities being studied. Several key characteristics of
CBPR include balancing research that is used for knowledge development with research
that is actionable for community benefit, prioritizing community-defined research
questions, engaging in long-term research partnerships, and disseminating research
findings to the community (Israel et al., 2001).
Adhering to these principles, I have worked with Usha leadership to develop a
research project that will both contribute to academic literature and result in knowledge
that will be used to benefit Usha and its members. There has been no systematic study of
Usha, and therefore both Usha and Durbar are interested in better understanding the roles
Usha plays in the sex work community. Usha is also interested in patterns of program use
and program participation outcomes that will be relevant to both Usha program
development and our broader research aims. Finally, Usha and Durbar are keenly aware
of the political landscape of traditional development interventions and are invested in
challenging and resisting this model through research. Usha recognizes that it can
strategically use partnerships with independent academic research institutions such as the
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University of Pennsylvania, as the DMSC has (Ghose, 2011). Publications and
conference presentation coming out of this research will break the research silence on
member-led economic interventions with sex workers and contribute to a growing
literature that is shifting the discourse on sex workers and sex work organizations.
I consulted with Usha leaders on all aspects of the study, regularly discussed the
potential meanings of my emergent findings, and, when not in Kolkata, sent reports
updating the organization on my work. We have identified future lines of inquiry that are
of interest to the organization and hopefully have begun to build a long-term research
relationship. All results and conclusions were shared with the organization prior to
dissemination.
Researcher positionality. In this dissertation I have critiqued Western
abolitionist feminists for non-reflexive engagement with sex workers. As a Western
feminist scholar myself, I, too, must be aware of my social location and the ways in
which it may influence the work I do with the Usha Cooperative. Much has been written
about ways that researchers can critically examine their research engagement with
communities that have been ‘othered’ by neo-colonialism and Western research
discourses (Chilisa, 2012; Mohan, 2001). I have used this literature to shape my research
question development, engagement in the field, and data analysis. I used memoing as a
way to map these critical reflections onto the actions of my methods and analysis
(Creswell, 2007), centrally position the voices of the community in my research, and
resist constructing flattened narratives of a generalized ‘third world woman’ through my
written representations (Mohanty, 1988). The checks and balances of CPBR also
contribute to this reflexive process.
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Case Study Method
Escobar suggests that specificity of context is central to research that will defy the
ahistorical and generalized ‘best practices’ privileged by the mainstream development
discourse. Instead, research must examine specific “alternative representations and
practices (1995, p.17)” in context. The Case Study Method (CSM) is appropriate when
the phenomenon of interest is inextricable from its context (Yin, 2008). The CSM is, as it
sounds, the systematic exploration of an identifiable case in its context (Miles and
Huberman, 1994). The strength of the CSM is in its use of multiple forms of data that are
integrated to develop, describe, and analyze the case (Yin, 2008). These data are woven
together, not layered on top of each other, such that the multiple forms of data are
triangulated to strengthen and complicate the case analysis (Baxter & Jack, 2008; Yin,
2008).
This dissertation is an intrinsic case study; a study in which the case is chosen
because it is exceptionally unique and a deeper understanding of the case may shed light
on an unexamined dimension of a phenomenon of interest (Baxter & Jack, 2008). Usha is
a unique case, the systematic analysis of which can help us understand neoliberal
development and the resistance thereof. To better understand this organization I will use
the case study method to analyze Usha’s organizational structure and culture (Hatch,
1993). Case studies are often guided by hypotheses (sometimes called ‘propositions’) that
are derived from the literature or preliminary field work (Yin, 2008). The propositions of
this case study were outlined in the previous chapter and will guide data collection and
analysis.
Research Site
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The research will take place in red light districts served by the Durbar Mahila
Samanwaya Committee and the Usha Multipurpose Cooperative Society. The biggest red
light district, Sonagachi, is home to the main branches of Durbar and Usha. Sonagachi is
located in northern Kolkata, West Bengal, India. Songachi has operated as a red light
district since the colonial era and is the workplace of about 9,000 sex workers (Basu &
Dutta, 2008). The second largest red light area is Kalighat, a historic temple district in
south Kolkata. Kalighat has satellite branches of Durbar and Usha. I will conduct
research in Sonagachi, Kalighat, and Seoraphuli, a rural field outside of Kolkata.
Qualitative Data Collection
Qualitative data were collected in two phases. Phase one data were collected to
gain a basic understanding of Usha’s programs and services, identify preliminary themes
regarding Usha’s organizational culture, develop and collect semi-structured interviews
addressing Usha members’ experiences participating in Usha, and extract quantitative
data from Usha’s administrative database. In phase two, data were collected to gain a
deeper understanding of the organizational structure and culture. To focus data collection,
collection in phase two was driven by emergent themes from phase one and the
hypotheses outlined in Chapter 3. During phase two I also gathered additional member
interviews and obtained updated database information.
Hypotheses, or ‘propositions’, in case studies are a useful tool to focus data
collection, however they must be applied in a sufficiently open-ended manner as to not be
prescriptive. I therefore used the hypotheses derived from the literature to identify ‘topics
of inquiry’ that could guide my data collection without setting a deductive agenda. These
topics of inquiry were: member service experience, the processes of community financial
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advising and loan approval, credit alternatives in community, member and staff
perceptions of exclusionary practices at Usha, processes of Usha income generating
projects, investment of income, management of Usha and Durbar funds, history of
development and original implementation of Usha, organizational decision making
processes, and the relationship between Usha and Durbar (See Appendix A for a list of
hypotheses and the areas of inquiry that will elicit information relevant to each
hypothesis).
Qualitative sampling procedures and recruitment. The final qualitative data
set consists of 60 semi-structured interviews with past and present Usha members, 20 indepth semi-structured interviews with Usha and DMSC key informants, participant
observation in the red light district and at Usha and DMSC offices, organizational
documentation, and a structured orientation to the DMSC collective. All interviews were
conducted in Usha and DMSC office spaces. Interviews were conducted using a
translator who is fluent in English and Bengali and has worked extensively with the
community. Member interviews from Phase One were conducted in collaboration with
three student researchers working with Usha. I personally conducted or supervised all
interviews included in the dataset. Participants were consented verbally immediately
before the interview took place (see Appendix B for Human Subjects Protection). With
participant consent, most key informant and several member interviews were recorded.
The majority of members did not feel comfortable recording their interviews. Extensive
notes were therefore taken during non-recorded interviews, as well as translator
debriefing directly after the interview and memoing documenting the context and process
of the conversation. Interviews that were recorded were transcribed. Interview notes,
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recordings and transcript files were password protected and stored in a password
protected computer.
Member interviews. Members were eligible to participate if they were current or
past members of Usha. Members were recruited using maximum variation sampling, a
technique in which participants are recruited to achieve heterogeneity in the sample
according to relevant characteristics (Creswell, 2007). To include a broad spectrum of
Usha member experience, members were purposively sampled to include variation in
member age, income, field (urban vs. rural), HIV status, length of membership,
involvement with Durbar, occupation (the sample includes both sex workers and madams
as well as both commuting sex workers and brothel-based worker). Current members and
member who had left Usha were interviewed.
Participant sampling concluded after conceptual saturation had been reached. This
means that sampling stopped after additional interviews ceased to contribute new
concepts, rather than after attaining specific sample size (Guest, Bunce, & Johnson,
2006). Most participants were recruited from the Usha member list with the help of Usha
staff to achieve participant heterogeneity. Additionally, 10 participants were recruited at
the bank without the presence of Usha staff to assess for potential staff selection bias in
participant recruitment.
Member interview protocol. The interview protocol was piloted with 15 sex
workers and adjusted according to pilot interview feedback for question clarity. Members
interviews lasted an average of 20 minutes and addressed members experiences with
Usha services. Members were asked, for example, how long they have been a member, in
which services they participate, challenges they had experienced in participating in Usha,
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benefits of participating in Usha, their opinion of Usha as a sex workers-only
cooperative, and suggestions for Usha. Participants were also asked about their financial
goals and strategies such as their savings goals, use of savings and loans, other financial
services they participate in, and sources of financial advice. Finally, members were asked
basic demographic questions, including age, field, whether they had children, and
occupation (see Appendix C for Member Interview Protocol).
Description of member sample. Participants were most commonly from the
Sonagachi field (24), but in total represented 10 different red light areas in Kolkata and
the surrounding area. Most had children (46) and identified as sex workers (40). Other
occupations included ‘sub-letter’ (madam, 11), ex-sex worker (7), housewife (2), and
domestic worker (1). Non-sex workers were members either because they joined when
they were active sex workers or currently work for the DMSC. Almost all participants
were members of the DMSC and 18 had worked for the DMSC in some capacity, mostly
as either as a peer educator or outreach worker. Most of the sex workers were based in
brothels (33). Other workers worked independently or were ‘flying workers’ who
commute daily to work in the red light districts. Most were currently Usha members,
though 16 participants interviewed had recently left Usha. Participant ages ranged from
19-60 years old. Length of membership at Usha ranged from under two months to 19
years. Interviews revealed a range of financial experiences from women who could
barely afford basic necessities, to those who had invested in land, construction, and
businesses. Though we did not ask participants about their HIV status, 4 participants
were recruited through the DMSC Positive Women’s Network and disclosed in
interviews that they were HIV positive.
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Key Informant Interviews and Focus Groups. I conducted a total of 20 semistructured in-depth interviews and focus groups each lasting between 35-75 minutes
(though shadowing interviews lasted several hours). Key informants from Usha and the
DMSC were recruited using purposive sampling that was driven by the topics of inquiry
and emerging themes throughout data collection. All key informant interviews were
organized through Usha staff. Key informant interviews took place in Usha and DMSC
Offices, with the exception of shadowing interviews with Usha Daily Collection staff
which took place as part of participant observation in the field. All key informants were
verbally consented immediately prior to the interview. Most interviews were conducted
with a Bengali translator who has worked extensively with the community. Two
interviews were conducted in English without a translator present. Interviews covered the
topics of inquiry listed above.
Key Informant Participant Description. Key informant interviews consisted of 7
interviews with Usha leadership and Management, including the Bank Manager,
Assistant Bank Manager, Usha Secretary and Usha President. These interviews covered
the main organizational structure of Usha, in-depth descriptions of programs and
services, Usha business investments, and discussion of emergent themes throughout the
study including elements of organizational culture, such as organizational values and
commitments. I also observed two board meetings in which the board discussed issues in
the field and reviewed loan applications. I conducted focus groups with the board after
these two meetings and at one additional time for a total of three focus groups with board
members. I conducted a focus group with the Daily Collection staff as well as 4 shadow
interviews in which I followed daily collection staff in the field to observe and discuss
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their work with members. I conducted a focus group with three founding members of
Usha to discuss the original development and implementation of Usha in the community.
The data also includes interviews with a male member of the LGBT sex worker activist
community to discuss the exclusion of male and transgender sex worker from Usha
program and a financial consultant from the West Bengal Cooperative Society who had
been working with Usha for 8 months to improve their services. Finally, I spoke with
DMSC leadership, interviewing both the secretary of the DMSC and a key strategic
advisor and original organizer of the DMSC to better understand the relationship between
the two organizations.
Other Sources of Data. I conducted participant observation in Usha and DMSC
offices as well as in the red light areas. Participant observation was conducted in
Sonagachi, Kalighat, and Seoraphuli. I observed the office staff and leadership
conducting daily business, daily collectors making their rounds in the red light areas and
conducting business in the office. I attended and observed board meetings. I also was
invited to and attended several DMSC community events which helped me understand
the broader sex worker’s collective, its role in the community, and its relationship to
Usha. I maintained a research journal documenting my observations and field notes. I
also participated in a week-long orientation to the DMSC and its branch organizations.
During this orientation each branch of the DMSC presented their programs, services, and
activities, including a question and answer session. The orientation was 4-6 hours a day
for one week and gave me an overview of all of the programs currently undertaken as a
part of the DMSC sex workers’ collective. Finally, Usha gave me access to
organizational documents such as the West Bengal Cooperative Society Rules and
49

Regulations and Half-Yearly organizational reports. Appendix D includes a full
description of all data sources, their justifications, and how they address the topics of
inquiry.
Qualitative Data Analysis
My qualitative data analysis process integrated multiple forms of data, thus leveraging
the strength of the CSM (Stake, 1995). Key informant interviews and participant
observation data were collected and analyzed iteratively according to topics of inquiry
and emergent themes, as in grounded theory (Charmaz, 2006). Conducting preliminary
analysis concurrent with data collection helped tease out potentially important facets of
the Usha organizational culture and structure and assisted in identifying additional
relevant sources of data.
After collecting and compiling the entire dataset I conducted several cycles of
analytic coding. Initially, I read through the entire dataset to familiarize myself with the
data. Then I completed a round of open coding which allowed me to stay grounded in the
data (Charmaz, 2006). Open codes were then compared between qualitative data sources
and grouped into broader conceptual codes to develop themes, utilizing the constant
comparison method (Charmaz, 2006). I organized these emergent themes into a
conceptual codebook. This codebook included themes such as exploitation, stigma, trust,
sex worker identity, self-reliance, staff motivation, convenience, social networks,
legitimacy, Usha and the DMSC, use of services, and role of Usha in the sex worker’s
life. I then re-coded the entire dataset using this codebook.
After these rounds of inductive coding I created a memo for each hypothesis
outlined in the proposal. I went through the entire dataset again, this time pulling data
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that supported, refuted, complicated, or otherwise informed the hypotheses. I concluded
each memo with a summary. I incorporated the conceptual themes from inductive coding
into the hypothesis memos to add analytic texture and depth. I reviewed both the
hypothesis memos and the conceptual codebook to see if any conceptual/inductive
themes did not fit into the hypothesis framework. All conceptual codes were subsumed in
and across the hypothesis framework. I then brought the quantitative findings into the
hypothesis framework. I wrote memos addressing the ways in which the quantitative
findings triangulated, and in some cases contradicted or complicated, qualitative findings.
Using these memos I drafted an initial summary of results. Finally, after writing
completing a draft I returned to the dataset for one final review to compare the themes of
the results back to the raw data.
The final case analysis presented in the results section is structured around the
final hypothesis memos and reflects the interplay of deductive/inductive themes that was
the result of integrating inductive conceptual coding, hypothesis driven coding, and
quantitative analysis.
Data rigor. There are several measures I took to promote data rigor. Throughout
the research process I maintained a research journal of methodological and analytic
memos to create a conceptual audit trail (Lincoln & Guba, 1985), making transparent my
methodological and analytic decisions. The conceptual audit trail helps the researcher
track the ‘chain of evidence’ that link research questions, data collection, analysis, and
conclusions (Yin, 2008). The data are also triangulated through multiple sources and
types of data (interviews with various groups, written documents, and quantitative data)
and discrepancies between data types are presented and analyzed (Padgett, 2008).
51

Additionally, as themes and patterns of experiences began to emerge, I sought negative
case examples to provide insight into potentially contrasting experiences. For this reason
I specifically sampled for members that may experience marginalization at Usha such as
HIV positive members, low earners, rural members, older workers, and flying sex
workers. I also sought out members who had left Usha or were excluded from
participation. Additionally, I maintained an on-going ‘negative case example’ memo in
which I specifically noted all data that contrasted dominant narratives. Throughout data
collection I brainstormed potential areas of tension or contrasting experience and pursued
these issues in informant interviews and participant observation. Finally, I used member
checks to get feedback from research participants regarding the data and my conclusions
(Maxwell, 2005). Throughout data collection and preliminary analysis I regularly
discussed emerging themes with key informants to check my interpretations.
Quantitative Data Collection
Quantitative data were collected from the administrative database maintained by Usha at
the Sonagachi bank branch. The database tracks all members and all transactions that
occur at the main branch of the bank. Data was extracted to tables in a series of queries
conducted by the creator of the database who is a consultant from the West Bengal State
Cooperative Association. Tables were connected in a master spreadsheet for analysis.
Analyses was conducted on the entire data set (n=14,382). All analyses were conducted
using Stata12 (StatCorp, 2011).
Description of member population. Members were mostly registered as living
and working in the Sonagachi area, with 51% living in Kolkata and 49% living outside
the city. Fields outside Kolkata ranged from the nearby Howrah field to fields in the far
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north-eastern regions of West Bengal, such as Siliguri. Eighty-one percent of members
were Hindu. Ages ranged from 5 years old (mothers can open accounts for their
daughters) to 89 years old with an average age of 29. Eight percent of Usha members
have taken a loan. Income information is only collected for those who have taken a loan.
For this group, monthly incomes ranged from a minimum of 200 rupees per month to a
maximum of 500,000 rupees per month. Median income was 3,000 rupees per month
(mean was 6,196).
Table 5.1: Member Descriptive Statistics from Administrative Database (N=14,382)
Variable
Kolkata
Kolkata
Outside
Religion
Hindu
Muslim
Other
Has Taken Loan
Age at time of
membership

N

%

7,635
7,868

51%
49%

6,872
918
534
1,224
Median

83%
11%
6%
8%
Mean

Minimum

Maximum S.D.

26

29

5

89

8.5

Quantitative Analyses. Quantitative analyses were conducted to examine
Hypotheses 1,2,3 and 7. Missing data in the administrative database was addressed using
listwise deletion (Allison, 2010). Tests on data variation indicated some
heteroskedasticity in the data. This was corrected for by using robust standard errors on
regression analyses showing evidence of heteroskedasticity. A coefficient significance
level was set at p<0.05 for all regression and logistic regression results. Descriptions of
specific analyses of hypotheses are included in the results.
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CHAPTER SIX
Results: Logistical Individual Impact of Usha
Table 6.1: Logistical Individual Hypotheses
Individual

Community

Logistical Logistical Individual
Hypothesis One: Usha will maintain loan affordability.
H1a: the average amount paid in interest on Usha
loan per month will be less than 30% of the
individual’s monthly income.
H1b: loans will be less expensive than credit
alternatives in the community.

Logistical
Community
H4, H5, H6

Hypothesis Two: Usha programs will be designed to
protect against over-indebtedness.
H2a: loan officers will use a complex calculus to
determine loan approval.
H2b: loans amounts will be matched with capacity
to repay (lower monthly income will be associated
with smaller loans).
H2c: loan size will be associated with financial
costs of proposed projects.
H2d: Usha will offer various kinds of savings
programs that accommodate a range of savings
needs.
Hypothesis Three: Usha will promote equitable
services by offering all community members access to
Usha services and equally supporting all members in
loan repayment.
H3a: after controlling for other variables, age,
length of time at Usha, income, field, and loan
amount will not be associated with the likelihood
of loan provision or successful repayment.
H3b: sex workers will not perceive systematic
exclusionary processes by Usha staff and
leadership.
Political
Political Individual
H7, H8, H9
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Political
Community
H10, H11,
H12

In this chapter I will use interviews with Usha members, staff, and leadership, participant
observation, and analysis of the administrative database to assess Usha’s individual
services based on the above criteria. I will then use microeconomic theory to analyze the
process through which Usha provides these services and assess their sustainability over
the long term. Finally, I consider outcomes of Usha participation and discuss the benefits
and enduring challenges of service provision.
Hypothesis One
Affordability will be evident in:
Hypothesis 1a: the average amount paid in interest on Usha loan per month being
less than 30% of the individual’s monthly income.
Hypothesis 1b: loans being less expensive than credit alternatives in the
community (such as money lenders, microfinance programs in the area);
Loan costs. Usha’s administrative database shows that nearly all loans (99%)
were given to sex workers at 11% annual percentage rate (declining balance). This is less
than half the interest rate of major microfinance institutions, both for and non-profit, in
India and elsewhere (Augsburg & Fouillet, 2010). Table 6.2 compares Usha’s loan
services with the State Bank of India, two major microfinance organizations in India, one
non-profit and one for-profit model, and the Grameen Bank.
Table 6.2: Comparison of Official Credit Options in West Bengal
Institution Usha

State
Bank of
India
12-18%

For-Profit
Non-Profit
Grameen
Microfinance* Microfinance** Bank***

11%
24.55%
22.55%
Loan
Interest
Rate
* www.bandhanmf.com ** www.sksindia.com ***www.grameen-info.org
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22%

Even at reasonable interest rates, however, loans can be too expensive for an individual if
she cannot afford monthly loan payments. I used Usha’s administrative database to
calculate the percentage of average monthly member income used to make average
monthly loan payments. Using the median as the measure of central tendency, the
average member is paying about 19% of their monthly income on loan payments. I used
median because there were some very high outliers in both the income and instalment
amount variables that skew the data. Using the mean as a measure of central tendency the
percent of monthly income spent on loan payment hovers around a third (34%). It is
important to note the functional definition of income in a sex work context. Room and
board are often deducted from income before it is disbursed to sex workers. The 19%,
then, refers to income after room and board are paid. Table 6.3 provides information on
loan relative to income. In hypothesis 2a I will discuss Usha’s loan decision-making
processes that promote the approval of loans that are affordable relative to applicant’s
capacity to repay.
Table 6.3: Loan Cost Relative to Income (N=1,686)
Rate
Percent monthly income
paid in loan payment
Average loan size
expressed in average
monthly income

Using Median

Using Mean

19%

34%

5 months income

8.4 months income

Credit options in the community. Since the development and growth of Usha,
legitimate financial institutions such as the state bank have opened up their doors to sex
workers to open accounts (see Hypothesis 7). However, no members I spoke with
mentioned taking a bank loan and only about 25% reported having a savings account with
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a bank outside of Usha. Members reported that this is due to the documentation needed
and the stigma sex workers experience while transacting with the state bank. Aside from
Usha, viable credit options in the community are limited to an informal system of moneylenders, madams, babus (long term client/husband), and family.
Unofficial Lenders. Usha was originally created by sex workers to address the
lack of credit and savings options open to the sex work community. According to
interviews with founding members of Usha and long-term community members, before
Usha was introduced most sex workers either kept their money hidden with themselves or
gave it to their madams. In the event of emergencies sex workers took personal loans
from madams or babus or took high interest loans from money-lenders. Original
members describe the credit options in the community before Usha:
Before Usha madams, dalals, and money lenders served the purpose of bank.
They were not much better than chit funds charging exorbitant interest rates.
Workers would have to give their jewelry to pay back. It is better to have
someone sympathetic to the plight of sex workers. –Usha leadership
If you wanted to take out loans you had to go to unofficial money-lenders. Then
there would be madams who would be interfering, they would also charge us
money for loans. We would be paying in this bottomless trap. We'd pay rupees
per day until the loan was paid off. At that time it was 30, 100, you'd keep paying
and it doesn't get paid off. Earlier these unofficial money lenders, I've always
noticed them banging on the women's door, coming at like 8 in the morning,
disturbing women and I always wondered why are women falling prey to this
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stuff? But after Usha became established and popular, the unofficial moneylenders hate Usha. They're like 'because of Usa we are not earning'. -Founding
Member
Sex workers now have access to low-cost Usha loans, yet some current sex workers still
reported using money lenders before being connected to Usha.
There are some unofficial money lenders in the community. A while ago I took a
loan for 5000 rupees to visit family. I paid 100 rupees a day until I paid it back. 53
I used to take loan from the local money lender and they used to charge high rates
of interest. If I took a loan of 1000 rupees I would be charged 20 rupees a day till
I repaid. It was very high. So when Usha was there I realized the benefits of Usha,
the low rate of interest... it has helped a lot. - 3
This member went on to explain that unofficial money-lenders take advantage of sex
worker’s lack of formal education to make exploitative deals that remain ‘off the books.’
There was no written document (for the loan contract) and I took loan for my
house from the local money-lender. I took 10,000 and I paid 20,000. The math
was wrong, but I paid the local money-lender who charged high interest, so it was
a loss for me. From Usha, first I took a loan for my health. I got sick so I took a
loan and repaid it. I took it against my 40,000 fixed deposit. Then, with two fixed
deposit I have taken an 80,000 loan and I am building my house. -3
Access to affordable loans can make a significant difference in the financial lives of sex
workers. Sex workers often face multiple economic vulnerabilities due to fluctuations in
the market, illness, and reliance of extended family on remittances from sex work
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income. Adding exploitative financial services can prove disastrous for workers. One
HIV positive sex worker explained how Usha alleviates at least one of these concerns. “If
I got a loan from an unofficial money lender he would charge interest so high that I
would never be able to repay. This would be terrible for me because I am sick and need
access to affordable loans. This helps me a lot (48).”
The introduction of Usha as a credit option has lessened the overall presence of
unofficial money lenders in the community. A board member describes how moneylending is less common now that Usha programs and services have saturated the
community.
Of course there are these loan sharks that are still operating but really way less
than what it was 15 years back. They are still around, but they are not as
popular… People who have access to Usha usually come to Usha for their loansbut people who don’t have an Usha account, they are more susceptible to that. Board Member
Similarly, the presence of Usha has helped sex workers become less dependent on
madams who also took a high price for loans, indebting sex workers financially and
exercising control over them. As one sex workers put it, “Usha helped make sex workers
financially independent. We don't need to ask madams for loans. We used to have to ask
madams for loans to visit home and other things. Now we don't need to depend on
madams because we have Usha (Founding Member).”
Microfinance. The red light areas in Kolkata have a high density of NGOs
working with sex workers. There are also many commercial microfinance organizations
in India which provide small scale financial services such as saving and loans.
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Interestingly, no one I spoke with in the community had heard of or participated in any
microfinance projects, either NGO or commercial, operating in the red light districts with
sex workers. Besides unofficial money-lenders, madams, and babus, therefore, sex
workers have very few credit options. Several sex workers mentioned taking loans from
family. This option is closed to many sex workers who have cut ties with their family
since coming to the red light area or who keep their profession a secret from their family.
For those who had relationships with their families, it was more often the case that the
sex workers were supporting extended family by sending remittances to home villages.
Usha, therefore, is the least expensive credit option for sex workers in the red light
district.
Community savings options. Loans are only a small part of Usha’s programs
and services. The majority of members participate in Usha’s savings programs. For most
of the members I spoke with, Usha had been their first opportunity to formally save
money. Before joining Usha most sex workers kept their money hidden with themselves
or with their madams and babus.
I started saving money in Usha because it was the safest place to save. A lot of
sex workers get tricked by their Babus or madams to save with them. Customers,
Babus, Madams, they steal their stuff, their mobiles, their money. It is a bad idea
to keep money with these people even if you trust them. At Usha your money is
safe. No one is going to steal your account book and even if they do it doesn't
matter, you can just get a new one. Usha is safe, convenient. I have told many
other workers to save with Usha. -49
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Saving money with babus, madams, and pimps makes sex workers economically
vulnerable and interrupts sex workers ability to mobilize their earnings to achieve
financial goals. As a founding member put it, “Personally, for me, I felt very exploited at
that time (before Usha) because I would have to give my money to my madam, she
would take it. I also had to give my Babu money. Even though I was earning I didn't feel
as though I was able to use my earnings.”
Usha gives sex workers a secure option for saving money that helps them
capitalize on their earnings to achieve financial goals. One member described how
freeing her income from the control of her pimp helped her develop savings goals. She
explained, “Before I was not saving money because I was giving it to the pimps, but now
I have hopes to save to build a house. Now, I don't have to give a lot of money to pimps. I
no longer have a pimp (31).”
Value of savings. Usha offers interest on its savings accounts that are competitive
with market rates. Their standard savings account scheme offers 5% interest, 1% more
than the State Bank. Longer term accounts, such as the Fixed Deposit scheme, offer up to
9% interest. Usha uses interest to incentivize saving among sex workers. Specifically,
higher savings on long-term accounts encourages sex workers to plan for the future.
Usha understands that sex workers also need options that allow for immediate access to
cash and has savings schemes to accommodate this as well.

Affordability with respect to opportunity costs. Financial affordability of loans and
high interest on savings are not the only reasons sex workers use Usha. Several members
had accounts with other banks, but also opened accounts with Usha because they
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considered Usha to be more convenient than alternatives. Usha members frequently cited
convenience as a reason for preferring Usha services. Usha was therefore also considered
affordable with respect to the opportunity costs of sex workers. Convenience was defined
by members according to several dimensions. Firstly, it is easy to open an account with
Usha, especially compared to other banks that require extensive documentation and
several potentially intimidating processes before opening an account. Members described
their experience opening their accounts,
Before (joining Usha) I wasn't saving anywhere. All of my money went to
drinking and other addiction. I put some money in a chit fund, but that money was
all lost. One day the daily collector came by and he said ‘do you have two
pictures of yourself?’ I said, ‘yes’ he said, ‘Great. You can start saving
tomorrow.’-27
A lot of didis encouraged me to save so unofficial money lenders wouldn’t have
power over me. That’s why I decided to save. We also encourage our neighbors
and didis to save in Usha. It’s better than saving in a state bank. There you need to
go through an entire process but here you only need 115 (rupees) and a small
photo and you can start saving fast.-18
Secondly, there is little to no wait on withdrawals at Usha. This is important for sex
workers who may need access to their cash quickly. Koken (2012) explains how sex
workers appreciate the immediacy of money earned doing sex work, not just the amount.
It is therefore important that Usha honor this benefit of sex work income while still
encouraging long term savings habits. A member told me, “I have so many expenses that
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come up like rent and electricity, and some things are unexpected. It is important that I
can take out money when I need to (53).” Additionally, Usha branches are located in the
red light areas. This makes it convenient for sex workers to visit the bank. Finally, the
bank buffers members from stigma that sex workers experience when access institutions
outside of the red light area. This member described the benefit of participating in an allsex worker bank.
I have a savings account at Punjab National Bank but the account is unused and is
almost closed. I opened it back before Usha. Usha is specific for sex workers. The
entire organization is run by sex workers and I wanted to be involved in their
organization more than this other bank. It is easy to deposit and withdraw at Usha.
I don't need to be humiliated because I can't sign in English. I can sign in Bengali,
or even if I can't sign at all I can use my fingerprint. -46
Specifically, many sex workers mentioned the convenience of the Daily Collection
program. The Daily Collection program uses Usha employees, the majority of whom are
the children of sex workers, to travel to the brothels and collect deposits from members.
Members described their reasons for using the Daily Collection program,
I thought if every day I could save like 100 or 200 rupees that would be a good
thing because if the money was with me I would spend it. I just have a daily
collection account. It’s very convenient. -8
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The Daily Collector is very encouraging and tells us whatever you can save is
good, even if it is only ten or fifteen rupees. It is important to form a habit of
saving, because you can't anticipate the expenses you will have in the future. -62
Additionally, the Daily Collectors are flexible and will work with sex worker’s schedules
to accommodate the irregular flow of sex work incomes.
The Daily Collector is really awesome. It’s because of the Daily Collector that I
have been able to put away so much money. The Daily Collector actually visits
me twice some of the days because I am not around all the time in the morning so
he kinds of checks in around ten and then around like two in the afternoon.-56
Members also expressed that this system encouraged them to save. As one member put it,
“The Daily Collection system helps me continue to save because the Daily Collector
comes every day and reminds me (7).” Another member echoed this experience, “(the
Daily Collection program) is really good. The fact that they come to us makes you want
to save more (6).”
Usha services and programs are designed with the sex worker in mind. They
provide affordable loans and generative savings schemes. These services are valued by
the community, especially in light of the dearth of acceptable alternatives. I will discuss
the challenges Usha faces in providing these services, as well as possible drawbacks of
this model later in this section, but first I will look into the ways Usha attempts to prevent
over-indebtedness in the sex work community.
Hypothesis Two
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At Usha, indebtedness is undermined by ensuring that loans are matched to financial
capacity to repay and loan purpose. Specifically:
Hypothesis 2a: loan officers will use a complex calculus to determine loan
approval, that will account for various characteristics of the loan applicant and the
proposed loan use (matching financial capacity);
Hypothesis 2b: lower monthly income will be associated with smaller loans
(matching financial capacity);
Hypothesis 2c: loan size will be associated with financial costs of proposed
projects (commensurateness of loan purpose);
Hypothesis 2d: Usha will offer various kinds of savings programs that
accommodate a range of savings needs (matching financial capacity).
Loan decision-making process. The Usha board of directors, a member-elected
board of sex workers, makes all loan decisions. Members individually submit loan
applications to the board, often with the help of Daily Collectors or office staff. All loans
are voted on by the Board of Directors of Usha at bi-monthly board meetings. The bank
manager reads the loan application aloud to board members as well as a summary of the
applicant’s history with Usha. Information about the loan applicant usually includes
salary, amount requested, proposed repayment time, amount in savings, savings history,
history of loan repayment, and loan purpose. Additionally, the board reports on anything
they know about the applicant from the field. The board will also consider non-liquid
assets, such as buildings, but tries not to rely on these forms of collateral because they
have never, nor would ever want to, seize property to recover loan money. Occasionally,
they will consult with the Secretary of DMSC for guidance on loan decisions. The board
tries to gather as much information as possible to make sound decisions. A board member
told me at a meeting I attended, “board decisions are final so we give it a lot of thought.”
Observing these meetings shows the loan approval process in action. In the board
meetings I attended the board reviewed about 15 loans per meeting. They considered
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each loan individually and in many cases waited to make a decision until they could
speak with the applicant to learn more about the proposed use or to ask other community
members about the applicant. In focus groups, board members expressed the difficulty of
balancing the desire to give workers loans and wanting to make sure both the individual
and the organization stay financially stable. They also must strike a balance between the
objective financial realities of the applicant and a more subjective assessment of trustworthiness, responsibility, and need. One board member described the decision-making
process when sex workers request emergency loans,
It is for sex workers so we definitely try to work around these issues, but also we
have to remember that we can’t let it go right into the ground. We have to make
some financially wise decisions also. However, we definitely try to work with
members. It’s also very subjective, you know, it’s not always just about how
much she’s saved, but if we really think that person is reliable, trustworthy, or if
she’s a new person, new in the field and she hasn’t yet had the time to save up.
We take all of that into consideration before deciding on the loan.
Usha makes loan decisions that prevent over-indebtedness by bringing together multiple
forms of data to consider the over-all feasibility of repayment of the proposed loan by the
applicant. For example, I attended a board meeting at which the bank manager reviewed
the application of a member who had applied for a 10 lakh loan. This was a relatively
large loan for the bank to give. The bank manager had analyzed her salary and assets and
determined that paying back the loan would require monthly payments equivalent to 40%
of the woman’s income. In the Bank manager’s opinion, the loan was untenable. The
board took several other factors into their decision, including history of loan repayment
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and proposed use of the loan, but ultimately did not approve the loan. They suggested the
member re-apply for a smaller sum.
Loan patterns in administrative data.
Matching Financial Capacity. Analysis of administrative data provides
preliminary quantitative evidence supporting the hypothesis that Usha tailors loan
decisions to member capacity and proposed project. To gauge patterns in loan approval I
used regression analysis to estimate predictors of loan size. Controlling for demographic
characteristics of age (at time of loan application), length of time at Usha, field (red light
district in which the member works), and loan purpose, those who had a higher monthly
income were given larger loans. Specifically, each Rs.100 in income was predictive of an
additional Rs. 722 in sanctioned loan amount. This suggests that the board matches loan
amount with capacity to repay, rather than giving out standard loans and exacting
repayment through other means, as is seen in commercial microfinance (Karim, 2011).
There was also a significant effect of length of membership at Usha. Each
additional year at Usha was predictive of 1,598 (about $25) additional rupees in loan
amount. This lends support to the idea that members can leverage their history with the
organization to build credit worthiness over time. Additionally there was a small effect of
age, with each additional year predictive of a little over 400 additional rupees (p<0.05).
Commensurateness with purpose. Additionally, the data indicate significant
differences between purposes. Building construction was the most commonly specified
use of member loans. Loans sanctioned for purchasing land, buying a car, and investing
in business were not significantly greater or smaller than loans for building construction.
Loans taken for education, marriage, medical treatment, and family purposes were
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sanctioned significantly less than building construction (p≤ 0.01). These are logical
results given that construction, business investment, land and car purchase are largeticket items. They are also long-term assets. Medical bills, marriage costs, and loans for
family members are not generative investments and are therefore sanctioned in smaller
amounts. This gives supporting evidence that, independent of income, board members
specifically consider the use of the loan when deciding on loan amount. It takes
administrative resources to give each loan application independent consideration,
resources that many microfinance organizations are not willing to expend to create
tailored loans. Table 6.4 presents the results from the loan size regressions.

Table 6.4: Predictors of Loan Size (N=1,353)
Variable
Monthly Income
Purpose (compared to Construction)
Business
Car
Education
Marriage
Family Use
Medical Treatment
Land Purchase
Repay Debt
Age (at time of app)
Length of membership (at time of
app in days)
Field
*p ≤ 0.05, **p ≤ 0.01

β
7.22**
-20650
1003929
-30963**
-26307**
-40359**
-32,016**
46310
-17020
408*
4.38*
-5068

Options for those denied loans. Usha has created several services to financially
support members who do not qualify for their credit program, allowing them to be
discerning with their loan approvals while financially supporting the full spectrum of
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member need. Many are encouraged to save up for the purchase of durable goods, rather
than or in addition to taking loans. In fact only about 8% of Usha members have ever
taken a loan. Most use Usha’s savings programs to manage their finances and built
toward financial goals. To achieve this, Usha has developed a range of different savings
schemes to match member’s needs and goals. I have already described the Daily
Collection system, in which money is collected by field workers and builds for one year
before withdrawal is allowed. This is an effective way for sex workers to develop savings
with small deposits. The Savings Program, Usha’s most popular scheme, operates more
like a high-interest checking account, with no restrictions on withdrawals or deposits.
There are also several kinds of long-term, higher interest accounts, such as the Thrift
Fund and Fixed Account, which assist members in achieving long term financial goals
like saving for retirement. Many members participate in more than one kind of account.
Table Five shows the different accounts and interest rates.
Table 6.5: Types of Savings Accounts (N=28,726)
Account Type
Number of
Percent of all
Accounts
accounts
Savings Account
13,508
47%
Thrift Fund Deposit 7,195
25%
Daily Collection
4,714
16%
Guarantee Fund/
1,775
6%
Fixed Deposit
Recurring Deposits 402
1%
Monthly Income
121
.4%
Scheme

Interest Rate
5%
7%
4%
Up to 9%
5%
8-9%

Some sex workers, however, find themselves with no savings and emergent need
for cash. Often these members apply for loans. One such loan application was reviewed
at a meeting I attended. The member had very little in her savings and asked for a loan
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for a medical treatment. Referring to the member’s clear inability to repay, a board
member said, “She is not asking for a loan, she is asking for a social welfare grant.” This
was not a dismissive remark, however. Usha has several social welfare grants to which
members can apply. These programs are funded through profits generated by Usha
investments and cover a variety of member need such as medical expenses, funeral costs,
and other unanticipated expenditures.
Usha also provides sound financial advice as a means to prevent overindebtedness. Almost all members interviewed stated that the didis (sisters) of Usha and
other Usha staff were their main source of financial advice. Usha staff helps members
manage their accounts to make the most of their money and make wise financial
decisions.
Hypothesis Three
Equitable service access will be addressed by offering all community members access to
Usha services.
Hypothesis 3a: loan applicant characteristics will not be associated with the
likelihood of loan provision or successful repayment.
Hypothesis 3b: sex workers will not perceive systematic exclusionary processes
by Usha staff and leadership.
It is an enduring critique that modern microfinance programs systematically underserve
marginalized groups within their catchment communities (Rankin, 2002). Logistic
regression predicting whether a member has ever taken a loan shows some potential
stratification in Usha services. Each additional year in the age of a sex worker increases
the likelihood of having taken a loan by 3% (p<0.01). In the context of the political
economy of sex work, older workers are more economically marginalized than younger
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workers. This finding therefore suggests that Usha services are in fact actually more
likely to serve those in the community with greatest need.
Field was also a significant predictor of whether a member took a loan (p<0.01).
Those working in Kolkata are 60% more likely than those living and working outside of
Kolkata to have taken a loan. Usha may need to investigate barriers to loan service faced
by sex workers in outer districts. Forty-three percent of members live outside of Kolkata,
so this barrier affects many sex workers. Additionally, length of time with Usha was
predictive of taking a loan. Again, this suggests that the process of building a relationship
with the organization increases mutual trust that is facilitative of the loan process.
Once a loan is approved, however, there is no indication of stratification in
repayment success. Sixty percent of Usha loans are overdue. Age, field, income, length of
time at Usha, size of the loan and purpose of the loan did not significantly predict on-time
repayment. Results of regressions measuring equitability of services are found in Tables
6.6 and 6.7.
Table 6.6: Predictors of Taking a Loan (N=13,267)
Variable
Age
Length of time at Usha
Kolkata
**p ≤ 0.01

β
1.03**
1.0004**
1.60**

Table 6.7: Predictors of Overdue Loans (N=690)
Variable
Length of time at Usha
Kolkata
Income
Purpose

β
1.00
.90
.99
1.02
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Loan Size
.99
Age
.99
*No variables were statistically significant
Interviews with Usha and DMSC staff indicate that there may be factors that
contribute to loan repayment success or failure that are not captured in the administrative
data. These variables include whether the member works independently or under a
madam, has children, has a babu, is brothel based or a ‘flying’ sex worker, and/or is HIV
positive. Analyzing loan repayment success according to these personal dimensions is a
potential future study.
One critique faced by commercial microfinance organizations is that they exclude
the lowest-earning members of communities (Cull, Demirgüç-kunt, & Morduch, 2008).
Smaller loans are more expensive to provide than larger loans, since administrative costs
on all loans are fixed. Usha has provided extremely small loans to members when
needed. All members, regardless of any criteria, are instantly eligible for a loan of 110%
or less of their savings. The smallest loan on the books at Usha was 300 rupees (about 5
USD) and 25% of loans are 5000 rupees or less (82 USD). In the concluding section of
this chapter I will examine how Usha can afford to offer such small loans. First I will
examine sources of potential exclusion at Usha that did not show up in the quantitative
data, but did in the qualitative data.
Perception of exclusionary practices. I asked Usha staff and members about
groups they thought might experience difficulty accessing or successfully participating in
Usha services and several groups came up. For some of these groups Usha has taken
steps to facilitate their incorporation into the cooperative. Other groups still face barriers
to inclusion.
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Flying Sex Workers. Most sex workers in Kolkata live and work out of brothels.
Brothels are concentrated in red light districts and house sex workers who are usually
working under a madam. The brothel system creates a dense network of centrally located
sex workers. Physical proximity was shown by Ghose et al. (2011) to play an important
role in the ability of sex workers in Kolkata to mobilize around community health and
well-being. Flying sex workers do not reside in the red light area. They commute daily to
the red light area to work. Because they are not geographically rooted in the sex work
community it is difficult to recruit flying sex workers to participate in community
programs like Usha. Often these workers keep their profession a secret from their
families at home. Heightened concerns about confidentiality impede flying sex workers’
willingness to participate in programs that require documentation, such as the Usha
savings account passbook. Usha staff and leadership are aware of these additional
barriers to participation for flying sex workers and have developed creative ways to be
more inclusive of this group. A member of the Usha leadership described how she would
work with flying sex workers to save, despite their challenges.
Whatever their daily income was, I used to keep it inside the passbook and
keep it with me. The flying sex workers couldn’t take their books back home, but
if they took the money back it would get spent, so I did that. Many of my friends
would say as long as you did that with us we could save.”
Incorporating flying sex workers into Usha’s programs and services is an ongoing
concern of Usha staff and leadership.
Exclusions due to daily collector commission structure. Several years back Usha
shifted the Daily Collection staff from a salary structure to a commission structure. The
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logic behind this was to incentivize the collection staff to see as many members as
possible in the day. It was feared, however, that collectors would only visit high earning
members as an unintended consequence of commission. Usha has implemented
additional checks and balances to stem such unintended consequences. A member of the
Usha leadership explains,
We had a problem with Daily Collectors only going to the workers who made
more money, now we've trained the DC's to go to each house and ask everybody.
We have surprise field visits to make sure they are seeing everyone. Members can
also go to peer educators (from DMSC) or the clinic or the Usha office to
complain that the Daily Collector isn't coming. Daily Collectors also give out
their mobile numbers to members so they can call when they want to make a
deposit.
Daily Collectors, too, told me how they maintain open communication with members and
are accountable to the community.
We are always ready for service, even if we don't come to work. They can call us
on our mobile phones and ask us, you know, why haven't you come to work?
Sometimes members see me on the road and are like dada (brother), why didn't
you come to work? And I’m like “I was sick, but if you have money to deposit
you can deposit directly at the bank or wait for tomorrow or something.” - Daily
Collector
The saturation of the broader network of Usha and DMSC in the community also
contributes to Daily Collector accountability. The assistant bank manager describes how
this network helps Usha keep tabs on the collectors in the field,
74

Monitoring is a very important part so there are several checks in place. For
example the monitors check whether they’ve gone to the fields, whether they have
visited all the houses, whether they have collected the money and when they are
posting it back over here. Every morning they check in. When they are out in the
field they encounter peers (Peer Educators from DMSC). Every day someone
from almost all fields comes in to deposit or withdraw money. So we ask them
have they seen the Daily Collector. It’s an informal way of keeping track, but it
seems to be effective because there are so many people that there’s a high chance
that someone will see them. We ask the Daily Collectors to check on each other
and report back.
Through this series of checks and balances Usha keeps daily collectors motivated to meet
with all members in the field. No member I spoke with had experienced challenges with
their daily collector.
Male and transgender sex workers. Usha prides itself as being a resource for the
sex worker community. The Usha by-laws, however are written such that only woman
are permitted to join the cooperative, thereby excluding male and transgender sex
workers. Usha is actively looking into how it can work with the WBCS to amend the bylaws to accept transgender workers. In an interview with a transgender sex worker, the
worker indicated that gender-nonconforming and transgender sex workers would need to
organize with Usha to advocate for a change in the by-laws. The worker said that
organizing the transgender worker community to this end is difficult, though a collective
of LGBTQ sex workers is forming and gaining momentum. There is little debate within
Usha about accepting female-identifying transgender sex workers as members.
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Accepting male workers is an issue of greater debate. Usha accepts all women in
the sex work community as members. This includes madams and the daughters of sex
workers. There is a concern among staff and members that opening Usha to male
members of the community would not just open Usha to male sex workers, who are often
exploited similarly to female sex workers, but also pimps and babus who are often a
controlling and exploitative element of the community. Many sex workers expressed
discomfort opening Usha to men.
Of course it is good that Usha is only for sex workers and only for women. The
Usha didis made it this way for a reason. If men were involved they could take
advantage of the sex workers, they could try to take their money. Men would
come in, withdraw our money, and try to exploit us. The didis made it this way
with a purpose in mind. -63
Other members expressed that accepting men would lead to increased deposits and
broader membership which would ultimately strengthen Usha. They also expressed
frustration that they could not open accounts for their sons and that they could not use
their husband’s assets as collateral for loans. For staff, the rule is used as a tool to protect
the financial independence of female sex workers. They have called on the ‘women only’
rule many times to prevent controlling babus from accessing their partner’s accounts and
to encourage sex workers to put land or building deeds in their own names. Usha has a
discretionary spending fund from which males sex workers in need of emergency money
can apply for loans. One board member has suggested opening certain services to men,
but protecting Usha leadership from male participation. The debate remains unresolved.
Logistical Individual Support: Staff Motivation and Social Network Mobilization
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In the preceding section I gave an overview of Usha’s programs and services in
comparison to alternative options in the community. On the whole, Usha’s programs have
proven to be affordable and supportive of sex workers’ financial health. Though Usha
may need to continue to develop ways to facilitate access for some groups, including
younger workers, rural workers, transgender workers, and flying workers, access to Usha
is far-reaching and continually being improved. In the last section I will analyze the
challenges Usha faces in providing these services as well as the specific beneficial effects
these services have had on the lives of sex workers. First though, I will look into the
reasons why Usha is committed to providing member-centered services and how,
according to the principles of micro-economics, they are able to do so.
Staff motivation. Usha has developed member-centered services because those
developing and implementing the services are members of the community themselves.
The Daily Collectors, for example, are for the most part children of sex workers. In a
focus group, Daily Collectors expressed that they were dually motivated by money and
their desire to help their fellow community members. Several Daily Collectors where
connected to the job through involvement at Amra Padatik. Amra Padatik is a collective
of sex workers’ children who fight for their own rights and the rights of their mothers.
Many Usha staff members are involved in different capacities in the larger DMSC
worker’s rights collective.
I also asked the Board about their motivations for running for election. Every
single board member described how they had been helped by Usha and had seen their
peers and friends helped by Usha. They joined the board to contribute to the growth and
improvement of Usha. One Board member told the story of her original involvement with
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Usha. She had provided for her extended family for years through her sex work and
always assumed they would be there for her if she fell on hard times. Several years back
she got seriously ill. No one came to her assistance and she fell into debt. The didis at
Usha took her in and through low-cost emergency loans worked with her until she got
back on her feet. She is now the treasurer of Usha. She said,
I’ve used my story to inform others. Because my story is so powerful even people
who hadn’t thought about saving do. We exist in this community. If we were not
sex workers (the bank) wouldn’t really bother to inquire after us, but because we
are sex workers we know how to take care of each other… That’s the whole point
of being in a community like this.
This expression of intrinsic motivation and community commitment contrasts accounts of
employees at other microfinance organizations who see NGO employment as one of few
professional options with upward mobility and are motivated by loan recovery, not
member experience (Karim, 2011).
The microeconomics of social networking. It is reasonable to wonder how Usha
manages to successfully provide services such as low interest rates, a wide range of loan
sizes, competitive savings rates, and social welfare grants. There are two key features of
Usha that appear to make such programs possible. First, Usha was incorporated in the
WBCS as a “Multipurpose Society” which allows it to take member deposits, give loans,
and invest in business ventures. Usha therefore invests its money in income generating
accounts and businesses, the profits from which are reinvested in the financial stability of
the bank. Usha invests in stable, community based enterprises that provide a regular
source of income to the organization. This income is used to help off-set the high price of
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small transactions and maintain the ‘Bad Debt Fund’ to cover unpaid loans. It also means
the organization does not rely on loan interest alone to run the organization, thus
facilitating low interest rates (for more on Usha’s business investments and use of profits
see Hypotheses 4-6).
The second way Usha maintains its programs is through the use of its vast
community social network in association with the DMSC. To understand the role of
Usha’s social network in its services, a basic understanding of the microeconomics of
lending is necessary. There is an economic justification for why microfinance developed
in the first place. It is expensive for lenders to lend to poor people. Lenders accept a
certain amount of risk when they make loans to borrowers. That risk would be nonexistent if the lenders knew in advance exactly what the lender would do with their
money. The lender does not have this information and risk exists because the lender
cannot observe the borrower’s intentions, behaviors, and actual returns on investment
(Armendariz & Morduch, 2010). This problem of asymmetrical information is referred to
as the “agency problem” in economics literature. These problems arise at the point of
deciding who gets a loan, referred to as adverse selection, and what the borrower does
after she obtains the loan, referred to as moral hazard (Besley, 1994).
Adverse Selection. Lenders don’t know which individuals in their potential pool
of borrowers will be at high risk of default and who will not. Lending to inherently risky
borrowers raises overall interest rates, because lenders need to cover anticipated loss
from risky borrowers. Lenders don’t know who is risky and who is not, so all borrowers
get the same interest rate. Therefore non-risky borrowers essentially subsidize risky
borrowers through inflated interest rates needed to cover their risky peers. There is the
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potential that lenders will raise their interest rates so high to cover the cost of risky
lenders that it pushes safe lenders out of the market and only risky lenders get capital
(Armendariz & Morduch, 2010; Besley, 1994).
Moral Hazard. Once loans are made, a new set of risks emerge. Loans are made
with a certain set of expectations regarding the borrower’s use of that money. However,
lenders do not know if borrowers are taking appropriate action to ensure repayment
(Armendariz & Morduch, 2010; Besley, 1994). Without some kind of leverage of
enforcement borrowers could claim bad luck and simply default on their loan
(Armendariz & Morduch, 2010).
If lenders knew more about their borrowers, they could make more informed
decisions about to whom they should lend and to what extent the borrower is actually
able to repay. However, gathering this information requires administrative resources
which drive up the cost of transaction per dollar lent, which, again, increases interest
rates (Banerjee & Duflo, 2010).
Limited liability. Commercial banks deal with these agency issues by taking
collateral. If the borrower can offer some asset that covers all or part of the loan amount,
this collateral can be leveraged to influence borrower behavior and/or eventually seized
to cover the cost of the loan. The use of collateral helps lenders lend more freely, thereby
keeping capital flowing and contributing to the overall decrease of interest rates and
efficiency of capital markets (Armendariz & Morduch, 2010). A problem occurs because
resource poor households do not have assets to offer as collateral (Armendariz &
Morduch (2010). This lack of collateral is called the problem of limited liability and is a
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major reason low-income/ low-wealth individuals have been excluded from commercial
credit (Armendariz & Morduch, 2010).
Another reason commercial banks shy away from disbursing loans to poor people
is that information gathered on loanees for the purposes of monitoring and enforcing
loans is fixed. It does not depend on size of loan. This makes smaller loans more
expensive for lenders. The gathering of information, however, is critical to mitigate the
problems of adverse selection and moral hazard. The combination of limited liability and
high administrative costs make small loans to poor people doubly unviable (Banerjee &
Duflo, 2010). On the other hand, this also means that small changes in administrative
costs can have big impact on cost, and therefore interest rates, of small loans. Decreased
administrative cost and the resultant decreased interest rates can encourage lending to this
group, as can the development of creative loan repayment enforcement without the use of
collateral.
Usha’s use of the social network. Usha relies on the social network of the sex
work community to address the agency issues inherent in lending and the administrative
costs of dispersing small loans. Lending institutions that enter a community from the
outside must figure out a way to gather information on loan applicants. This is a costly
process. Usha can call on its connection to the community to gather information on loan
applicants quickly and efficiently, thus offsetting the risk of adverse selection. It can use
these same social networks to monitor loan grantees after the money has been disbursed,
thus making it possible to intervene early on problem loans and accurately assess the
worker’s financial situation, dampening the risk of moral hazard. Usha field
representatives, Daily Collectors, Monitoring Officers and Durbar Peer Educators and
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Outreach workers are in the field gathering member information on all members- whether
they have taken large loans, small loans, or no loans. This equalizes the cost of
administering small scale loans, making such loans more feasible for Usha than for
lending institutions without community networks.
There is also the issue of limited liability. Some sex workers have sufficient assets
to put up for collateral. Sex workers often take loans against accumulated savings, which
is low risk for all involved. However, there is another dynamic in the sex work
community that allows Usha to offer low rates and expect repayment, even when loan
risk is present. As I have illustrated, Usha is the only affordable credit option currently
open to sex workers. This incentivizes members to repay their loans because they want to
be eligible for loans in the future. Additionally, members know that successful repayment
of loans builds trust with the organization and increases the potential for being granted
larger loans in the future. This is called dynamic incentive in the microfinance literature
(Armendariz & Morduch, 2010) and is a powerful motivator for repayment.
Potential sustainability problems. Evaluating Usha according to these
microeconomic principles also points out potential problems that Usha may face in the
future as the community changes. Part of Usha’s success in avoiding strategic default it
the lack of viable options in the community. Usha and the DMSC work to promote the
acceptance of sex workers in broader society. As other financial institutions increasingly
open their doors to sex workers it may become easier for sex workers to shop around for
credit after defaulting at Usha. Perhaps loyalty and community solidarity will counter-act
the pull of increased options, but this isn’t guaranteed to be the case.
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The potential break-down of the social networks that provide Usha with ample,
low cost information on loan applicants is another major concern. The staff at Usha has
begun to notice a larger percentage of flying sex workers in the field. If a commuterbased sex work market grows, it will be more difficult for Usha to inexpensively gather
applicant information to make sound loan decisions and track loanees. The bank manager
reported that the loan recovery rate has dropped from as high as 98% to between 80 and
90% in recent years. He attributes this shift to the exit of women from brothels. Usha has
had to create a new position in the last year, monitoring officers, for whom a major
responsibility is loan recovery. This had not been needed earlier at Usha.
Logistical Individual Support: Challenges and Benefits
Challenges. Aside from the potential agency problems outlined above, there are
more immediate challenges that Usha faces. Usha functions due to a delicate balance of
trust and organizational checks and balances. When those systems break down, there can
be serious consequences for the organization. This happened in dramatic fashion in the
summer of 2013 when many sex workers lost their money to chit funds. When I arrived
at Usha in 2013 there had been a rash of fraudulent chit funds that took advantage of sex
workers in West Bengal. Chit funds promise returns of up to 40% if you deposit your
money with them. They make one visible pay out in the community that convinces
people that the operation is legitimate and then leave the community, absconding with
everyone’s money.
Usha experienced a residual fall-out from this scandal. Many sex workers had
invested in chit funds and had lost money. The shaken trust in financial systems and misinformation buzzing throughout the social network caused hundreds of Usha members to
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withdraw their money from Usha. To make matters worse, a Daily Collector from Usha
had been working as a double agent and was collecting members’ money and depositing
it in the chit fund. One day in the office, I was present to see the devastation that occurred
when a member went to make a withdrawal from her account and found that her money
had never made it to the bank. Usha fired several Daily Collectors who had been
complicit in the fraud and implemented many of the extra check and balances I described
earlier, including a more rigorous receipt monitoring system and the creation of the
monitoring officer position. It took a large-scale mobilization of Usha and DMSC
leadership to educate the community about the risk of chit funds and to regain the trust of
members who had been wronged by the daily collector and chit funds in general. Over
the past year Usha has been able to reimburse those who were scammed by the Daily
Collector and membership is back up above the pre-chit fund number.
Though a handful of sex workers were tricked into giving their money to chit
funds, the majority of those involved gave their money willingly. Some even withdrew
their savings from Usha to invest in chit funds with the hopes of high returns. This
illustrates another major challenge Usha faces; improving the over-all financial literacy
of the sex worker community. As the assistant bank manager put it, “A lot of sex workers
don't have the financial education to understand that their money can't double in a year
and that savings grow slowly. I am interested in figuring out ways to help sex workers
understand the reasonable pace of savings in a legit financial institution as well as the
importance of saving in a place like Usha.”
Some workers, for example, reported that they always felt a step behind their
savings goals. They reported that they should have saved for a family before they had
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children. They should have saved for retirement before they started losing customers.
Older sex workers often have no financial support except what they have saved for
themselves. Many sex workers cycle through daily collection periods, saving money over
a year or two, spending the entire sum, and starting over. Though this facilitates the
purchase of durable goods, it does not support long term financial health. Usha finds it
challenging to communicate this to members.
The final challenge of Usha is the limitation of all banking-based programs; in the
end, members can basically only reap what they sow. Benefits received from Usha are
directly related to the resources members are able to contribute. One member described
the limitations of their own income with regard to utilizing Usha’s services.
Usha is doing a lot for us. It is we that kind of falter. Usha has advised us to put
our money in the fixed deposit which has a higher interest rate, but, you know, I
have to take out that money for my personal purposes and things like that. Usha’s
services are good, but it’s not always easy for us to follow up on them. I am here
today to withdraw my money at the end of a daily collection cycle and am starting
a new cycle. –54
Usha can only help sex workers make the most of the wages they earn. This is, in and of
itself, experienced as a benefit to the community. However, Usha alone cannot advocate
for fairer wages or help workers earn more. That is why it is critical that Usha is one cog
in a much larger sex worker’s rights machine. The DMSC can and does advocate for the
broader social, political, and economic issues facing sex workers. Because of this, Usha
can focus on providing the services it specializes in, knowing that other issues are being
addressed by the DMSC.
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Benefits. Despite the challenges Usha faces, every member I spoke with, both in
formal interviews and causally at the office, was extremely appreciative of Usha and told
me the myriad ways Usha services had benefitted them in their lives. Even modest
benefits help. As one member put it, “I had nothing before I joined USHA. At least now I
have some dishes to eat on (42).”
Many members also described how participating in Usha changed their
relationship with money. Usha has helped sex workers look beyond immediate survival
to strive for future financial goals.
My goal is to buy land in Kolkata. My kids are currently with my mother. I want
to build a house so my children can come and live with me. That is my dream. It's
very expensive, but it is my dream. -8
I want to start a business in the future. I had same goal before Usha but I didn’t
know how to get the funds before. I wasn’t saving as much.-42
I’m thinking about building up savings to buy land and build a house. Before I
didn't have many financial goals. -28
Ten years ago I did not think about saving in the long run- now I am more aware
about saving and the future. - 39
Finally, a testament to Usha’s commitment to the community is evident in the big and
small ways Usha staff and leadership help cooperative members in ways that extend
beyond their official work responsibilities. I saw the secretary of Usha personally deliver
money to pay for medical expenses of a member who was in the hospital. The rural Daily
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Collector told me how he accompanied a DMSC worker to return a minor to her home
village so they would feel safer on the journey. Board members will go with members to
buy land or a house to help interpret documents and evaluate the investment. I sat with a
Daily Collector and a member on the floor of the member’s bedroom as they discussed
the members’ relationship with a controlling Babu- the Daily Collector offering her
support and friendship along with financial services. Usha leadership attends and
contributes to the funeral services of members who pass away. It is clear in these and
many other activities that Usha does not just provide financial services; they are a core
part of the sex worker community.
Conclusion
Usha provides affordable, accessible financial services to the sex worker community. The
results demonstrate that the cost and effectiveness of these services is directly attributable
to the organization’s immersion in the community. Figure 6.1 summarizes the results of
the logistical individual analysis of Usha’s services. The following Chapter examines
how Usha reinvests in the community through its businesses choices and use of profit.
Logistical Individual
H1: Usha will maintain loan affordability
H1a: the average amount paid in interest on Usha loan per month will be less
than 30% of the individual’s monthly income.
 On average Usha members pay 19% their income in monthly loan
installments (34% using mean). Income in this context is after room and
board are paid.
H1b: loans will be less expensive than credit alternatives in the community
 Few sex workers participate in formal banking services due to stigma and
bank requirements.
 High interest rates were charged by madams and money-lenders before Usha.
 Opaque loan calculations by money-lenders left sex workers vulnerable to
intractable debt.
 No members reported participating in microfinance programs.
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Convenience of Usha financial services facilitates active and sustainable
member participation.
H2: Usha programs will protect against indebtedness
H2a: loan officers will use a complex calculus to determine loan approval.
 Loan decisions made by a member-elected board of sex workers.
 Board considers each loan individually, weighing the likelihood of
repayment based on multiple applicant characteristics.
H2b: lower monthly income will be associated with smaller loans.
 Monthly income was a significant positive predictor of loan amount, with
each additional Rs.100 in income predictive of an additional Rs.722 in
sanctioned loan amount indicating that the Board matches loans to capacity
to repay.
H2c: loan size will be associated with financial costs of proposed projects
 Significant differences in loan amount between loan uses indicates that the
Board specifically considers loan use when sanctioning loan amount, with
investment-oriented loans sanctioned in higher amounts than consumptionbased loans.
H2d: Usha will offer various kinds of savings programs that accommodate a
range of savings needs.
 Usha has developed a wide range of savings programs specifically designed
to meet the financial needs of sex workers at various stages of their financial
lives. Usha offers advice to sex workers to help them successfully manage
their finances.
H3: Usha will promote equitable services by offering all community members
access to Usha services and equally supporting all members in loan repayment.
H3a: after controlling for other variables, age, income, length of time at Usha,
field, and loan amount will not be associated with the likelihood of loan
provision or successful repayment.
 Older member, members living in Kolkata, and members with a history at
Usha were significantly more likely to have taken a loan at Usha.
 There are no characteristics which significantly predict whether a loan will
be overdue.
H3b: sex workers will not perceive systematic exclusionary processes by Usha
staff and leadership.
 Usha experiences challenges engaging flying sex workers and transgender
sex workers and are taking steps to better reach these groups. Male sex
workers are currently excluded from participation and are likely to remain so.
No other systematic exclusions, for example by income or HIV status, were
reported by staff or members.
Figure 6.1: Logistical Individual Results

88

CHAPTER SEVEN
Results: Logistical Community Impact of Usha
Table 7.1: Logistical Community Hypotheses
Individual
Logistical
Logistical
Individual
H1,H2, H3

Community
Logistical Community
Hypothesis 4: Usha will invest in projects and businesses
that directly benefit the sex worker community.
H4a: Usha will invest in businesses that provide
products integral to the sex work profession.
H4b: Usha will invest in businesses that employ parttime or retired sex workers.
H5: surplus income generated by Usha will be reinvested
in the community.
H6: Usha will achieve community control of funds by
autonomously managing all Usha and Durbar financial
accounts.

Political
Political
Individual
H7, H8, H9

Political Community
H10, H11, H12

To examine these hypotheses I analyzed interviews with Usha staff, interviews with Usha
and Durbar leadership, and Usha documentation, including annual reports, brochures,
Usha’s website and the West Bengal Cooperative Society Rules and Regulations.
Hypothesis Four
Projects and businesses in which Usha invests will directly benefit the sex worker
community. Specifically:
Hypothesis 4a: Usha will invest in businesses that provide products integral to
the sex work profession.
Hypothesis 4b: Usha will invest in businesses that employ part-time or retired sex
workers.
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Usha is an officially registered cooperative, therefore must abide by the rules and
regulations of the West Bengal State Cooperative Board. A cooperative is a member-run
institution. All organizational decisions are made through democratic processes.
Members participate either by voting directly on issues at the annual general meeting or
through the elected representation of Board. Major organizational decisions, such as the
introduction of new business investments, are made at the annual general meeting. The
board decides together about the finer details of running the businesses and disbursing the
social welfare funds. All decisions are reported out to members via half-yearly published
reports. Since literacy levels in the organization are low, Usha also disseminates the
outcomes of meetings and board decisions through the network of field representatives.
In this way, sex workers themselves steer the trajectory of organizational investment and
growth (for an in-depth look at organizational decision making processes, see Hypothesis
9). The organization has chosen to invest in business ventures which also contribute to
the well-being and success of sex workers. Usha accomplishes this by investing in
businesses that are needed and relevant to the community and by hiring community
members who want to leave sex work or supplement sex work income.
Social marketing of condoms. The Secretary of Usha explained to me that a
balance that must be struck between identifying viable businesses that will generate profit
for Usha, and investing in businesses that benefit sex workers in some way. This balance
is perhaps best illustrated by Usha’s ‘Social Marketing of Condoms (SMC)’ program.
Early community organizers from the sex work community found that women were much
more likely to use condoms when educated and encouraged to do so by other sex
workers. It was also clear that sex workers valued condoms more when they invested in
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them as a professional tool, i.e. when they were purchased and not simply acquired for
free. It was also important to the sex worker community that high quality condoms were
sold to sex workers at reasonable (below market) prices. These community findings led to
the development of the SMC program.
The SMC team, called Basanti Sena, consists of 20 sex workers from different red
light communities. Small groups from Basanti Sena visit brothels, educate workers about
condom use, and sell condoms. Usha receives condoms at a subsidized rate from the
government and sells them at a price of 36 paise per piece (a little over ½ a penny USD).
Usha makes a profit of 1 paise per piece. With annual sales of up to 5.4 million condoms
a year, the profit from this program is considerable. Usha mobilizes its social network to
access the market, increasing the efficiency of the program. It is rare for workers’
cooperatives to embark in this kind of business project. A government consultant from
WBCS who has been advising Usha remarked on this program,
The social marketing of condoms is unique... Sex workers have access to
inexpensive condoms and Usha makes a profit that is then reinvested in the
community. Other cooperatives have not organized such programs. They mostly
just stick to savings and loans. This is extra work for Usha, but it is important in
the fight against AIDS and to help the sex worker community.
Other income generating projects. Other Usha business investments also benefit
the sex worker community. For example, Usha owns a building in a nearby rural area,
Bariupur, which they rent out to other organizations for trainings and conferences. The
space can also be used for events organized through Usha or the DMSC. This small
business is run by a sex worker and founding member of Usha. Usha also owns several
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buildings in Kolkata which house various DMSC programs. DMSC pays rent to Usha for
the use of this space. DMSC is able to operate in good quality offices at low rent. Usha is
able to receive regular income with consistent tenants. Real estate is also booming in
West Bengal and Usha has plans to buy additional real estate in Kolkata to create
affordable housing for sex workers.
Several other Usha investments do not benefit sex workers through their business
activities, but Usha does hire sex workers to staff these programs. For example, Usha
runs a small agriculture program and fishery near Kolkata. In 2014 Usha was working
toward organic certification. Staff for these programs is sourced from the sex work
community.
Since sex workers drive all investment decisions made by Usha, ideas for profit
generation that do not meet with sex worker approval are not considered by the
organization. The WBCS consultant found this out when he suggested that Usha lower
their interest rates on savings. By the summer of 2014, the WBCS consultant had spent
eight months working with Usha to increase their profits. He suggested that Usha lower
the interest they offer on savings. He also suggested that loan interest be charged on full
principal rather than diminishing principal. The members did not endorse these ideas, so
they were off the table. Usha and the consultant were considering stable alternative
investments to generate additional profit.
Hypothesis Five
Surplus income will be reinvested in the community in the form of increased availability
of loans and funds for Usha social welfare programs.
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When we were discussing the profit generating activities of Usha, the WBCs consultant
highlighted that all net income is given back to cooperative members. Increasing profits
helps the cooperative thrive and protect against shocks, they don’t ‘line anyone’s
pockets’, as the consultant put it. Commercial microfinance has been criticized for
generating large pay-outs to shareholders who are, it is argued, making profits on the
backs of poor people (Rutherford, 2009). All sex workers who save or take loans with the
Usha Multipurpose Cooperative Society are cooperative members and therefore part
owners. All net income in a cooperative is redistributed back into the membership base in
the form of a dividend. This is a critical difference between a cooperative and a
microfinance institution.
Uses of profit. Before disbursing dividends, Usha reinvests most of its generated
income into community initiatives. Profits are used to fund the Social Welfare Programs
offered by Usha to members. Profits are also reinvested to grow Usha businesses. Some
profits are put toward developing Usha’s services. For example, in the Summer of 2014
Usha was working with a formal bank to develop check cashing and ATM facilities. This
initiative was a response to a call for such services from members. These are amenities
that have been previously unavailable to sex workers and have not been developed at
other cooperatives. They also use profits to expand Usha into unserved red light areas.
Finally, Usha uses funds to support DMSC activities. As I discuss in the next section, this
support helps the DMSC pursue its agenda independent of donor approval.
Hypothesis Six
Autonomous fund management will be achieved by the independent control of all Usha
accounts and management of all Durbar funds by Usha staff and leadership.
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Usha independently manages all Usha-related accounts and affairs, with oversight from
the WBCS, as I have described. The DMSC manages its own funds internally. Usha does,
though, provide crucial financial support for the DMSC. A key advisor to DMSC
explained the role Usha plays in logistically supporting the community activities of the
DMSC.
DMSC is the political wing so they have a lot of activities which address (sex
workers’) rights as a worker... Within that they have to do a lot of advocacy,
activism. Now-a-days no one gives money, no donor gives money for advocacy or
for activism, if you want to have a demonstration in the streets, claiming your
rights- which costs a lot if you want to organize 5,000 sex workers and this. In
those cases they get support from Usha. So Usha's profit goes to support activism
of DMSC.
Support from Usha also allows the DMSC to pursue initiatives at the rate they are
identified and needed in the community, not the rate of donor approval and fund
disbursal. The DMSC website explains the role of Usha in supporting DMSC initiatives,
Greater financial independence has also enabled Durbar to be pro-active about
developing its own programs and initiating new programs in response to
community needs rather than donor priorities. For example, Durbar has been able
to start new clinics and education centers in district sex work sites before official
donor funding was secured, further enabling it to build trust among local
communities, simultaneously providing evidence of its efficacy to convince
agencies to provide longer term support (Durbar.org).
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Such creative funding relationship will be necessary for the survival and resilience of
activist organizations.
Conclusion
As a member-led organization, Usha is accountable to the greater sex worker community.
The organization conducts business in a way that reinvests in the community. All profits
are folded back into the organization or paid out to members. Usha promotes communitylevel economic empowerment by freeing the community from the constraints of outside
funding sources which may not share community ethics and values. Figure 7.1
summarizes results of the logistical community hypotheses. In Chapters Seven and Eight
I examine how Usha moves beyond logistical support to address underlying political
barriers to authentic empowerment.
Logistical Community
H4: Usha will invest in projects and businesses that directly benefit the sex worker
community.
 Investment decisions are made by sex worker members through direct vote or
representation by an elected board. Usha does not approve proposed investments
which are not met with member approval.
H4a: Usha will invest in businesses that provide products integral to the sex
work profession.
 Usha invests in a social marketing of condoms program that provides
condoms at below-market costs to sex workers.
 Usha is pursuing real estate investment to provide low-cost housing for sex
workers.
H4b: Usha will invest in businesses that employ part-time or retired sex
workers.
 Usha’s other businesses, such as agriculture and event planning, are staffed
by individuals from the sex worker community.
H5: surplus income generated by Usha will be reinvested in the community.
 Profits are invested in growing Usha services and social welfare grants disbursed
to members.
 Cooperative bank structure ensures that all net profits which are not reinvested
into Usha are returned to members in the form of dividends.
H6: Usha will achieve community control of funds by autonomously managing all
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Usha and Durbar financial accounts.
 Usha independently manages its own funds in consultation with the West Bengal
State Cooperative Society.
 Usha does not manage DMSC’s funds. However Usha supports DMSC’s
political activities through their profits, lessening dependence of the DMSC on
outside donors.
Figure 7.1: Logistical Community Results
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CHAPTER EIGHT
Results: Political Individual Impacts of Usha
Table 8.1: Political Individual Hypothesis
Individual

Community

Logistical
Logistical Individual
H1,H2, H3
Political

Political Individual
Hypothesis 7: sex worker professional
identity will be enhanced through
participation in Usha as professional
organization.

Logistical Community
H4, H5, H6

Political Community
H10, H11, H12

Hypothesis 8: Usha will promote
independent individual financial decision
making.
Hypothesis 9: Usha will encourage member
participation in organizational leadership and
decision making.

Hypothesis Seven
Sex worker professional identity will be enhanced through participation in Usha as
professional organization.
Professional identity and the founding of Usha. The development of collective
professional identity has been shown to promote sex worker’s well-being as well as alter
community perceptions of sex workers (Ghose, 2012; Ghose et al, 2008). Usha’s history
illustrates its role in developing and fostering a professional identity in the sex work
community. I spoke with founding members of Usha and the DMSC to better understand
the history of the organization and the import of its legacy on current organizational
culture and structure.
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In the early days of the DMSC, the sex work community came together to
mobilize around their rights as workers. Usha was developed contemporaneously with
this union organizing. One of the most pressing community issues identified by the union
was the economic exploitation sex workers faced at the hands of money-lenders,
madams, and babus. In response, founding members of Usha decided to create a bank.
They decided to register as a worker’s cooperative, rather than partner with an outside
organization, to maintain control over the process and assert their ownership of the
project as sex workers. However, when they approached the Ministry of Cooperatives
they were met with resistance. A DMSC advisor who was instrumental in the process of
organizing Usha describes,
I think it was difficult because there were such clauses in the act itself (laws
regarding the incorporation of cooperatives) that said no one could register for
cooperative society without having good moral character. It sounds quite
amazing. How do you define good moral character? But it continued for a couple
of months to a year to convince the respected department to allow sex workers to
register their cooperative society, because it was regulated by the government
institution of West Bengal.
A ‘morality clause’ in the cooperative laws was used to deny sex workers the right to
incorporate. Additionally, cooperative groups must be registered under a common
profession and sex work was not considered a legitimate profession. The Secretary of
DMSC explained, “The cooperative department said you are sex workers, you have no
identity. You cannot come here and form a cooperative. There is no profession. You must
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write a profession, but sex work is not a legal profession... That was the biggest challenge
in the beginning of the Usha cooperative.”
The Secretary of DMSC went on to describe the tactics Usha used to persuade the
Minister of their legitimacy as a professional group. The original Usha didis invited the
Minister to come to the red light district and witness the organizing activities of the
DMSC. The DMSC advisor describes the effect of these visits on the Minister.
It took a long time and finally the Minister in charge started the discoursebecause it was really difficult for someone to define (immorality). (The sex
workers) said, “I'm not killing people, I'm not harming anyone else... So how
come we should be considered as immoral and all?” So minister through this
discourse could understand that (he’s) not the person responsible to give a verdict
who is moral or immoral. (His) job is to see whether a cooperative society could
function effectively. That's why the ministry was created. After that (Usha) got
registered.
The founding members of Usha also made the case that cooperative registration would
allow sex workers to build a legitimate identity.
We convinced the cooperative department. If you want to be a part of a bank, you
have to bring in your voter cards, ration cards, etc. etc. But we as sex workers
don't have access to that, so we want this to be our way to identify. As sex
workers we will open this bank and this will be our identity. –Founding Member
Usha was officially incorporated in 1995. Though the state was initially resistant to
allowing sex workers to incorporate, Usha is now one of the most successful cooperatives
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in West Bengal. This success has impacted the perception of sex workers in public
opinion.
It has helped to avert the age old image of sex workers as only victims and the
society's attitude toward sex workers that they do only sex work. And they are
incapable of managing, running and taking any sort of responsibility as a citizen.
But, the success of Usha, I'm talking about monetary success, not the political, the
monetary success of Usha… Based on their success, they have been considered
one of the best cooperatives… So that also helps the commoner to rethink about
sex workers. Not see just them as a victim but that they could exert their agency
as- their human agency as an individual, as a citizen of the country. Slowly but
steadily they get this established. – DMSC advisor.
Increased public awareness of sex work as professional work was echoed by the WBCS
consultant who had been working with Usha. Not a member of the community, he could
see the impact of Usha on the perception of sex workers from an outsider’s perspective.
Now, after the advocacy of sex workers they can use Usha documents to register
for a voter card, register their children in school, open accounts in other banks if
they choose, access government benefits. Usha attained that status for the sex
workers. The bank has had a great influence on public opinion of sex workers.
Sex workers fought for their rights and through Usha became recognized.
Legacy of the organization’s history. The legacy of Usha’s organizational
history was present in member interviews. I asked members whether it mattered to them
that Usha was only for sex workers, and why or why not. Several expressed that Usha

100

was representative of a community achievement. Usha provided sex workers with a
positive professional boundary marker.
This bank is the pride of sex workers. Even if I don't earn anymore, I have my
savings to fall back on-39
For sex workers this (gaining access to banking) has been a struggle… it should
be a personal bank just for sex workers.-50
It is very important that it is just for me… the bank has a lot of history tied to sex
workers. - 49
It is our bank...There is a significance of Usha to the sex worker movement.-26
Most mainstream representations depict sex workers as desperately and barely surviving.
Sex workers in West Bengal use Usha services to move out of a survival paradigm and
make long-term investments in their lives and the lives of their families, as other
professionals do. As a board members put it, “I see (Usha) as a way to help sex workers
realize their dreams.” One member describes how Usha has helped her achieve
professional goals.
After I took (my first) loan I repaid the loan. Then I made a fixed deposit and I
took (another) loan. So this process influenced me to keep money and save money
very regularly. I constructed a big building and rent each room to a tenant. I earn
money in that way. So I used the money for business. I still use that
system…Usha has helped a lot. -2
Other sex workers express pride in their ability to invest their income, despite lingering
social stigma.
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I got divorced sometime back. I had to learn to live on my own and look after my
son. My son and I were worried because he was a good student and we didn't
know if he would have the funds to continue school. But, I told him that it didn't
matter what job I had, I wanted to make sure he could fulfill his dreams. Recently,
I have disclosed to my son that I am a sex worker and my son has accepted that.42
We as a community have a lot to be proud of, but this is something to be
especially proud of- to have created our own whole bank and the daily collection
system. I have put both of my sons through college and built my own stable home
through the use of Usha's savings and loans programs. If I were to apply to
another bank they would make fun of me… they would humiliate us. We don't
need that now. -46
A sense of professional identity has also allowed sex workers to be bold in demanding
their rights as workers. As a founding member explains, “Earlier women would be very
scared to talk to the police, but now women are forming their own boards, they are taking
to the police straight faced. They are giving their own issues to the police and lawyers, so
this is very different than it was 20 years ago.”
Professional need as driver of service. The development of a professional
identity for sex workers is interrelated with the structure of Usha bank services. Firstly,
bank policies and procedures accommodate the idiosyncrasies of the sex work profession
and the ways in which these idiosyncrasies translate into specific banking needs. These
are treated as professional realities, not barriers to service. For example, the rural district
has a high percentage of seasonal workers who migrate to work for four or five months at
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a time. Usha encourages them to open an account and the rural Daily Collector works
with them to maximize their savings while present in the red light district. Other workers
make small, regular deposits as they earn money, rather than at the end of the month, as a
salaried employee might. Such irregularities are received at other institutions with
suspicion. One member explains,
My main concern about saving with another legit financial institution is that sex
worker income is not fixed. If I go and make daily deposits of 200 rupees or I
deposit a few times a week I am worried that another banks would wonder why I
save that way. It would raise eyebrows. But at Usha, they don't ask any questions,
you can just deposit.-25
At Usha, the small but regular income received by sex workers is seen as a reality of the
work and a potential financial asset. It provides daily opportunities to save money and
Usha created the Daily Collection program in response.
Professional identity as a source and outcome of community trust. Collective
identity also promotes trust. Almost everyone involved at Usha is a sex worker. This
facilitates trust of staff to member and member to staff. Founding members recalled that
in the beginning, it was very difficult to gain the trust of fellow sex workers. However, as
sex workers themselves, they were able to demonstrate their own trust in Usha by saving
their money with the bank. This helped their peers trust the original Usha collectors.
Usha slowly gained recognition in the community as a powerful professional resource.
This perspective contrasts with other interventions designed to ‘rescue’ women from sex
work. At Usha, being a sex worker is seen in a positive light. Sex workers provide a
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valuable service and through their work support themselves and their families. Several
members described how shared identity fosters trust in the sex workers’ cooperative.
Clearly I've received more benefits from Usha than other banks. At other banks
you need a large collateral for a loan, even if you only want 20,000 rupees. Usha
trusts me as a member and a sex worker and so they will give me loans based on
that. It is an honor… The work we are doing is special to benefit the community
of sex workers. -48
Collective professional identity has been shown in other studies to promote condom use
among unionized sex workers in Kolkata (Ghose et al, 2008) and is shown here to
support the functioning of the Usha cooperative and the economic empowerment of sex
workers.
Professional identity beyond West Bengal. Usha is also involved with
initiatives to create sex worker cooperatives in other regions. Usha leadership has advised
groups in Mysore and Bangladesh who are trying to form sex workers cooperatives. In
partnership with Durbar, Usha is active in national and international sex workers
coalitions. Through these actions, Usha promotes the professional status of sex workers
beyond the boundaries of West Bengal, advocates for the official recognition of the sex
work profession and plays an integral part in the international “sex work is work”
movement.
Enduring strength of stigma. Despite community efforts to build professional
identity, stigma against sex workers endures and is felt by Usha members. Though some
described Usha as a positive professional boundary marker, this was often paired with a
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pervasive sense that others would not want to participate in an organization associated
with sex workers.
We, as sex workers, are very proud of being involved with USHA. We want
USHA to just be for the sex worker community and their family. We don't need
any outsiders coming in and telling us how to run things. Also, I don't think they
want to be involved because they see sex work in a negative light. Why would we
want to be involved with them if they don't want to be involved with us?-42
These women over here (sex workers) don’t have the amenities that outside
women have. This is something that we really cherish. (Non-sex workers) have
other things. We over here only have this. Even if you did (open up Usha to nonsex workers) they don’t trust Usha with the money, only we do. This is our only
hope. For them, they have other access to government banks… they won’t want to
use this bank.-57
A lot of people look down on the profession. This is a cooperative bank just for
sex workers. Other people can go to the public bank and that is fine, but it is good
to have a bank that is exclusively for sex workers. Especially since sex workers
are so looked down upon, it is empowering to have something just for us.-27
Some members, however, saw the draw of Usha for all women, even the ‘good women’.
It’s sad because sometimes the ‘good women’ (non-sex workers) ask, you know,
you are able to open an account because you are sex workers, but we are not.
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That’s a little sad. Everyone should be allowed to open an account for bank
service. - 56
Enduring stigma was also illustrated by the desire for some members to keep their
profession a secret from their families. One worker reported, “I joined because I wanted
to save money and since I don't live in this area I don't want my family to know about my
sex work (36).” Others were using Usha services to protect their children from life in the
red light area. A member explained, “Being a good role model is difficult if you have a
son and are a sex worker… We come to do sex work because we don’t have enough
money and we want to take care of our families, but sons don’t understand that (25).”
This member justified her choice to do sex work and sees it as work, yet still
struggles with tension between earning money and setting an example for her son.
Members also use Usha to conceal their profession from their families.
No one at home knows that I am a sex worker. They think I am a domestic worker
in the city. If I went back home with a lot of money it would arouse suspicion in
my family, so I just take a little bit home at the end of the day. I deposit most of it
in Usha at the end of the day before going home.-63
Though Usha and the DMSC encourage sex workers to embrace a professional identity,
they realize the delicate balance sex workers maintain between work and family. Usha
leadership shows members how they can use Usha to control occupational disclosure.
We said, 'we know that a lot of you have not told your families that you are
working here, you left your hometown to come here, but no one back home
knows about it. We can offer you that kind of protection, we will keep this
confidential. If anything people who come to ask about your whereabouts we will
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them that you are working in an organization… There are a lot of women working
in this organization, not all of them have to be sex workers. –Founding Member
Though politically invested in the development of professional identity and pride in sex
work, the organization doesn’t pressure women to disclose their sex worker status. The
next section describes additional ways Usha supports sex workers’ agency in personal
and financial decision making.
Hypothesis Eight
Independent individual financial decision making will be promoted by giving members
full control over their use of savings and loans programs and encouraging members to set
personal financial goals and priorities.
Programs for sex workers described in the literature restrict sex worker’s use of money
and are exclusively oriented toward exit from sex work. Usha respects members as
working adults who manage multiple financial responsibilities and can make their own
financial decisions. Though Usha advises members, the paternalistic oversight of money
use present in other programs is absent.
Variety in loan use. The administrative database tracks all loans disbursed by
Usha and keeps data on proposed loan use. Unfortunately many of the early loans were
simply marked ‘personal use.’ Recent data collection by Usha on loan use is more
detailed. Figure 8.1 illustrates the various uses of member loans where a specific purpose
was listed (N= 587).
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Use of Usha Member Loans
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Figure 8.1: Use of Usha Loans (N=587)
The loan data show that there is a variety of acceptable loan uses, indicating that Usha is
not highly restrictive regarding loan use. It is interesting, though, to note high rates of
loan use to pay medical bills and to repay debt, suggesting potential economic issues in
the community regarding financing medical treatment and paying off non-Usha loans.
Interviews with members also illustrate a broad range of savings uses. Workers
used their savings to pay the tuition costs of children’s education, for construction, for
marriage costs, and to smooth over gaps in income and pay for household expenses,
among other things. A few older workers said with pride that they use Usha savings to
buy nice ornaments for themselves. Usha allows sex workers to make their own decisions
with their money.
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Commitment to sex worker agency is a part of the larger DMSC culture. The
DMSC Anti-trafficking initiative, for example, is rooted in respect for adult women’s
choice. When a woman enters the red light district she meets with the DMSC selfregulatory board (SRB). If the woman is an adult and comes to sex work under her own
volition the board orients her to the DMSC, giving her access to the health clinics, a
membership to the union, and an overview of all the programs offered, including Usha.
Several sex workers I spoke with were seamlessly connected to Usha upon arrival in
Sonagachi through the SRB process. This program is predicated on the belief that if an
adult woman willingly comes to work in the red light district she should be given
supports to keep her safe and well. Usha extends this culture of respect to its services.
Self-reliance. After speaking with many sex workers it became clear how
unacceptable a paternalistic intervention would be. Members have been taking care of
themselves and their families for years. It’s no one’s job to save these sex workers, not
even Usha. Usha provides them with a vehicle for achieving what members already know
to be important. Sex workers with whom I spoke valued being financially independent.
I have saved this money for my future because I am HIV positive and at any time
I can get sick and need the security for health check-ups or treatment. And I want
to remain self-supported. I don't want to depend on my children. For that reason I
keep the money in the Usha account.-2
No one else gives me advice. It’s just myself and my knowledge. I thought about
myself and my future. I thought about how I would not always be working and
thought that saving was a good idea. It was about me developing, looking around,
and gaining knowledge.-13
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I like that I see a lot of other sex workers using the bank, same as me. It makes
me feel good. Sex workers all have their own expenses. Like me, I think about
rent and electricity. Others have expenses related to their children or their house.
At Usha everyone can use the service for their own need. –Member 53
The risk of privileging member independence, however, is that sex workers are free to
make bad decisions. There was some anecdotal evidence of sex workers making illadvised investments with their savings and using loan money other than for proposed use.
Members have taken loans to invest in chit funds or to give their Babus. I spoke to the
bank managers about such problems. They said these things do happen, but there is only
so much they can do. They can’t tell workers how to spend their money. They can only
give the best advice they can and be there to support members if they get into a difficult
financial situation.
Usha respects sex worker agency because it is led by sex workers. Usha leaders
themselves would not want to be condescended to and craft the structure and culture of
the organization accordingly. A culture of community leadership pervades all aspects of
Usha. The subsequent section will take a closer look at Usha as a member-led
participatory organization.
Hypothesis Nine
Member participation in organizational leadership and decision making will be
encouraged through formal structures such as elected leadership positions and open
cooperative decision making forums.
The data support this hypothesis and give additional insight into informal modes of
member participation. As a member-led organization, authentic participation is a central
component of Usha’s organization structure and culture. Firstly, the organization is built
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on sex worker leadership. Founding members discussed the original development and
implementation of Usha.
There were some problems because people were opposed to the idea of sex
workers forming their own cooperative. How can sex workers take charge of
their finances or their lives? Who is going to speak for them? So I said we will
speak for ourselves. We will decide.
Founding members fostered a horizontal power structure from the most nascent stages of
organizational development.
We had a small room to ourselves and we decided who would be the secretary,
treasurer, president, it was very equal and it worked well for us because we were
close. If we got stuck in disagreements and if we got stuck in fights and ego issues
and everything we probably wouldn't have accomplished what we did. –Founding
Member
Formal modes of participation. The original spirit of sex worker leadership and
participation has been codified in the decision-making policies of the organization. As
discussed in Chapter Five, Usha operates according the laws of the WBSCS. This
provides formal structures of member participation. Members are invited to attend the
Annual General Meeting (AGM), at which important organizational decisions are
deliberated and decided upon. At the AGM members are encouraged to ask questions and
raise concerns. Usha tries to get at least 10 members from each field to attend the AGM.
At a large AGM there will be 150-200 members in attendance. Members also elect 42
field representatives who become the Usha point-person in each field. On average Usha
has a voter turn-out rate of about 100-200 members per field (there are 33 fields), but
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they try to encourage as high voting rates in the field as possible. Field representatives
nominate and elect 8 board members. The board makes decisions through consensus.
Informal avenues of participation. Members can raise concerns with their field
representative or a board member, who will raise the issue at a board meeting. On a rare
occasion, a member will show up directly at a board meeting to address an issue.
Members can also go directly to the Usha office to discuss any concerns or suggestions
they have. Members who would rather not speak directly to Usha, or do not interact with
Usha staff frequently, can speak with a DMSC Peer Educator or Outreach worker, who
will communicate feedback back to Usha. Authentic elicitation of informal feedback has
been a strategy of Usha since the beginning. A founding member described the process of
building trust with the community.
Sometimes when I went to the member's house to make them a member, since I
was a daily collector, I would also sit down and have some tea and snacks and
chat about a lot of other stuff. We had to mix with them really well in order to
know what they wanted. We can't just come in and do our thing and leave. That
was when we decided to become friends, try to get people involved in Durbar and
Usha. We tried to benefit them. -Founding Member
Every member I spoke with could describe how they would give feedback to Usha if they
needed or wanted to. In Chapter Five I explained how Usha services cater to sex worker
need. This is achieved largely because sex workers decide how Usha is ran and operated.
When viewed in isolation, it seems self-evident that Usha would promote sex
worker professional identity, respect sex worker agency, and encourage member
participation. It is only in comparison to existing sex work interventions and the
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prevailing discourse on sex work that the political power of these organizational
characteristics is apparent. For example, I checked the board of directors for both the forprofit and non-profit microfinance organizations I have used as comparators to Usha and
neither has a single Indian woman on their board of directors. As I examined in Chapter
Two, there are no other economic interventions designed for sex workers which are
member–led, respect of sex workers as workers, or support sex workers’ self-directed
financial goals. By addressing this gap, Usha not only provides needed services to sex
workers, it asserts the worth of sex workers as workers and decision-makers. Figure 8.2
summarizes results of the political individual hypotheses.
Political Individual
H7: sex worker professional identity will be enhanced through participation in
Usha as professional organization.
 Original founding of Usha was oriented around asserting the professional
legitimacy of sex workers in the eyes of the state and public.
 Members connect to a professional identity through membership in Usha and use
Usha services to leverage their earnings as other professionals do.
 Usha services are designed to fit the specific financial patterns of sex work
professionals.
 Usha’s continued financial success promotes sex worker professional legitimacy
in West Bengal and beyond. Usha partners with other sex worker groups to
support similar cooperative building initiatives.
 Despite these gains, many sex workers continue to experience internal and
external stigma.
H8: Usha will promote independent individual financial decision making.
 Usha members are free to use their money as they see fit without paternalistic
restrictions. Usha staff offers advice regarding financial decision-making.
 Sex worker members have been self-reliant and therefore value independence
and flexibility.
H9: Usha will encourage member participation in organizational leadership and
decision making.
 Usha provides formal opportunities for participation through annual general
meetings and leadership elections.
 Members also have a variety of informal ways to provide feedback to Usha.
Member input is valued and acted on by Usha staff and leadership.
Figure 8.2: Political Individual Results
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CHAPTER NINE
Results: Political Community Impacts of Usha
Table 9.1: Political Community Hypotheses
Individual

Community

Logistical
Logistical
Individual
H1,H2, H3
Political
Political
Individual
H7, H8, H9

Logistical Community
H4, H5, H6

Political Community
Hypothesis 10: Usha will undermine economic exploitation
by power-brokers in the community.
Hypothesis 11: Usha will provide a system of informal labor
sector protection.
H11a: participation in Usha will allow members to
build an individual financial safety net and lead to
increased systematic financial management.
H11b: participation in Usha will serve as a gateway
to participation in the Durbar worker’s collective.
Hypothesis 12: civil society incorporation will be enhanced
by the legitimization of the sex work profession through
official cooperative bank recognition and participation in
Usha as a means to achieve legitimate property and business
ownership.

Hypothesis Ten
Usha will undermine economic exploitation by power-brokers in the community.
The development of Usha was driven by the desire of founding members to undermine
structures of economic exploitation in the community. The power vested in madams,
babus, pimps, and money lenders was illustrated by their reaction to the original efforts to
organize Usha. Taking on this community political power structure was a huge task for
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the Usha pioneers. The DMSC advisor who originally consulted on the development of
Usha explains the adversity the original team faced.
(Implementing Usha was) not an easy task because, as you can think, at this
moment Usha’s annual turnover is more than three million (dollars), now. When
we started this that similar amount of money used to flow in these areas. And who
were the major beneficiaries? All these money lenders and others. So there was a
lot of resistance and they did violence to the sex workers, threw bombs to peers
workers and wanted to stop peer workers from entering into the houses. One came
into my department and threatened me with a revolver as consequences. Because
it's a huge monetary sort of benefit. They started to see they would lose that
amount of money… However, slowly the building of a network, influencing the
police commissioner, lots of things resolved it. It took more than two years to
prevent money-lender from in a major way threatening people, sex workers and
others.
Founding members experienced similar challenges.
It was a big struggle. Convincing community members to join Usha was difficult.
I spoke to this one woman and I was persistent. I explained saving 5 rupees per
day could add up to 2000 per year which can be a big help to your family. But I
had no idea that her madam was overhearing the whole conversation. She came
up and she grabbed me by my hand. I had lot of glass bangles on my hand and
they all broke into my skin and it was bloody. I still have scars (she showed me
the scars). She was like no, you better not...It was a very difficult time. We had a
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lot of work to do. We faced a lot of set-backs from madams and babus and pimps.
We still continued our journey. We still worked to convince members. Babus
would throw food at us and hot tea. I would still keep coming back. I was like, ‘no
I want you to become a member of Usha.’–Founding Members
Economic exploitation was also tied to health. Usha used its connection with the DMSC
peer health workers to address these dual community issues.
We were taking away (madams and babus) power over the women because we
were forcing (sex workers) to save money and become members of Usha and rely
on Usha instead of other people. We were also teaching them about heath related
stuff like using condoms and being safe. So that was why a lot of the madams got
mad. Even today if you ask a sex worker to not use a condom you charge more, so
you are actually decreasing their income. Because they weren't really aware of the
health risks and were more concerned about their money they named us the
condom women and made fun of us as we were trying to help these women
understand”. -Founding Member
Usha still uses creative strategies to structurally undermine exploitation. In this way,
Usha protects individuals as well as shifts the dynamics of power in the community.
Current tactics to combat exploitation. As we have seen, by simply offering
secure and independent financial services Usha has given sex workers the ability to
disengage from abusive and exploitative working situations. Usha pairs these services
with several other strategies to undermine exploitation experienced by members.
Structure of Services. Usha has structured its services to protect independent sex
worker control over money. With the exception of accounts that mothers open for
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daughters, Usha does not allow joint accounts. As discussed earlier, men are also not
allowed to open accounts at Usha. Usha uses these policies to discourage controlling
babus and madams from accessing member’s accounts or dictating their use of money.
Babus and madams, however, still often wish to exert their power over sex workers and
Usha has developed strategies to deal with such power struggles.
Diverting Power Brokers. Sometimes it is safer for sex workers to deceive babus
and madams than it is to stand up to them. Usha staff understands this and supports sex
workers as necessary. The manager and assistant manager of the bank described instances
where sex workers will come to the bank, explain that they will return in a few hours with
the babu, and ask the bank to report out a smaller amount than is actually in the account
so that babu won’t know the full value of the member’s account. A founding member
said that in the early days members would ask her to approach them when their babu was
not there so that he wouldn’t know about the Usha account. This tactical use of Usha was
corroborated by several members I spoke with who currently keep their Usha account a
secret from their babus. Usha does not judge this deceit. Though staff encourages
members to be assertive with their partners, they understand the complex and sometimes
dangerous dynamics at play in these intimate partnerships.
Asserting Bank Boundaries. The following vignette I witnessed in the field
describes how Usha is assertive with babus and others to protect the integrity of Usha and
the independence of members.
A babu came into the office with an Usha member and began to question Usha’s
withdrawal policy. The Usha staff explained the policy and reminded the babu
that he had no reason to get involved because he is not a member, his sex worker
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partner is. The babu replied that he had worked in a bank and never encountered
such policies and he thought they were unnecessary. Again the Usha bank
manager reminded him that he was not involved in the matter because he was not
a member. The babu said, “but the members of the Usha are uneducated and
illiterate, they are foolish women and this bank bogs them down with
cumbersome and unnecessary rules and regulations.” To this Usha staff replied
strongly that Usha was not like other banks. It is a sex worker's bank and
therefore extra checks and balances are in place to make sure that the sex worker's
money is protected and they are not exploited. The babu, who was speaking in an
aggressive manner to the staff and board, continued to criticize the bank's policy.
The conversation intensified as the babu tried to assert his authority by raising his
voice and insisting the bank was wrong. At one point the babu pushed a board
member. The staff told him quite strongly that he needed to leave, and speaking
powerfully to him they literally backed him out of the office.
After the babu left, the assistant bank manager said that babus will try to assert their
power in subtle, but constant ways to keep their sex worker partners in awe of them. That
is why the staff and board need to address the issue so powerfully. Another staff member
said it is difficult, because even these seemingly minor challenges to Usha are attempts
by the babu to undermine the authority of Usha in the eyes of the sex worker and assert
the authority of the babu. The intent is to de-legitimize the bank because the presence of
Usha undercuts the power of babus in the babu/sex worker relationship. The bank
manager said that Usha staff members must know the rules and their justifications clearly
and not question themselves in the face of conflict and manipulation. The staff is trained
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to deal with confrontation in this way. Such interactions are not uncommon at Usha. I
witnessed several conversations between babus who were questioning Usha’s policies
and Usha staff who were defending their policies and procedures. These interactions not
only impact the specific members and babus involved, but continually set the precedent
in the community of Usha as a strong and consistent resource for sex workers.
Incorporation of potential exploiters. Finally, Usha reaches out to potential
exploiters to help them recognize their stake in the activities of Usha and DMSC and
transforms them from adversaries to allies. The Secretary of Usha explained this process.
Through collectivization madams got scared. At one time sex workers used to get
beat up by madams, but now madams recognize that they too have something to
gain from DMSC. Madams can also call up DMSC if they are members to get
help… There used to be a lot of tensions, threatening sex workers, exploiting
them, taking their money. Now madams are more sensitive to sex workers.
Durbar encourages them to remember they were sex workers once as well. Now
madams will go with sex workers to the clinics, encourage them to save in Usha,
and generally support DMSC. This has happened over the last 8 or 9 years.
Several members I had spoken with were encouraged by their madams to join Usha or
learned about Usha because their madam had an account. Additionally, since the
introduction of Usha, sex workers are better able to use their savings to build or buy flats.
Many of these sex workers then rent rooms to other workers for extra income. The
secretary of Usha described this new role. “Madams now, due to the collectivization of
sex workers and Durbar, are more like house owners who get paid rent than managers
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who get commission.” I spoke with several such members. They referred to themselves
as ‘sub-letters’, not madams, indicating a new arrangement in the red light district.
When appropriate, Usha also takes steps to include babus. For example, though I
witnessed confrontational interactions between Usha staff and babus, much more
frequently I saw Usha staff explaining services to members and babus simultaneously.
Accepting babus as potential allies has been an Usha strategy from the beginning. A
founding member explains,
We realized the babus had a lot of power over them. The women really listened to
what the babus told them… We tried to get the babus together and make them
educated about saving and how they could convince women to save and be safe
with their clients… There are different kinds of babus. Some babus would be very
controlling… but then there are some that would actually understand that it's
important for the women to save. For example one said, ok I will explain to her to
save her money.
Madams and babus have their own social networks through which information flows and
community norms develop. Incorporating such power brokers into Usha’s efforts is
therefore a strategic move in the effort to advance sustainable economic empowerment of
sex workers at the community level.
Usha uses the tactics I have outlined above to combat exploitation of sex workers.
Though Usha interacts with individuals to develop financial independence, the effect of
Usha reverberates out to the community, where babus, madams, and money-lenders now
hold less power over sex workers. The presence of Usha has transformed the roles of
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community power brokers and fundamentally shifted the power dynamics of the
community.
Calling on the DMSC. Sometimes there are instances of exploitation in the
community that require more decisive action than Usha is trained to appropriately
administer. In these cases Usha can call on the DMSC to intervene. An example of this
happened while I was at Usha. A Daily Collector had spoken to a member whose madam
was withholding her earnings. The Daily Collector wasn’t sure what to do. Usha
leadership decided it would be best to help the member to report the issue to her DMSC
outreach worker. The DMSC has monthly ‘hotspot’ meetings of community stakeholders
in which they discuss labor issues and can mobilize the community to address labor
exploitation in the field. This organization has the training and capacity to deal with
emergent issues. Because of its partnership with the DMSC, Usha can focus on fulfilling
financial service needs, while relying on a trusted organization to address labor rights.
In sum, Usha historically and currently combats economic exploitation in the
community by offering secure, financial services structured to promote sex worker
financial independence, asserting itself as a strong financial resource in the community,
allowing sex workers to use Usha to navigate often perilous financial dynamics in
intimate relationships, and incorporating potential exploiters as allies in the fight for sex
workers’ rights. When specific instances of exploitation are present in the community,
Usha can call on the power and knowledge of the DMSC to address the issue.
Hypothesis Eleven
Informal labor sector protection is addressed by incorporating sex workers into the union
and giving structure to sex workers’ financial management systems. Specifically:
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Hypothesis 11a: participation in Usha will lead to increased systematic financial
management, including increased knowledge of amount charged per customer,
number of customers seen, and cut taken by madam.
Hypothesis 11b: participation in Usha will serve as a gateway to participation in
the Durbar worker’s collective.
Protection from direct economic exploitation is just one of many labor rights that the
average worker should expect to enjoy. Bateman (2010) and others have criticized
microfinance for expanding the informal sector without developing the basic labor safetynet available to (some) workers in the formal economy. Though not formalized as
structured benefits, Usha is used by members to fulfill this role of social safety-net.
Saving with Usha takes workers out of the hand to mouth paradigm, allowing
them to take time off if necessary. If a sex worker is sick, for instance, she can use her
savings to take a day off. Usha savings also help workers maintain stable housing.
Several members reported using savings or emergency loans to stave off eviction. Usha
savings enables sex workers to engage in safe sex work practices. A founding member
explained, “A lot of sex workers, especially older sex workers, they had very little
bargaining power at the time, so they would take in clients that did not want to use
condoms and this was a major health concern. “
Having an Usha account also gives members the tools they need to critically
evaluate their work arrangements. One member explains,
The last madam I worked with exploited me. For example if I saw five customers,
my madam would only pay me for two. We fought and I left and went to another
brothel with the madam who introduced me to Usha. Now having savings has
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made me more intelligent about my money and how to use it. I make my
decisions myself now.-8
I was a part of collectivizing the workers in my brothel. As a group we confronted
the madam, asking her why she does not show us the calculations of how much
we make and how much she keeps. The madam said that we didn't need to know
that information, but we demanded transparency and the madam relented and
began to show us how much we made and what cut she took. Around this time I
took my money out of the hands of my madam and started saving with Usha. –
Usha leadership
Many workers also use Usha savings to prepare for retirement. Usha incentivizes this
through higher interest fixed deposit programs. Usha also gives older sex workers a
higher interest rate on certain accounts and is looking into the potential of creating
affordable housing for retired sex workers. Usha and the DMSC have worked together to
explore the option of a more formal pension system for sex workers, though this will take
political advocacy on the part of the DMSC.
All of these informal labor protections, however, are neoliberal at their core. In
each case, the individual sex worker is responsible for saving sufficient income to cover
immediate and future needs. This is why Usha relies on the DMSC to fight for more
formalized labor rights of sex workers. The DSMC also offers community services that
are free to all sex workers.
Usha and the DMSC: a mutually beneficial system. Originally I hypothesized
that Usha would serve as a gateway for sex workers to get involved with the union
activities of the DMSC. This hypothesis grossly underestimated the depth of the presence
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of the DMSC in the community. All the sex workers I spoke with were involved with the
DMSC in some capacity. Most sex workers did not perceive any difference between Usha
and the DMSC. They were both considered to be a part of the same system that supports
sex workers.
There are many dimensions to the mutually beneficial relationship between Usha
and the DMSC. In hypothesis six I illustrated how Usha financially supports DMSC. I
also discussed how DMSC networks give Usha access to community information,
provide checks and balances on Usha operations, and address community exploitation. In
addition to this, the DMSC offers programs open to all sex workers, regardless of
income. This broadens the social safety net in a way that an income-based service, such
as Usha, cannot. In a week-long orientation to the DMSC I met with representatives from
each major DMSC initiative. The following descriptions pull from those meetings and the
DMSC website (durbar.org).
Health Clinics: DMSC runs a network of health clinics to address broad range of healthrelated hazard of sex work (including but not limited to HIV). There are also mental
health services including a new initiative to develop peer-led depression groups.
http://durbar.org/html/health_care.aspx
Education: DMSC offers adult education program rooted in Freirean popular education.
Students develop literacy skills while critically engaging with issues affecting the
community. DMSC education programs for youth include tutor support, drop-out
prevention programs, quiet study spaces, the residential school in Bariupur, and youth
sports programs. http://durbar.org/html/education.aspx
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Vocational Training: DMSC provides vocational training for sex workers and children of
sex workers to be employed in fields such as electric repair, cosmetology, and artisanal
craftsmanship. http://durbar.org/html/vocational.aspx
Amra Padatik: The children of sex workers have formed their own collective to fight for
the rights of sex workers and their children. They address stigma, education rights, and
the rights of all marginalized children regarding issues such as dowry and child marriage.
https://www.facebook.com/pages/Amra-padatik/111828725575993
Cultural Group: The Cultural Group, Komal Gandhar, develops dance and theater
performances that speak to the experiences of sex workers and their families. They have
performed locally and internationally at sex worker conferences.
http://durbar.org/html/cultural.aspx https://www.facebook.com/komalgandhar.culture
Anti-trafficking: Through the development of the Self-Regulatory Boards and policy
advocacy, the DMSC addresses the problem of trafficking with insight from the
perspective of sex workers themselves. http://durbar.org/html/anti_trafficking.aspx
Research: The DMSC research team partners with academic researchers to develop best
practices in physical and mental health in the sex worker community.
http://durbar.org/html/research_training.aspx
Additionally, the DMSC engages in ongoing political advocacy for sex workers in
Kolkata in partnership with national and international sex workers organizations. For
example, representatives from Durbar and others from the All India Network of Sex
Workers met in August 2014 to discuss the development of organized pensions and
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maternity entitlements for sex workers. As of the time of this writing, the DMSC is
engaging in a flurry of public actions, such as community rallies, in support of
decriminalizing sex work. This push was galvanized by the potential of a proposal to be
put forth India’s National Commission on Women before the Supreme Court to
decriminalize sex work. Through its connection to DMSC, Usha is a part of a larger
system that provides a wide-reaching social safety net and carves formal labor rights into
an informal market.
Hypothesis Twelve
Civil society incorporation will be enhanced by the legitimization of the sex work
profession through official cooperative bank recognition and participation in Usha as a
means to achieve legitimate property and business ownership.
In Chapter three I described how the pressures of individual neoliberal social welfare
occupy the energies of marginalized groups, thereby impeding in the process of
organizing as a political citizenry. In contrast, the original creators of Usha sought to
build formal in-roads for sex workers to access institutions of civil society. It is for this
reason that Usha became officially recognized as a worker’s cooperative rather than
simply forming an unofficial lending organization comprised of sex workers, as other
groups of informal workers have done successfully out of necessity (Gugerty, 2007).
Because of this, Usha and the DMSC were able to petition the government to accept Usha
membership cards as official identification. Usha and the DMSC then convinced the
election commissioner to accept Usha cards as identification for voter registration.
Previously, sex workers were not able to register to vote because they did not have formal
identification. Voter i.d. cards do not only encourage sex worker civic participation
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through voting, they can be used to access other banks and insurance providers, officially
register children for school, and access government benefits. Several sex workers I had
spoken to said that they had either gotten their voter card through Usha or were in the
process of obtaining one. In this way, Usha contributes to sex workers’ ability to
participate in formal aspect of society.
Usha’s incorporation into the West Bengal Cooperative Society also led to
permanent changes in the ability of all marginalized groups to form cooperatives. As I
noted earlier, Usha contended with a ‘morality clause’ in West Bengal cooperative law
that obstructed sex worker incorporation. There was an additional clause in cooperative
law that mandated worker’s cooperatives to invest a minimum initial deposit of Rs.
50,000 to create a cooperative. DMSC argued that this effectively prohibited
economically marginalized groups from forming cooperatives. Through DMSC
advocacy, both the morality clause and the minimum deposit clause were entirely struck
from cooperative law. The founding of Usha thus marks a political victory for all
marginalized groups seeking entre into civil society through cooperative incorporation.
Finally, participation in Usha has allowed sex workers to legitimately purchase
real estate with sex work income. Building and construction is the single largest use of
Usha loans on record. Many sex workers with whom I spoke had either bought land or
real estate with Usha savings or were hoping to do so in the future. Legitimate purchase
of land builds a bridge for sex workers from informal and illicit employment to legitimate
economic participation. It also allows sex workers to claim ownership of space outside of
the paralegal and unstable arrangements of the brothel. Many of those who acquire
legitimate property and build wealth as sex workers through Usha remain tied to the sex
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worker’s movement after property purchase. This is evident by members I interviewed
who have invested in real estate and remain Usha members.
The tenacity of Usha membership illustrates how the Usha sex worker community
differs from a ‘population’ as constructed by governmentality. Populations under the
power of governmental management are delineated by the patterns and statistics of the
expert. Once an individual does not meet the criteria of a specific population (i.e. stops
being ‘poor’ or a sex worker as defined by the government) they are no longer a part of
that group. Self-defined collective identity in the sex worker community, however, is a
stronger bind than that of a managed population. For this reason, women stay with Usha
even as their personal financial situations evolve, leading to a more stable and sustainable
community. The strength of this community supports the financial stability and
sustainability of the bank, which does not lose members as they become more affluent, as
well as provides a foundation on which to build a political movement and garner
influence in civil society.
Conclusion
There is evidence that the introduction of Usha in the community has shifted dynamics of
power for individuals and the sex worker community as a whole. In doing so, Usha sets a
new precedent for economic interventions with sex workers. In this new paradigm, the
agency of sex workers is respected as they fill the roles of worker, provider, and decision
maker, and structural sources of social marginalization are addressed. Figure 9.1
summarizes results of the political community hypotheses.
The individual and community-level political impact of Usha in the lives of sex
workers described in this chapter and Chapter Seven, taken together with the individual
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and community-level logistical impact of Usha described in Chapters Five and Six,
illustrate how Usha achieves a multi-level, multi-dimensional empowerment intervention
unique in the fields of economic development and sex worker interventions. The full set
of hypothesis results is summarized in Figure 9.2.
Political Community
Hypothesis 10: Usha will undermine economic exploitation by power-brokers in the
community.
 Introduction of Usha into the community instigated a dramatic reduction in the
power of madams, pimps, and babus in the community.
 Usha works strategically with sex workers, madams and babus to undermine
exploitation through systematically supporting the financial independence of sex
workers, asserting Usha’s prominence in the community and engaging
community-power brokers as potential allies.
 Usha partners with the DMSC on urgent instances of labor exploitation.
Hypothesis 11: Usha will provide a system of informal labor sector protection.
H11a: participation in Usha will allow members to build an individual financial
safety net and lead to increased systematic financial management.
 Usha participation enables sex workers to develop a personal financial
safety-net to protect against minor economic shocks, such as missed work
due to illness or unexpected expense. Members also used Usha to plan for
retirement.
 Member participating in Usha reported being more organized with their
finances after joining Usha. This led members to demand knowledge of their
earnings from madams, such as amount charged per customer, the madam’s
cut, etc.
H11b: participation in Usha will serve as a gateway to participation in the Durbar
worker’s collective.
 DMSC is pervasive across the sex worker community and most Usha
members are DMSC members.
 DMSC members have access to a broad range of non-income contingent
health, education, and social programs.
 Financial support from Usha allows DMSC to develop service according to
community pace, need, and ethics.
H12: civil society incorporation will be enhanced by the legitimization of the Usha
organization and member participation in Usha services.
 Usha’s successful campaign for official cooperative incorporation legitimized
sex workers as workers in the eyes of the state. This successful campaign also
abolished the morality clause and minimum initial deposit which were limiting
statues for all marginalized groups.
 Usha and the DMSC leveraged Usha’s incorporation into the State Cooperative
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System to create a mechanism for sex workers to obtain legal identification and
voter registration.
 Usha has allowed sex workers to legitimately purchase property and develop
businesses. Members making these investments stay tied to the sex worker
community.
Figure 9.1: Political Community Results

Individual
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H4: Reinvests income in community
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Political
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exploitation
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financial decision making

H11: Provides labor protection in an
unregulated informal labor sector.

H12: Serves as vehicle for access to
H9: Encourages member
institutions of civil society.
participation in decision making
Figure 9.2: Full Conceptual Model Results Summary
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CHAPTER TEN
Discussion: Organizational Conceptual Model: Banking Intervention and Worker’s
Collective Partnership
This case study presents the Usha Multipurpose Cooperative Society as a dissentient from
hegemonic representations of economic development. Such representations of
development construct people in the ‘Third World’ as objects to be shaped by expert-led,
technologically driven, modernist development interventions (Escobar, 1995). In seeking
recourse from this intransigent view of progress, Escobar asserts that critical scholars
must “imagine a post-development regime of representation to investigate and pursue
alternative practices in the context of today’s social movements in the Third World (p.
11, 1995).” Study of such alternative practices must be situated within concrete local
sociopolitical contexts so as not to reinforce generalizing definitions of and remedies for
‘underdeveloped’ countries, communities, and individuals. Indeed, the preceding
analysis of the Usha Multi-purpose Cooperative Society illustrates the importance of
historical, social, and political context to the organization’s current structure, culture, and
impact on the community. Additionally, by focusing on practices located within the sex
worker’s social movement attention is given to the ways objects of development reclaim
the power to define and determine their social world.
Though this case analysis is anchored to the specific geographies of Sonagachi,
there are several concepts and themes which inform the general discussion of global
development in the new millennium. In this chapter I look deeper into the organizational
form created by the partnership of the Usha bank and the DMSC sex workers union. The
partnering of these two types of community-led organizations is a unique organizational
system that has not been examined extensively in social policy or development literature.
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I argue that this partnership system is the key which unlocks the sex worker community’s
ability to achieve multi-level (individual and community), multi-dimensional (logistical
and political) empowerment.
The Usha/DMSC System.
Study findings detail how Usha and the DMSC contribute mutually supportive features
that together form a system of logistical and political empowerment at the individual and
collective level. The conceptual model presented below delineates 1) contributions to this
system that can be primarily attributed to Usha or the DMSC, though all contributions are
interdependent and 2) elements of the system to which Usha and DMSC each contribute
different dimensions. These contributions come together to establish 3) a set of shared
core values, material resources and symbolic resources resulting in 4) a set of multi-level,
multi-dimensional outcomes achieved by this organization system. Figure 10.1 visually
depicts this conceptual model.
Collaborative Contributions. Usha and the DMSC each have a different
organizational expertise and were developed to address different facets of sex workers’
experiences. However, even relatively independent contributions of each organization are
supported by the activities of the other. For example, low cost loans are provided to the
community by Usha, but as we saw, it is through leveraging the DMSC social network
that these low costs are achieved sustainably. Furthermore, Usha would not exist without
the successful organizing of the DMSC, which convinced the West Bengal Cooperative
Minister of the sex worker community’s capability to run a cooperative. On the other
hand, universal social services and political advocacy of the DMSC are supported by
Usha funds. Collective political action is a key tool of the DMSC worker’s collective and
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may go unfunded and unrealized without the financial help of Usha. Additionally, the
legitimacy of the sex workers’ rights movement is bolstered by Usha’s high profile
successes.
Though the organizations are clearly interdependent, maintaining some
organization boundaries was shown to be important for the healthy functioning of both
organizations. For example, though Usha staff is often the first to learn about labor issues
in the community, the DMSC is the primary mediator during instances of community
exploitation. The DMSC is equipped to deal with the highly politically charged
environment of intra-community dispute. Usha does not have the training or resources to
address these issues, just as the DMSC does not have the capacity to run a bank.
Delimiting organizational responsibilities allows each to focus on specialty areas.
Usha and DMSC also mutually strengthen community processes such as the
development of professional identity, development of sex worker leadership, reduction of
stigma associated with sex work, and promotion of citizenship rights of sex workers. The
DMSC promotes sex worker professional identity through, for example, labor rights
advocacy and encouraging condom use as a marker of professional conduct (Ghose,
2008). Usha promotes professional identity through the codification of sex work as a
legitimate profession and by helping sex workers invest and mobilize their earnings to
achieve financial goals. Taken together, these elements of organizational structure and
culture create a layered sense of professional identity which envelopes sex workers
engaging in Usha and DMSC programs and services.

133

Usha to the DMSC and the Sex
Work Community








Safe money storage
Affordable financial
services
Financial support for
DMSC
Informal labor
protection through
individual self-help











Collective identity
Sex worker
leadership
Reduced stigma
Citizenship rights
Employment
opportunities
Combat exploitation

DMSC to Usha and the Sex
Work Community




Political advocacy
Social network
Provides informal
labor protection
through collective
self-help

Shared material
resources
Shared symbolic
resources

Resulting in:
 Income and non-income contingent services
 Ongoing fight against exploitation, violence, and abuse within the
community
 Organizational and financial sustainability of the system
 Dynamic programs and services adaptable to community-defined
needs
 Active fight for formal and informal labor rights of sex workers
 Development of sex worker leadership
 Sex work leaders in the social movement and in the administration of
services
 Leadership in individual financial and work decisions
 Development of a collective professional, social, and political identity
 Among community members
 In the eyes of the public, decreasing stigma
 In relationship with the state

Figure 10.1: Organizational Conceptual Model: Banking Intervention and Worker’s
Collective Partnership
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Shared material and symbolic resources. In her study of the DMSC, Cornish
(2006) draws on Freire to analyze how the DMSC mobilizes material and symbolic
resources to resist social stigma experienced by the sex work community. Freire (1973)
argues that both material oppression, which denies people of their agency, and symbolic
oppression, which denies them self-definition, undermine the energy and will for
collective mobilization. Cornish argues that, in the context of sex worker mobilization,
both material and symbolic approaches are necessary to inspire a new, empowered social
order for sex workers. She states, “material changes that are not discussed at the symbolic
level as a part of a community’s political agenda and grand ideals without material
backing are equally incomplete (p.470, 2006). “
Through this partnership, Usha and DMSC have established a set of shared
symbolic and material resources which can be drawn upon to achieve the logistical and
political goals of the community. Pooled material resources provide for the needs of the
community through direct services. Symbolic resources generated by this system include
the organized collective power of sex workers to achieve community goals, a foundation
of community trust upon which to build both services and a social movement, and a
shared vision of a respected and healthful community of sex workers. The Usha/DMSC
system demonstrates the inextricable interconnectedness of material and symbolic
resources. The development of symbolic resources through collective mobilization relies
on the material resources generated by the bank. Likewise, Usha’s financial resources
were actualized through the political mobilization of the sex worker community and
continue to thrive largely due to the trust and accountability fostered by collective
identity in the sex worker social network.
135

Resulting benefits for sex workers. The final piece of this conceptual model
outlines the practical and political outcomes achieved by the Usha/DMSC system which
were discussed in detail in the results. The Usha/DMSC system conceptual model
illustrates the potential of bringing together a community-led banking intervention and
worker’s rights collective to achieve a multi-level, multi-dimensional intervention
promoting economic and political empowerment in the sex work community. This
specific organizational system is intertwined with its context. However, the concept of an
organizational partnership between direct financial service and a worker’s collective is an
idea that could be explored in many different contexts and tailored to fit a variety of
specific forms of labor, social and political contexts, geographies, etc.
The synergistic model described here enables the sex worker community to
redefine empowerment on their own terms and breach the limitations of mainstream
microfinance and current economic interventions with sex workers. By bringing the Usha
case analysis into conversation with mainstream discourses on economic and gender
empowerment, Chapters Ten and Eleven return to the original research questions and
discuss the extent to which Usha reclaims the social transformative potential of
microfinance and engenders sex workers’ individual and collective agency.
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CHAPTER ELEVEN
Discussion: The Usha Multi-purpose Cooperative Society and Economic
Empowerment
This case study was driven, in part, by the goal to evaluate whether and how Usha
reclaims the empowerment potential of microfinance. ‘Empowerment’ is a cornerstone
concept in discourses relating to development, poverty alleviation, and global social
welfare. The term has proven slippery and stakeholders from varied ideological locations
have recast definitions of empowerment to meet their ends. Differing definitions of
empowerment have led to intense debates about the usefulness of the construct, what
processes are illuminated by the concept, and what are obscured. Scholars must therefore
cut through the ambiguity of the term and articulate the social and political ontologies
undergirding concepts of empowerment, trace how different forms of empowerment
shape policy and programming and, finally, evaluate their impact on social welfare at the
individual, community, and sociopolitical levels.
In Chapter One, I briefly outlined the turn toward neoliberalism in the late
twentieth century, the global reach of this ideology, and the role of the power of
governmentality in its promulgation. I argued that microfinance is the quintessential
intervention of neoliberal empowerment. Through top-down interventions, developed by
economic experts and without much user input, microfinance directs resource-poor
individuals into self-run small businesses, mostly in an unprotected informal labor sector.
This is one aspect of a larger process of ‘dispossession by financialization’ (Harvey,
2005), advanced through microfinance by bringing marginalized people into an
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exploitative market, making profit off of the debt burden of poor people, and privatizing
elements of social and material life previous provided by the commons.
It has also been argued that microfinance serves to ameliorate the sting of
structural inequality resulting from neoliberal policy. Microfinance occupies the world’s
poor with taking advantage of ‘self-help’ opportunities, thereby distracting a potentially
dangerous underclass from collectively mobilizing for political and structural change.
‘Empowerment’ is constructed as the privilege to access this self-help opportunity
structure. Structural change, or collectivizing to shift power dynamics that shape the lives
and ‘opportunities’ of the poor, is not discursively presented or included as an
empowerment option for the population and is thereby ‘allowed to die’ under neoliberal
governmentality.
This line of argument demonstrates the limitations of market-based neoliberal
empowerment. Top-down neoliberal development forecloses the possibility of a
community-defined conceptualization of empowerment. Usha, as a grassroots
organization, was not limited in this way and was able to organically develop its own
working definition of empowerment in accordance with the lived experiences of sex
workers and within the larger context of a fledgling sex workers’ rights movement. For
these reasons Usha both achieves and transcends neoliberal goals of economic
empowerment, extracting the intervention from the paradigm of individual self-help and
creating a new paradigm that holds space for individual and collective self-help along a
number of social and political dimensions. I argue that Usha thereby facilitates the
neoliberal goals of individual financial responsibility, but also challenges the neoliberal
order by a) promoting a collective social safety net built on community redistribution of
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wealth and b) demanding governmental accountability for their role in the systems of
social inequality which marginalize sex workers.
Usha and individual self-help. Usha provides many of the individual sources of
economic self-help privileged by mainstream development. Usha offers a secure place to
build savings and access to credit which enable sex workers to make and achieve
financial goals. The results demonstrate the impact of Usha on member’s ability to
purchase real estate, invest in businesses, care for family, and educate their children. This
form of economic empowerment-through-financial-independence is celebrated in the
microfinance discourse.
Sex workers also use Usha as a form of individual labor protection in a market
without formal benefits. As we saw, sex workers use Usha services to build a financial
cushion which can be used to take a day off due to illness, refuse a client, leave an
abusive domestic situation, cover unexpected expenses, and, if a member is extremely
forward thinking, save for retirement. These are all processes of reclaiming agency that
are championed by mainstream microfinance.
Even at the individual level, however, Usha services begin to expand the
empowerment potential of banking. Firstly, founding members did not cede the power of
service provision to an outside organization. They knew that, particularly as a stigmatized
group, outside leadership would undermine the symbolic impact of a sex worker bank
and limit sex workers’ ability to shape services according to community need. Original
Usha leadership recognized that even the right to provide services is political and that
management should come from the community. Secondly, and I would argue largely due
to this community leadership, terms and conditions of Usha financial services are
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demonstrably more favorable to program beneficiaries than other microfinance programs.
Additionally, because Usha profit are democratically reinvested back into the community,
the Usha cooperative does not participate in the processes of accumulation by
dispossession connected to commercial microfinance.
However, despite these distinctions, the logic of individual services provided by
Usha is bound by the same fundamental limitations as neoliberal microfinance. Social
protections provided at this level are moored to the extent to which sex workers’ can
build a personal safety net and do not account for market failures, unforeseen needs, and
stratified initial circumstances. Clearly, individual programs alone are not sufficient to
protect and empower workers.
Usha and communal self-help. Usha’s programs and services, however, are not
limited to income contingent programs. The constellation of universal programs and
services supported by Usha creates a social safety net for all members of the sex work
community. This social safety net is communally funded by pooling resources from Usha
profits, funding received by DMSC programs, and DMSC member fees. This
community-resourced system of collective self-help compliments the individualistic selfhelp provided through personal financial services. In this way, the Usha/DMSC system
has begun to rebuild ‘the commons’ desecrated by neoliberalism.
Additionally, the presence of the Usha/DMSC system has fundamentally shifted
community power dynamics, lessening the power of madams and babus to control sex
workers. At an interpersonal level, this is an individual benefit. However, the shift in
power dynamics does not just impact single sex workers who now maintain independent
control of their money. The success of Usha has contributed to a change in the status of
140

madams and babus in the role they play in the community. Simultaneously, sex workers
may experience an increase in social capital (Bourdieu, 1986) as the community now has
access to bank leadership and staff for assistance during emergencies and general
financial guidance. These processes signify a cultural shift in the community which
benefits sex workers whether or not they save with Usha.
By mobilizing community resources the Usha/DMSC system is able to support its
community members. However, this system of communal self-help also contributes to a
development dynamic critiqued in microfinance. Neoliberal development highlights the
role of social capital in achieving development goals. This social capital discourse has
been criticized for resting the responsibility of poverty alleviation on the backs of poor
communities and smoothing over economic gaps produced by structural inequality on a
broader scale, protecting the state and non-state governing bodies from the brunt of
discontent. Rankin writes,
“the social capital framework enables the architects of neoliberal economic policy
to cast the reconfiguration of state–society relations in progressive terms – local
capacity building, local self-reliance, net social benefits from reduced transaction
costs, and increased returns to human capital. As such, social capital can be
expected to fill the vacuum left by the restructuring of the welfare state in
countries around the world (p.10, 2002).”
Usha does, in fact leverage social capital to fill a void in this way. The sex work
community’s redistributive system of collective self-help therefore cracks the neoliberal
edifice of individualism, but on its own does not challenge macro structures of power
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which shape sex worker’s lives. It is only through Usha’s partnership with the DMSC
that these larger political objectives can be met.
Usha as a form of structural empowerment. The DMSC has mobilized sex
workers to address sociopolitical issues shaping the experiences of sex workers. In the
results I highlighted several such projects including petitioning the government for
formalized social welfare benefits and dismantling the Immoral Trafficking Prevention
Act, which has been used to systematically target and marginalize sex workers. When
the service activities of Usha are paired with the collective political activities of DMSC
we begin to see the potential of a banking intervention as an integral part of a social
movement.
Community banking and social movement building. There are several ways
that Usha supports political advocacy within the sex worker community.
Attending to basic needs, advocating for bigger change. It is difficult to organize
toward abstract political goals when survival needs are not met. This is why much of the
organizing efforts of marginalized groups are oriented toward obtaining basic needs
entitlements (Chatterjee, 2004). Community banking models such as the Usha
cooperative can help support the provision of immediate survival needs in-house. This
frees up the sex workers movement to advocate for structural political change when
engaging with both community-level power brokers and governing institutions.
This independent funding stream also allows the DSMC to create programs that
operate according to community ethics and values. This is especially important when
these ethics are discordant with the mainstream discourse on sex work. Usha contributes
to several DMSC programs that counter deficit-based interventions for sex workers. For
142

example, Usha supports a residential school in Bariupur for the children of sex workers.
Children who attend this residential school have regular contact with their mothers and
the school is run by members of the community. There are other residential schools
designed for the children of sex workers in Kolkata which do not welcome mothers to
participate in the children’s lives and educations (Durbar.org). This discriminatory and
presumptive attitude about sex worker mothers was unacceptable to the DMSC, who
created the school in Bariupur in response.
Usha has also recently purchased land outside of Kolkata to build a residential
home for trafficked minors. This will also be run by the DMSC, who understands the
complex impact of trafficking on the lives of young people and develops culturallyrelevant responses accordingly. It would be difficult for these kinds of pro-sex worker
programs to find funding in an international funding field dominated by abolitionist
‘rescue, raid, and rehabilitated’ models.
Additionally, because the Usha/DMSC system provides for the needs of its
community, Usha/DMSC is not in competition with other marginalized groups for scarce
resources. The Usha/DMSC system can therefore partner with other marginalized groups
to advocate for structural change. By joining together with other groups, such as
Domestic Workers (durbardisha.wordpress.com), this system resists the tactics of
governmentality that seek to address differently defined ‘populations’ in siloes,
suggesting an environment of scarcity in which demands of this group can be met only if
demands of that group are not (Chatterjee, 2004). Recently, DMSC members joined with
other groups to advocate for stronger pro-poor policies from the government. Usha has
worked with other sex work communities to build cooperative banks. By coming together
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in coalition, the DMSC and other marginalized groups defy the population definitions
ascribed to them to uncover and mobilize around multilateral experiences of exploitation
and marginalization.
Independent funding for political action. The DMSC advisor I spoke with stated
that the political work of the DMSC would be impossible without financial support from
Usha. Grassroots organizers across many contexts have suggested that alternative funding
mechanisms for political advocacy will be needed as state, corporate, and even
foundation funding becomes increasingly hesitant toward (or in outright contempt of)
direct political action (see INCITE!, 2007). The relationship between Usha and the
DMSC illustrates how community banking is one alternative mechanism for funding
activist activities that has not been explored much in the literature.
Changing public perception of sex workers. The final way that Usha supports the
political goals of the sex work movement is by changing the public perception of sex
workers. Usha has received several high profile accolades for the success of its
cooperative, including being awarded “Best Mahila (Women’s) Cooperative of 2014” by
the West Bengal State Cooperative Society. DMSC uses this publicity as a platform to
highlight Usha’s success as a sex worker’s organization and draw attention to broader
political goals of the sex workers movement.
Multi-level, multi-dimensional strategy. The Usha/DMSC system therefore
demonstrates that sex workers can a) achieve neoliberal goals of self-help and selfempowerment b) provide for community need through a collective social safety-net and
c) still demand structural change to address issues that cannot be surmounted through
individual responsibility or communal care. The Usha/DMSC system exposes a false
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dichotomy between individual responsibility on the one hand and communal care and
structural change on the other. For example, this case study reveals how the collectivism
built into the Usha/DMSC system actually strengthens the potential for individuals to
achieve their personal financial goals by keeping interest rates low through leveraging the
collective’s social network.
This study also demonstrates how a development intervention which is
accountable to the community can still achieve broad goals of economic development.
For example, Usha’s business investments in agriculture, pisciculture, and handicrafts
have created local employment opportunities. Through membership in Usha sex workers
have gained access to the real estate market, providing both an opportunity for sex
workers and a new market population for the quickly expanding West Bengal
construction business sector. However, these goals are achieved without charging
exorbitant interest rates, over-indebting the community, excluding the most marginalized
(as demonstrated by the high number of older sex workers accessing Usha services and
the range of loan sizes available), dismantling common resources or ignoring structural
causes of poverty. In this way, the study of Usha helps us see how capital can in fact be
generated in a community without succumbing to the processes of accumulation by
dispossession critiqued in neoliberal capitalism (Harvey, 2005). Figure 11.1 rearticulates
the multi-level, multi-dimensional model, highlighting the forms of empowerment each
level/dimension supports.
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Logistical Individual

Logistical Community

Individual Self-help

Communal Self-Help

Individual / Behavioral
Empowerment

Community / Redistributive
Empowerment

Political Individual

Political Community

Individual Political Agency

Communal Political Agency

Socio-political
Transformation

Socio-political
Transformation

Figure 11.1: Usha multi-level, multi-dimensional model and forms of empowerment
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CHAPTER TWELVE
Discussion: The Usha Multipurpose Cooperative and Gender Empowerment
Gender Empowerment in Millennial Development
Gender empowerment is a central discourse in turn of the millennium development,
expressed in countless media representations of ‘empowered’ third world women and
codified in the U.N. millennium development goals (MDGs). We have reached the 2015
MDG deadline to ‘promote gender equality and empower women
(www.un.org/millenniumgoals).” Evaluating the extent to which women have been
‘empowered’ is difficult given the varied and often ambiguous definitions ascribed to
gender-based empowerment, as we saw with the empowerment discourse more broadly
(Aslanbeigui, Oakes & Uddin, 2010; Mosedale, 2005). Most definitions, however,
include dimensions of “change, choice, and power (Cheston & Kuhn, 2002, p. 12),” and
posit empowerment as a process through which women identify constraints on their life
choices and alter limiting structures of power to expand what is possible (Cheston &
Kuhn, 2002; Kabeer1999; Mosedale, 2005). The second research question guiding this
case study accesses this question of expanded options, asking whether the Usha
organization engenders individual and collective economic agency in the sex work
community. This study also investigated how these forms of agency contrast abolitionist
economic interventions, which have all but erased sex worker economic agency by
limiting acceptable options for sex workers to narrow alternative employment schemes
and ushering women into specific forms of capitalist entrepreneurialism.
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The fallacy of universal womanhood and the role of context. Theories of
empowerment put forth by the microfinance and abolitionist discourses fall prey to the
fallacy of ‘generalized womanhood’ which Mohanty (1988) suggests drives gendered
development interventions in the ‘Third World’. Mohanty argues that top-down
development interventions implemented in the global south are blind to the historical,
cultural, and political contexts of their program recipients, casting a gendered haze of
uniformity across intervention-receiving communities. Assumed homogeneity of
experience makes it possible to franchise out microcredit models and alternative
employment programs. These intervention programs are founded upon exogenous value
systems and theories of change assumed to be universal.
This is problematic on several levels. Interventions which impose a monolithic
identity on women often fail when the complex lives of real women to not fit the mold
cast for them (Basu & Dutta, 2008). The identity constructed for these women, often by
Western and/or middle class feminists, generally depicts women as victims of backward
cultures, justifying outside intervention (Doezema, 2001). Finally, such interventions
ignore the sociopolitical contexts of women’s lives and are therefore necessarily inept at
addressing structural oppression (Basu & Dutta, 2008). Chapters One and Two present
evidence of these shortcomings in both the microfinance and sex worker literature.
Taking together, these critiques suggest that to achieve a more meaningful
broadening of possibilities for women, economic interventions must be responsive to
participant need within cultural context, resist reification of patriarchy and
neocolonialism within its own organizational structure, and contribute to the dismantling
of macro sources of gendered disempowerment in service communities.
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Usha achieves these goals and in doing so articulates three interrelated realms of
agency relevant to multi-level, multi-dimensional empowerment. Usha engenders 1)
individual agency, by supporting independent financial decision making of sex workers
and recognizing complex contexts within which decisions are made, 2)
organizational/programmatic agency, through member leadership and a democratic
organizational structure, and 3) structural agency by a) supporting sex worker’s collective
political mobilization and b) undermining neoliberal processes of gendered accumulation
by dispossession.
Individual agency. At Usha, respect for professional context has led to a system
of services suited to the unique needs of sex workers, facilitating their ability to access
services and achieve their goals. Whereas microfinance has been found to constrict loan
use, obscuring the true varied uses of loans disbursed to women (Karim, 2011), Usha
openly acknowledges a variety of loan uses that range from investment to consumption.
Abolitionist economic interventions assume the profession of sex work to be
disempowering and are oriented toward exit from sex work. In contrast, Usha has tailored
its services to maximize what empowerment potential lives in the profession. Though sex
workers still experienced stigma, members also expressed pride in their ability to make
and achieve personal financial goals. Members can use Usha financial services to grow
their sex work business, become a madam, or finance their permanent exit from the red
light district. In a profession-affirming organizational context such as Usha, these
achievements do not need to be marred by society’s denigration of sex work and
problematic accompanying gender values.
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Additionally, the results also demonstrate how the Usha/DMSC system accounts
for the complicated and varied relationships between madams, babus, and sex workers.
Rather than assume all madams and babus to be the enemy and all sex workers to be
victims, staff at Usha recognize variations in these roles, inviting some madams and
babus to be a part of the sex worker support system, while using the strength of Usha to
undermine the power of others. This occurs according to the specific and varied
experiences of individual sex work members, respecting their agency in complicated
interpersonal relationships. Regarding the broader discourses of millennial development
and human trafficking, this handling of interpersonal relationships dismantles both the
flat ‘patriarchal partner’ and ‘evil trafficker’ archetypes in microfinance and sex work
discourses respectively.
Finally, though the Usha cooperative is invested in the sex worker’s rights
political movement, political engagement or endorsement of certain political ideals are
not enforced on members. The Grameen Bank has been critiqued for imposing the ‘16
decisions’ on members; a set of ‘modern’ values, not relating directly to banking, that
women are asked to recite at meetings and subscribe to in life. This has been viewed as
paternalistic and coercive (Selinger, 2008). Usha members consent to use of the profits
from their savings to support the sex worker’s movement through the DMSC. Otherwise,
Usha doesn’t force members to identify with a workers movement. Usha accepts that
some members remain ambivalent or ashamed of their profession and will in fact actively
help members use the structure of the DMSC to conceal their profession from family if a
member so choses. Usha members do not need to join the DMSC to become an Usha
member (though all members I had spoken with had).
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It is just as problematic to assume that sex workers are unanimously politically
engaged and prideful of their work as it is to assume all sex workers are victims. Usha
culturally and structurally avoids this trap. Solidarity around the identity of sex work is
neither assumed nor imposed by Usha on sex workers. Engaging in worker’s solidarity
through the activities of the DMSC is therefore an active choice, not an obligatory task
necessary to access a service. In these ways Usha demonstrates respect for sex workers as
adult women making complicated financial and interpersonal decisions.
Organizational leadership. Organizational decisions are made democratically
and therefore only services, investments, and institutional changes that meet the approval
of the member base are advanced. Sex workers are therefore in control of the services
they will receive. In this way, Usha defies patriarchal stereotypes by simply being a
financial institution that is run by sex workers. Such an idea was inconceivable when the
founding members first approached the Cooperative Ministry to be incorporated as a
bank. As sex workers, this was a group of women that had been rendered voiceless by
discourses of victimhood. If empowerment is, at least in part, concerned with reclaiming
the right to self-definition and expanding the boundaries of what is possible, the
incorporation and subsequent success of the Usha Multipurpose Cooperative Society is in
and of itself a powerful story of gender empowerment.
Through member leadership, Usha undermines processes of governmentality
which distance people from the management of their own experience. Results
demonstrate that member leadership leads to both effective and efficient services for sex
workers and awakens the potential for this banking intervention to address non-technical
(political) determinates of economic well-being.
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Meaningful solidarity and structural change. Mainstream microfinance
suggests that women will under-take community projects of gender-based social
transformation with other women participating in their lending groups. This assumes that
women, randomly assembled into lending groups, will recognize in each other the seeds
of revolution sprouting from a shared struggle. Critics have suggested that this is
unlikely, given that the activities of the lending group are restricted to loan repayment
and disbursement, lending group members are in direct economic competition with one
another and groups range across relevant personal characteristics of class, social standing,
religion, etc. (Karim, 2011). My research with Usha corroborates skepticism about this
logic. Shared economic program participation alone would most likely not necessarily
engender solidarity among women at Usha. Women in this sex work community are
direct competitors and income information is considered private. Furthermore, most
women come to Usha to make transaction as they would any other bank. Convenience
and simplicity are valued by members. If Usha was limited to the microfinance logic of
lending-based solidarity there would be limited potential to mobilize sex workers through
Usha participation.
The community did not mobilize solely around economic vulnerability, however,
they mobilized around a collective identity as sex workers. Mobilizing around the
gendered issue of sex work led to the establishment of the DMSC and Usha. Usha has
therefore been able to channel its resources to support a system of solidarity that is
meaningful to the community. This research suggests that sustainable gender
empowerment must be rooted in a stronger sense of community than program
participation alone. Microfinance programs hoping to inculcate solidarity and social
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change can look to Usha and other initiatives that foster collective political identity as a
springboard to broader empowerment (Sengupta, 2013).
Usha and gendered accumulation by dispossession. In an article entitled “The
rationality of empowerment: microcredit, accumulation by dispossession, and the
gendered economy” authors Keating, Russmussen, and Rishi (2010) examine how
discourses of feminism have been coopted to ‘lend ideological cover to economic
restructuring (p.).’ Microcredit contributes to this process by constructing borrowers as
‘rational’ economic women oriented toward entrepreneurialism, thereby embedding
capitalist values into the very concept of gender empowerment. Accumulation by
dispossession is accelerated by this dynamic as bigger and more generative loans are
construed as more and more ‘empowering’ in the microfinance discourse, with creditproviding institutions reaping profit off of this ‘empowerment’ process (Aslanbeigui,
Oakes & Uddin, 2010). Empowerment is realized through capitalist productivity, not
through combatting injustice or even basic recognition of human worth (Parmar, 2003).
Similarly, in the sex work discourse, empowerment is defined as the move away from sex
work toward acceptable market activity, with return to sex work considered a failure.
As the partnering bank of a worker’s collective, Usha is uniquely situated to
challenge the discursive connection between gender empowerment and capitalist value
systems. Kabeer (2001) notes that women often experience increases in self-esteem and
higher status in interpersonal and social relationships as a result of obtaining and
investing a loan. Many members I spoke with did in fact find self-worth in their
capitalistic productivity. This is, however, a tenuous foundation on which to rest the
whole of gender empowerment. If an investment is not profitable, if a bigger loan
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becomes untenable, if the sex worker does not save enough to send their child to school,
is her empowerment undone?
It is the responsibility of community groups to construct systems of empowerment
that are not validated exclusively by capitalistic success. By advocating for wholesale
structural change, the Usha/DMSC system does not make gender empowerment
contingent upon success in the market- as the Usha branch of the organization without the
DMSC might. In other words, the Usha/DMSC system engages in action that asserts that
all sex workers, whether economically ‘successful’ or not, deserve to work free of
exploitation and physical, sexual, symbolic, and epistemic violence.
The Usha/DMSC system also loudly reintroduces a public discourse on gendered
labor rights and rebinds gender empowerment to democracy by making direct demands
on the state and its constituents. Finally, Usha/DMSC undermines the alienation of
laborers under advanced capitalism by bringing together coalitions of marginalized
groups, moving toward a collective approach at the base of what Appadurai (2001)
describes as “deep democracy.” In these ways, Usha pushes past the limitations of
neoliberal gender empowerment that is contingent on entrepreneurial success as
promoted by microfinance and provides an alternative vision of multi-level, multidimensional gender empowerment.
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CHAPTER THIRTEEN
Discussion: Research Limitations, Future Research and Conclusions.
Research Limitations and Future Research
There are several limitations to this research that are worth noting. Despite accessing a
range of interview participants and observation locations, there is the potential for
selection bias. For example, the members I spoke with were able to meet me at an
Usha/DMSC office to conduct an interview. There may be members who are more highly
restricted in their movements or less connected to the DMSC/Usha social network that
this research misses. I was also not able to conduct research in the full range of Usha
fields, some of which are quite far from the city of Kolkata. Additionally, since I only
spoke with Usha members, I have no way of comparing the financial experiences of Usha
members as compared with sex workers not participating in Usha. Finally, the
quantitative analysis was limited to variables collected in the administrative database.
This database was not collected for research purposes and therefore misses several
potentially important variables, such as, for example, whether a member has children, is a
flying or brothel worker, and or has a babu.
Future research can address some of these short-comings. In developing a longterm research partnership with Usha, we have identified potential future projects to
extend this work. A large scale survey study could quantitatively analyze some of the
potential patterns of loan approval, loan repayment, and savings use according to a
variety of independent variables not captured in the administrative database.
Additionally, as Usha expands there is the potential to conduct a replication field
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experiment comparing economic and health outcomes in a region receiving an Usha
branch as compared to a control community.
Conclusion
This is the first study to examine a community-led economic intervention
supporting the health and well-being of sex workers. Usha demonstrates that a longstanding, financially sustainable cooperative led by female sex workers in the global
south is not only possible, but can achieve successes according to multiple indicators.
The logic of neoliberal, neocolonial development would lead us to believe this is not, in
fact, possible without substantive institutional interference by outside development
experts. As community-led organization, Usha has expanded discourses of empowerment
beyond current neoliberal limitations to include communal support and structural change
for women participating in a gendered and stratified economy.
This organization therefore achieves the ‘alternative representation of
development’ called for by Escobar. This case study does not suggest the immediate
replicability of Usha into other contexts. Usha is the product of a unique socio-political
context. Sex worker organizations developing in places without a strong legacy of
cooperative banking, a close-knit geographic red light district, and a range in sex worker
incomes would encounter different challenges and opportunities. I do argue, however,
that we can learn from the community-led multi-level multi-dimensional model to
challenge the current state of millennial development. By using the broad multi-level
multi-dimensional structure as an organizing framework, organizations and emerging
social movements can address logistical and political empowerment at the individual,
community, and structural levels to acheive relevant and sustainable social change.
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APPENDICES
APPENDIX A
Topics of Inquiry and Hypotheses
Individual

Community

Logistical H1: Maintains loan affordability
 Credit alternatives in community
 Member service experience

H4: Reinvests income in
community
 Investment of income

H2: Disburses loans responsibly to avoid H5: Benefits community through
investment projects
over-indebtedness
 Processes of Usha income
 Processes of community financial
generating projects
advising and loan approval
 Member experience
H6: Manages organizational
funds autonomous of outside
H3: Disburses loans equitably
 Member and staff perceptions of institutions
 Management of funds
exclusionary practices at Usha
 Relationship between
 Processes of community financial
Usha and DMSC
advising and loan approval
Political

H7: Marks member professionalism
 History of development of Usha
 Member experience

H10: Undermines community
economic exploitation
 History of development
of Usha
 Member experience

H8: Maintains member agency
 Processes of community financial
H11: Provides labor protection in
advising loan approval
an unregulated informal labor
 Member experience
sector.
 Relationship between
H9: Encourages member participation
Usha and Durbar
 Organizational decision making
 Member experience
processes
 Member experience
H12: Serves as vehicle for access
to institutions of civil society
 History of development
of Usha
 Member experience
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APPENDIX B
Human Subjects Protection
The proposed research has been approved by both the University of Pennsylvania
Institutional Review Board and the Research Ethics Board of the Durbar Mahila
Samanwaya Committee.
Confidentiality and Privacy. At no point during the study were subjects’ full
names, contact information, or unique identifiers recorded by the researcher. Only the
researcher had access to the recordings and field notes. All quantitative data was deidentified and spreadsheets were connected by a client i.d. number. Audio files,
transcripts, and quantitative data were stored in an encrypted and password protected file
on the researcher’s password protected computer. Interviews took place in an
Usha/Durbar office space or space of participant’s choosing.
Consent Process Informed consent was obtained at the beginning of interviews
by the researcher, using the translator. Consent was obtained verbally, as a written
consent form would otherwise be the only document linking the subject to the study. The
interview followed immediately after obtaining consent. Participants were made aware
that participation in the interview was voluntary and that the decision to participate or not
participate in the interview would in no way affect current or future services received at
USHA or the DMSC or have any bearing on their current or future employment with
USHA or the DMSC. The researcher and translator obtaining consent used language that
is clear and simple to describe the study, the subject’s rights as a research participant, and
the risks and benefits of participation. The researcher asked permission to record the
interview, if permission to record was not granted the interviewer took notes. During
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participant observation in the field the researcher was introduced as a researcher. If at any
time anyone was uncomfortable with the researcher’s presence the researcher did not
enter the space.
Risk/Benefit. There is low risk in participation in this research. Members gave
anonymous interviews about their experiences participating in Usha and managing their
finances. Other key informants gave interviews about their experiences with Usha and
their thoughts on the Usha and Durbar organizations. There are no individual benefits to
participating in the research. However, the research may positively impact the Usha
organization that could lead to potential benefits for the sex work community in Kolkata.
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APPENDIX C
Interview Protocol: Members
Interview Protocol: Current Members
Are you currently a sex worker?
For how long?
In what field do you work?
Are you brothel based?
If not, please describe your work arrangement.
Do you have any children? How many and what are their ages?
Membership
How long have you been a member at Usha?
Where did you keep your money before joining Usha?
Did you save? How?
How did you originally connect to Usha?
Why did you decide to join Usha?
Service User Experience
In which Usha programs do you participate?
If Savings: Have you experienced any benefits from participating in Usha savings
program? Please describe.
Have you experienced any challenges participating in Usha savings programs?
If so, please describe.
What are your current savings goals?
Have you experienced any challenges achieving those goals? If so, please
describe?
Please describe some of the ways you have used your savings.
Have you taken a loan? If yes, what for?
If loan: Have you experienced any benefits from participating in Usha loan
program? Please describe.
Have you experienced any challenges participating in Usha loan program? If so,
please describe.
Is there anything you would change or add to the services you currently receive
from Usha? If so, please describe.
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Has participating in Usha influenced the way you make decisions about spending
and saving? If so, how?
Has participation in Usha programs impacted your access to social programs,
sources of identification, or financial institutions?
Community Options
What saving options other than Usha, if any, are currently available to you?
Please describe these options.
Do you currently participate in any of these programs? If so, please describe your
experience with these programs.
What loan options other than Usha, if any, are currently available to you? Please
describe these options.
Do you currently participate in any of these programs? If so, please describe your
experience with these programs.
Participation in Decision Making
Have you ever given feedback to Usha regarding their services, programs,
business investments, etc? If so, please describe this experience. What
feedback did you give?
If not, if you were interested in giving a suggestion or voicing a concern about
Usha, how would you go about it?
Financial Support
Who, if anyone, gives you financial advice?
What kinds of advice do they give you?
Usha Culture
Usha is only for members of the sex work community. Is it important to you that
Usha is an organization specifically for sex workers? Why or why not?
Do you think Usha should be opened up to non sex-workers? Why or why not?
Usha is currently only open to women. Do you think Usha should be opened up to
transgender members of the community? Why or why not?
What about men? Why or why not?
Durbar Involvement
Are you a Durbar member? Describe your involvement with Durbar.
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Are you aware of Usha's business projects and/or social programs for sex workers
and their kids? Please tell me what you know about these programs.
Demographics
Age, Children, Field, Occupation (if not stated in interview)
Is there anything that you would like to tell me about your experience with Usha
or your finances in general that I haven't asked about?
Thank you for your participation in this interview. I greatly appreciate the time you took
to speak with me. Do you have any additional questions for me about the project or your
participation.
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APPENDIX D
Data Source

Description

Recruitment Data

Durbar
Orientation
Week of
5/16/14

Presentations
during the
DMSC
orientation.
Gave
overview each
DMSC
branch. Each
branch
presented and
fielded
questions.

Presentation
was
organized by
DMSC

Member
Interview
Summer of
2013
Summer of
2014.

Interviews
with present
and past Usha
members.

Usha Staff
and
Leadership
Summer 2013
and Summer
2014

Interviews as
well as
questions
during
participant
observation
with the Bank
Manager,

Notes from five
days of
presentations and
Q&A on the
DMSC including
Usha, the SRB,
Anandam, Amra
Padatik, the
Positive Women’s
Network, the Babu
Collective, Disha,
the Durbar
Research Center,
as well as
presentations/
observation at the
health clinics and
in the red light
district.
Interview 1- 60 semi structured
50 recruited
interviews.
through Usha Interviews
staff.
averaged about 20
Interviews
min. Some
51-60 were
recorded and
recruited via transcribed. Others
availability
recorded using
sample at the notes. All
bank teller
conducted using
window.
translation.

Usha staff
made
themselves
available for
questions as
they arose
during the
day in the
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Topics of
Inquiry
Addressed
The relationship
between Usha and
Durbar

Credit
alternatives,
Community
financial advising
and loan
approval,
Member service
experience,
Perceptions of
exclusionary
practices at Usha,
Usha and Durbar
relationship
7 in-depth
Credit
interviews with
alternatives, loan
various pairings of approval,
these 4 people.
Member service
Additional
experience,
questions/discussio Perceptions of
ns as they arose
exclusionary
during participant
practices at Usha,

Assistant
Bank
Manager,
President and
Secretary of
Usha

Board
Meeting and
Focus
Groups
6/6/2013
7/2/2013
7/9/2014

Attended bimonthly
board
meetings and
conducted
focus groups
with the Usha
Board of
Directors.

Daily
Collector
Focus
Groups,
Observation
Focus Group:
6/6/2013
Shadow
Interviews:
7/26/2013
7/05/2013
6/25/2013
5/28/2013

Paid Usha
staff who go
into the field
six days a
week to
collect
deposits and
disburse
receipts.

office.
Interviews
were
scheduled
directly with
Usha staff.

observation. Some
recorded and
transcribed. Others
recorded using
notes. Protocol
developed through
iterative
collection/analysis
process. Interviews
ranged from 35-90
minutes.
Arranged
Observed 2 board
through
meetings with
Secretary and focus groups
President of
afterward during
Usha
which I took
detailed notes (90120 min). The
third focus group
(90 min) with
board members
was recorded and
transcribed (for a
total of two
meetings and three
focus groups).

Introduced
through Usha
leadership,
built rapport
with DCs,
was invited
to shadow.
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4 shadowing
sessions with daily
collectors in the
field in which I
followed DCs on
their daily rounds
and asked
questions about
interactions in the
field. One focus
group with the
Sonagachi DC
staff (56 min),

Usha businesses,
Investment of
income,
Management of
Usha and Durbar
funds,
Organizational
decision making,
Usha and Durbar
relationship
Credit
alternatives, Loan
approval,
Member service
experience,
Perceptions of
exclusionary
practices at Usha,
Usha businesses,
Investment of
income,
Management of
Usha and Durbar
funds, History of
development of
Usha,
Organizational
decision making,
Usha and Durbar
relationship
Credit
alternatives,
Community
financial advising
and loan
approval,
Member service
experience,
Perceptions of
exclusionary
practices at Usha

Leadership
at the DMSC
6/26/2014
7/3/2014

Key
informants in
leadership
positions at
the DMSC.

Founding
Members
7/02/2014

Sex workers
among the
original 12
who initially
organized and
implemented
Usha.

WBCS
Consultant
7/4/2014

Banking
Consultant
from the state
cooperative
society who
has been
working with
Usha for 8
months.
Individual
active in the
fight for rights
of LGTBQ
sex workers.

LGBTQ
Leader
8/21/2014

recorded and
transcribed.
Participant
observation in the
office.
Connected
2 semi-structured
through Usha in-depth
leadership
interviews (37-51
min). One with a
senior advisor to
DMSC and
another with the
Secretary of
DMSC. Recorded
and transcribed
verbatim.
Recruited
One semithrough the
structured, inPresident and depth focus group
Secretary of with three
Usha.
founding members
(80 min).
Recorded and
transcribed.

Credit
alternatives, Usha
businesses,
Investment of
income,
Management of
Usha and Durbar
funds, History of
of Usha, Usha
and Durbar
relationship
Credit
alternatives, loan
approval, Usha
businesses,
Investment of
income,
Management of
Usha and Durbar
funds, History of
of Usha,
Organizational
decision making,
Usha and Durbar
relationship
Usha income
generating
projects
Investment of
income

Met during
participant
observation.
Offered to be
interviewed.

One in-depth
interview (40
min). Took
detailed notes.

Recruited by
a contact at
the LGBTQ
branch group
at Durbar.

One interview. Not Perceptions of
comfortable with
exclusionary
recording, so
practices at Usha
interviewer took
notes.
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Participant
Observation
in the Usha
Office
Summer
2013/14

Spent time in
the Usha
Office
observing
daily
interactions.

Attended
DMSC
activities and
programs
while in
Kolkata.
Organization Documents
al Documents produced by
Usha
reflecting
different
processes and
program.
Participant
Observation
in DMSC

Administrati
ve Database
Data

Data collected
for
administrative
purposes on
members,
loans, and
accounts

Usha
leadership
granted me
permission to
spend my
days in the
office
observing
daily
interactions
Through
connections
at Usha/
DMSC.

Took notes
throughout the
day, followed up
with key
informants when
clarifying
questions were
necessary.

Provided or
published by
Usha or
affiliated
organizations
.

Website, Yearly
reports, signs in
the Offices, West
Bengal State
Cooperative
Society Rules and
Regs.

Provided by
Usha from its
administrativ
e database

Extracted from
database and
combined to form
a single data set.
Includes
information on
member
demographic info,
accounts, loans.
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Attended several
events and
programs, took
field notes.

Community
financial advising
and loan
approval,
Member service
experience,
Organizational
decision making,
Usha and Durbar
relationship
The relationship
between Usha and
Durbar

Usha businesses.
Investment of
income,
Management of
Usha and Durbar
funds, Usha and
Durbar
relationship
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